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ALLIES WITH THE INFIDEL

The Ottoman and French alliance in the Sixteenth Century

Christine Isom-Verhaaren

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For Bruce, Catharine, Christopher, and Nathaniel

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION, PRONUNCIATION AND NAMES

In this book, Ottoman Turkish words have been transliterated according to modern Turkish orthography for the most part. Words such as sultan, pasha, and vizier are rendered as they commonly appear in English.

Since modern Turkish uses a modified Latin script, I include a list of characters that are different from those in English.

C, c = j as in jump

Ç, ç = ch as in church (Note that this is different from the French usage of ç which produces an "s" sound. In French words ç has its usual French pronunciation.)

Ğ, ğ = soft g. This is usually pronounced as a lengthening of the preceding vowel.

I, ı = unrounded back vowel, as in "bird"

İ, I = as in "bit"

Ö, ö = as in French peu

Ş, ş = sh as in "shoe"

Ü, ü = as in French "tu"

Ottoman names cause great difficulty. The order of elements in names is fluid. The spelling is variable. I have identified individuals as their names most commonly appear in English language publications.



Map: The Mediterranean in the Sixteenth Century

INTRODUCTION: WEBS OF DIPLOMACY AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL IMAGES

I believe that I have clearly shown and confirmed by reasonable and accurate arguments two main points: first, that the king [François I] has accepted the forces that were sent to him by the Ottoman Sultan [Süleyman] without harm to his title and honor of 'Most Christian;' second, that this aid was more helpful than harmful to Christendom. And I will add a third ... : which is that the king did this not because of an ambition to dominate, not to avenge injuries he has received ... not to justly recover that which has been usurped from him, but merely he has retained this succor for defense. I mean, Illustrious Lords [of Venice], to defend his kingdom, which the Emperor [Charles V] always has tried to ruin by means of violent overtures, ... with treason, against all reason and justice.

Jean de Monluc's speech to the Venetians in 1544 as reported by his brother Blaise de Monluc in his *Commentaires*.[1]

When passion reigns, respect for the divine and the human is lost; the passion that took hold of Francisco [François I] was so powerful that, even though he was a celebrated Christian prince, he sought the friendship of the Turk. He took up arms and brought them to bear against innocent Christians in order to avenge himself against his enemy [Charles V].

> Notorious are the deeds that were done, for the costs were very dear, for he gave more to the Turks because of his stubbornness, than the worth of Milan, and even Naples. He joined with Barbarossa, a powerful pirate captain and enemy of the Christians, with a fleet and men loyal to the Great Turk [Süleyman], and gave him protection and welcomed him into his kingdom. And when he [François I] finally wanted to cast him out, he could not; he found himself so poor, dishonored, and cursed that the sorrowful Christian captives themselves had to do it. And then that same Turk, Barbarossa, stayed in the harbor, cutlass in hand, and mocked him.
>
> Prudencio de Sandoval recounting events of 1543 in 'Barbarossa comes to France with the Turkish fleet' in his *Historia del Emperador Carlos V, Rey de España*.[2]

The Ottoman sultan, Süleyman known to his western European contemporaries as the Magnificent, formed an alliance with François I of France against Charles V, king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor. Charles V and his supporters condemned François I's diplomacy as exceeding the limits of accepted diplomatic practice by which a ruler could seek to find support against his enemies, by forming an alliance with a ruler who practiced a different religion. The Habsburg Charles V's view of the alliance has dominated the western historiography of the ensuing events. At the time, however, the alliance generated a much wider spectrum of views regarding its appropriateness, but this diversity has disappeared from the historical record. This book offers an alternative view of relations between the Christian West and the Islamic East as it analyzes contemporary French and Ottoman participants' and chroniclers' perceptions of an alliance between Muslim Ottomans and Christian French in the sixteenth century. Moving beyond describing these perceptions, it proposes answers to why few of these views were incorporated into the western historiographical tradition, despite the existence of abundant sources produced by Ottoman and French participants. An understanding of the process by which certain views of an event become dominant is a critical element in writing and evaluating history. Thus, discovering the contemporary Ottoman and French

perception of their alliance, with the aim of tracing its impact on the historiographical record, has wider implications than describing one famous alliance in its sixteenth-century context. The Habsburgs and their supporters projected a view of alliances with 'infidels' that has dominated western historiography to the exclusion of both the Ottoman and the French perspectives. An example of the pervasiveness of the view of events originating in Habsburg sources is found in a biography of François I. The following quotation reflects the view found in sixteenth-century Habsburg sources, but not that found in sixteenth-century French ones.

> The sight of Christians fighting Christians with the help of Infidels was shocking enough to many people at the time, but there was worse to come.... Toulon consequently became a Turkish colony for eight months,... The transformation of a Christian town into a Moslem one, complete with mosque and slave market, did not fail to amaze those who witnessed it.
>
> He [François] also began to find the Turkish presence on French soil embarrassing, since it earned him universal opprobrium and many complaints from his Provencal subjects.[3]

Far from being embarrassing or destructive, the Ottoman presence in Provence was viewed as useful by both French and Ottomans; a view that was countered by Habsburg propaganda and that is still ignored by historians who accept this propaganda as an accurate portrayal of these events. This book redresses this imbalance by reconstructing the history of the alliance with its fifteenth-century background as well as by discussing its historiographical implications.

Historians who have analyzed historiography are as diverse in terms of subject and period as J. R. Walsh in the twentieth century reviewing Ottoman-Safavid relations of the sixteenth century and Henri Voisin de la Popelinière in the sixteenth century discussing ancient Greek and Roman historians, but they share an understanding of the bias that afflicts historians when writing about an earlier period. Awareness of the issue does not prevent historians from experiencing the influence of their own time when they write about past events. This becomes

evident in the following brief overview of the historiography of the Ottoman-French alliance.[4]

The Ottoman-French alliance in the sixteenth century, in which a Christian king allied with a Muslim sultan against another Christian ruler, has been regarded as a sensational aberration from the norms of Renaissance Diplomacy. It is argued here that this perception is both Eurocentric and anachronistic, as it projects a nineteenth- or twentieth-century worldview onto the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This alliance was neither an aberration, nor regarded as sensational in the sixteenth century by those who dealt in political realities rather than crusade rhetoric. The Ottomans were not outsiders but an integral part of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European Mediterranean world, despite their distinct political and cultural system. The Ottomans and the French viewed their allies from multiple perspectives, not solely as adherents of different religions, and their religious differences did not prevent them from pursuing joint military action against their mutual enemies.

The Ottomans and their contemporaries in Europe were joined through a 'pattern of alliances' that evolved from informal, ad hoc relations formed as mandated by events in the fifteenth century to a formal alliance between two powerful rulers of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman sultan Süleyman and François I of France.[5] In the fifteenth century diplomatic initiatives were sporadic and frequently unreciprocated depending on the individual ruler and his priorities at the time. In the sixteenth century, Süleyman and François entered into a formal alliance. Although François wavered in his commitment to the agreement, he never abandoned it since he realized that his only effective means of combating the power of his rival Christian ruler, Charles V, was to request Ottoman assistance. From this somewhat tenuous beginning, whose roots lay both in French diplomacy with the Ottomans as well as in the diplomacy of Italian states of the fifteenth century with them, emerged the Ottoman-French alliance that endured through the seventeenth century and still continued with minor modifications into the eighteenth century. Despite these extensive earlier roots and the continual renewal of the alliance in later centuries, the alliance and the events in the sixteenth century

associated with it continue to be viewed as an aberration from normal diplomatic patterns.

Historiography, which is influenced by its time, in its turn has an impact on future historical writings. The bias that a given time and place imprints on the historical literature produced in that milieu is often accepted uncritically by later scholars because it has become part of the historiographical tradition. In Europe and America, the study of the Middle East became an academic discipline during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a time of western imperial domination of the region. Therefore, the works that form the foundations of Middle Eastern studies reflect this imperialist heritage.[6] Although at present some of these past assumptions appear obviously outdated, recent events such as September 11, 2001, and US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided impetus to popular views of a 'clash of civilizations' as formulated most famously in the writings of Samuel P. Huntington. While scholars who specialize in the history of the Middle East are reexamining earlier assumptions, it is difficult to change a pervasive and entrenched tradition. Often scholars of neighboring regions who wish to examine the role of the Middle East in the history of their own areas of specialization continue to use the older historical literature uncritically. For example, a book on the 'idea of Europe' incorporates views of the Ottoman Empire found in an earlier study on the Ottomans that most specialists in the field today would consider obsolete.[7]

This book on the Ottoman-French alliance of the sixteenth century differs from most studies of this episode in that it examines contemporary Ottoman and French sources, whose perspectives have been ignored. The neglect, even by French historians, of contemporary French sources in preference to the Habsburg perspective is connected to the weakening of Ottoman power, when, by the nineteenth century, it became difficult to acknowledge that the French had ever sought Ottoman aid in their struggle for power in Europe with their Habsburg rivals. In addition, historical writing in France during the seventeenth century was dominated by historians who favored polished prose over historical research, and it was not until the nineteenth century that the two traditions were combined in French historiography.

Portraying the Past: The Methodological Issues

The past becomes more difficult to portray accurately as it becomes increasingly different from the present, and various historical trends obscure our understanding of it. This book investigates some fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conjunctures, which differ markedly from those of the twentieth-first century. The methodological problem is how to discover and interpret sixteenth-century views of 'the other.'[8] Historians have employed various methods for recovering the voices of individuals from the past and interpreting them in their own context.

Many historians have explored the many ways in which the present can misunderstand the past. While scholars such as Norbert Elias, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel have produced works that point out the dangers of assuming that past practices and beliefs were the same as those at present, John Francis Guilmartin in his study of Mediterranean warfare in the sixteenth century approaches the subject of this book more closely when he discusses anachronistic tendencies that prevent an understanding of a period in its own terms:[9]

> the traditional historiography of armed conflict at sea has been based upon a number of implicit assumptions which do not apply to the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. Almost without realizing it, modern historians of maritime affairs have used as their analytical framework the series of relationships which existed in the eighteenth century between maritime trade, naval forces, and the nations supporting them.[10]

Traditional historiography has also assumed an anachronistic state of relations between the sixteenth-century states that engaged in diplomacy.

European views of the Islamic 'other' have varied over both time and place. Many studies of the impact of Orientalism on historiography, such as Edward Said's *Orientalism*, emphasize the nineteenth and twentieth centuries neglecting the important transitional Early Modern period. Writings from this period about Muslims and Islamic

lands were less dominated than the writings of the medieval or modern periods by either medieval polemic against Islam or modern imperialism and colonialism. This study examines a crucial period in the history of relations between western Europeans and inhabitants of the Middle East that has been neglected.[11]

Finally, some scholars have demonstrated that not only do views vary in relation to time and place, but also that at the same time and in the same place they may differ depending on the identity and social position of the individuals expressing them. Carlo Ginzburg demonstrates that the views of the lower classes are often unlike those of the contemporary elite and that historical events could influence the various layers of society differently.[12] R. W. Southern's *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* illustrates the danger of relying on the views of one group, who had a perspective particular to their role in society, to judge the opinions of an entire civilization concerning another one. The 'Western Views' discussed by Southern are solely those of churchmen, ignoring those of merchants and travelers whose first hand experiences often produced different perspectives on Islamic lands. Moreover, Southern's study only considered the genre of polemic, ignoring other religious writings such as the pilgrimage itinerary or commentaries on the Qu'ran.[13]

Analyzing contemporary Ottoman and French sources demonstrates that sixteenth-century individuals held views different from those of twenty-first century individuals, but more importantly, this analysis reveals that the widely differing views held during the sixteenth century have been unevenly incorporated into the modern western historical literature. Understanding how events were perceived by various people in the past necessitates recovering the views of individuals whose perspectives do not reflect the dominant tradition today and then considering them in the context of the sixteenth century. While it is impossible to ever know what views were held by *everyone* (evidence is generally available only for those who were literate), a range of opinions concerning allying with non-fellow believers is accessible. These views were not static but altered over time in relation to circumstances, demonstrating the complexity of the process of the formation of views of 'others.'[14]

Views of the Ottomans and Ottoman Views

The most common image of the Ottomans in the early modern period, as presented in modern historical studies written by western scholars, is one of fearsome adversaries whose presence in Europe was terrifying, but whose impact aside from terror was marginal.[15] This image is frequently encountered in western historical literature. Moreover some historians claim that this was the 'common feeling of Europe.'[16] Other modern historians have described another image of the Ottomans current in the early modern period, but their work has had little impact on the historiographical tradition. Clarence Dana Rouillard in *The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (1520–1660)* evaluates the views of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French travel writers.

> The constant admiration in travel writings, not only of Turkish civil and military discipline but of fine moral qualities underlying it, could not fail to lead intelligent readers to some readjustment of values, especially when such admiration frequently evolved into sharp criticism of French or Christian institutions or practices. Even that last bulwark of complacency, the superiority of the Christian over the Infidel, was shaken by revelations of a superior zeal in prayer, reverence, fasting, and charity among the Turks.

Rouillard found that the views of these travelers generally had little impact on popular traditions of the 'Cruel Turk' and the 'Amorous Turk' in seventeenth-century French fiction, but in contrast they had a major impact on sixteenth-century authors of political theory such as Bodin and Montaigne. Rouillard's study also has had minimal impact on Ottoman historiography. His comment, 'We must not underestimate the tremendous force of inertia in the long-standing tradition that the Turks were evil and ignorant Barbarians and Infidels, ... ' still applies.[17] This study presents additional evidence that there was no 'universal' view in Europe of the Ottomans as an alien, terrible enemy, by showing a contrasting view of the Ottomans,

as they appear in contemporary French sources, that of a fascinating ally.

More crucially, contemporary Ottoman views of the French, which have hardly been surveyed yet, need examination more urgently to recover a larger range of views of the Ottoman-French alliance and then to understand the development of its historiography. Consequently, this book relies on contemporary Ottoman sources to reveal how Ottomans viewed the French, and their alliance with them. Once again, the opinion commonly accepted by modern western historians is that only one attitude existed, namely that the Ottomans perceived all Europeans as 'despised infidels,'[18] but this book argues that the Ottomans did not dismiss all Europeans as barbarian infidels. Ottoman opinions concerning a particular people, for example the Spanish subjects of Charles V, varied depending on the history of that groups' relations with Muslims, the current diplomatic relations with the Ottomans, and the extent and nature of contact between them and the Empire. By examining both French views of the Ottomans and Ottoman views of the French, this book shows that on both sides the image of 'the other' during this period was not based solely on religion.

The Ottoman-French encounter in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries culminated in an alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France, which was a crucial part of both Ottoman and French foreign policy against their mutual enemy, the Habsburgs. On the level of Ottoman and French diplomatic history, this study describes aspects of the alliance in detail and demonstrates the alliance's importance for Ottoman and French foreign relations. Moreover, it shows that the Ottomans were accepted as diplomatic partners by the French and others, including the pope, as the need arose during the sixteenth century. Finally, this book explores how both the Ottomans and the French understood their own alliances with infidels.

The Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest powers of the sixteenth century, having a considerable impact on the emerging states of western Europe and influencing the unfolding of sixteenth-century European history. This is rarely reflected in the western historical literature on early modern Europe, where the Ottoman Empire is included as a marginal factor, if it is discussed at all.[19] In contrast,

contemporary sources confirm that Ottoman power and interests were closely intertwined with the wars in Italy and the Valois-Habsburg rivalry.

The rivalry of the Ottoman, the Habsburg, and the Valois dynasties in Italy involved two related concepts, balance of power and universal monarchy. As Italy became the battleground and the prize for which the great powers of the time fought, any state that was threatened would turn to a greater power for protection. This policy led to the French invasion of Italy in 1494, which began the era of the Italian wars. When in the early sixteenth century Charles, the Habsburg heir, became the ruler of Castile, Aragon, Burgundy, Austria, and the Holy Roman Empire, with possessions in Italy and the Americas, he was accused by the kings of France of wanting to usurp the monarchy of Christendom.[20] His chief rival in the west, François I, employed the usual policy of enlisting a more powerful ally when he sent an envoy to the Ottoman sultan. The threat of one power growing too great led to alliances between other states, in order to balance the threatening power or if possible to overcome it in any ensuing struggle. This is the political and diplomatic context for the views that will be analyzed. While this context is not the principal subject of this study, understanding the context, that the alliance conformed to diplomatic trends in Italy that had become standard practice, strengthens the argument supported by the evidence produced by sixteenth-century observers.

Analyzing western views of 'the other' during this period reveals that this was a transitional period between the religious polemic of the Middle Ages and the condescension of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the Ottoman Empire was described as 'a pawn on the European chess-board.'[21] This era is distinct from both the preceding and the following periods, although it contains elements of each. Portraying the relationships that then existed between Christian states in Europe and the Ottoman Empire as solely those of conflict is overly simplistic; in reality there were many inter-European conflicts during which confrontations were between Christian states that were allied with the Ottomans. Alliances were fluid and changing; one year's ally was often the next year's enemy. Anti-Ottoman rhetoric should

not be confused with the pragmatism of diplomacy in the sixteenth century. In addition, many contemporary European portrayals of the Ottomans were positive. Scholars who claim that the political confrontation between predominantly Muslim and Christian powers during this period was central to the formation of a European identity[22] do not incorporate this more complex picture. Nevertheless, this view of the construction of a European identity has shaped the discourse about 'the other' evident in the works of western historians.[23]

Modern western historiography includes several works on historical relations between Muslims and Christians. Norman Daniel in *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* studied Christian views of Islam in the period 1100–1350, confining his subject to religion and polemical religious texts. He claims that western Christians preferred an inaccurate image of Islam in this period, although they could have obtained a more accurate one, and then explores why this inaccurate image was created and preserved. When Daniel briefly discusses the image of Islam in the early modern period, he states: 'Travelers always seem to show independent judgment most when they are speaking of actual encounters, and least when they discuss theory, dogma, or the life of Muhammad. They easily confused what they saw, what they were told, and what they had long ago read in books.' He emphasizes the persistence of long standing traditions despite evidence to the contrary.[24] A similar trend exists in modern western historiography on the Ottoman-French alliance, as Ottoman and French sources have been neglected in writing on this subject, resulting in an account that forgets their perspective. This book investigates why this biased view of the alliance has become standard.

R. W. Southern in *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* examines the views of theologians who were struggling with 'the existence of Islam [which] was the most far-reaching problem in medieval Christendom.' Southern emphasizes the differences between 'Western Christendom and Islam' claiming that 'they were societies extraordinarily unlike from almost every point of view.' While reviewing western Christian theologians' misconceptions of Islam in the medieval period, he also depicts relations between Muslims and Christians as one of a menacing Islam threatening western Europe.[25]

Southern analyzed the views of four fifteenth-century bishops, including Jean Germain, who he claims 'was only interested in Christendom and in attempting to rally it to a sense of its own identity: above all, he hated those Christians—merchants and others, in increasing numbers—who traveled in Islam and came back with scruples and criticisms of the Christian faith.' Although his sample is limited to the opinions of four bishops, Southern implies that their views were representative of all people living in western Europe throughout the Middle Ages. Southern concludes by claiming that the views of these four bishops concerning Islam from 1450 to 1460 were 'larger, clearer, and more lifelike than at any previous moment, or any later one for several centuries at least.'[26] Southern did not include in this work the views of merchants and other travelers who visited the Levant for reasons that had little or nothing to do with religion. They produced an extensive and rich literature about the region that in the sixteenth century often showed an interest in, appreciation for, and admiration of the lands ruled by Muslims, which they knew as eyewitnesses.

Bernard Lewis's *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* is a contrast to most works on relations between Muslims and Christians because it explores the 'discovery' of Europe by Muslims, that is, the growth of Muslim knowledge of the west. In contrast to Daniel and Southern, Lewis does not limit his study temporally or geographically, but includes information concerning Muslims from the seventh to the nineteenth century from India to North Africa. Lewis emphasizes the adversarial nature of relations between Muslims and Christians: 'dealing with familiar events from an unfamiliar angle—that of the adversary.' Lewis describes relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe in adversarial terms, as the advance of the Ottoman Empire 'seemed to pose a mortal threat to Christendom.' He describes Ottoman views of Europe similarly: 'For the advancing Ottomans, Frankish Europe was no longer the remote and mysterious wilderness that it had been for the Arabs and Persians of medieval times. It was their immediate neighbor and rival, replacing the defunct Byzantine Empire as the emblem of Christendom, the millennial and archetypal adversary of the House of Islam.'[27] This emphasis on adversarial relations between the Ottomans and western Christians ignores Ottoman alliances with

many Italian states as well as France during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In chapter 1, these alliances are described, providing evidence for both the quantity of alliances that the Ottomans formed with 'Frankish Europe' and the wide variety of rulers and states that sought alliances with them.

It is also inaccurate to view the medieval period as one in which Muslims and Christians viewed each other solely as religious enemies. Diplomatic relations were common between Muslims and Christians during the crusades in Medieval Spain and fourteenth-century Anatolia.[28] The French remembered these earlier alliances and used them to support their arguments in favor of their decision to ally with the Ottomans in the sixteenth century.

Contemporary Sources: Ottoman Eyewitnesses

Eyewitness reports of Ottomans and Frenchmen about their alliance provide the basis for formulating an alternative view of both the alliance and the views of 'the other' included in the accounts. Additional evidence representing other viewpoints is valuable, but for the purposes of eliciting Ottoman and French views, eyewitnesses, both French and Ottoman, are of primary importance. Chapter 5 provides an in depth analysis of the sources of these views, but a brief discussion here identifies those sources that are crucial in preserving evidence of these views.

Uncertain attempts at diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and the French began in the fifteenth century when in the 1480s the Knights of Rhodes held an Ottoman prince, Cem Sultan, captive in France until papal diplomacy led to his transfer to Rome. An eyewitness account by one of Cem's companions in captivity, the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, presents the Ottoman view of Cem's experiences. This episode exemplifies many aspects of Italian diplomacy with and concerning the Ottomans, as well as showing how Italian practices spread to other areas of Europe, notably France.

Approximately fifty years later, the French king, François I, requested Ottoman military aid against the Habsburgs. The Ottoman sultan sent his fleet in 1543 to assist the French as they attacked the

Habsburgs. Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, led the expedition with the French ambassador, the Baron de la Garde, informing Hayreddin of French objectives for the campaign. The Ottoman fleet agreed to spend the winter in the French port of Toulon because the French also hoped to use the fleet in campaigns in 1544. Ottoman views of this expedition are found in two narrative accounts that include the perspectives of eyewitnesses. One of these, a section of the *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, is attributed to Muradi (a companion of Hayreddin Pasha on many of his campaigns) and focuses on the exploits of Hayreddin Barbarossa in 1543–44.[29] Another account of this naval expedition, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş Estergon ve İstunibelgrad*,[30] was written and illustrated by Nasuh Matrakçı, a probable participant in the sea campaign. The manuscript's paintings of Toulon, Marseilles, Nice, and Genoa accurately represent these cities as they appeared in 1543. These two accounts are essential for exploring the Ottoman view of the events of 1543–44.

These two episodes, when Ottomans and Frenchmen encountered each other directly in France, produced these unusual examples of Ottoman views of the French that reflect Ottoman experiences in French territory. Not only were relatively large numbers of Ottomans present on French soil, interacting with Frenchmen in a variety of situations for fairly extended periods of time, but Ottoman authors, who were either directly involved or who could interview those who were, wrote about this interaction in ways that indicate that they appreciated how unusual these circumstances were. They wished to explore various aspects of this encounter and then articulate their own perceptions of it. These sources express how Ottomans, with personal experience in encountering the French, viewed their western Christian 'other' in relation to specific events. Their views modify the perspective created by studying this interaction solely from the viewpoint of western sources, which do not consider Ottoman aims or constraints in their alliances with their western neighbors. The difficulty of using Ottoman sources written in Ottoman Turkish, which few western historians were able to read, few of which were published or even well cataloged, may partially explain why these sources have not been used extensively. Since the same difficulties did not apply to French sources,

other considerations limited their use in studying the alliance, and these factors may also have impacted the neglect of Ottoman sources.

French Sources: How Views become History

The factors that determined why French sources had minimal impact on the western historiographical tradition have little to do with the difficulties of language, location, or access, rather they concern questions of choice: why were these sources and the views they represent deliberately ignored? And when did this trend begin? The western historiographical tradition's exclusion of contemporary French views of the alliance follows long-standing historiographical trends of emphasizing adversarial relations while minimizing cordial ones between the Ottoman Empire and the countries of western Europe. Recent works on European identity, which posit its creation in relation to an eastern 'other,' do not present the complexity of views of the Ottomans in the sixteenth century but only the adversarial ones, which became part of the dominant view. By the sixteenth century, the construction of an eastern 'other' was well developed as it had begun with the ancient Greeks. The advent of Christianity and Islam altered some issues, but the concept of a fundamental division between east and west flourished.[31] An entrenched tradition is difficult to replace, especially one that has existed in various guises for over a thousand years. Moreover, trends since the sixteenth century have established this historiographical perspective more firmly than ever. In addition, the development of the genre of History in France, with varying opinions on how historians should use sources, impacted the study of the alliance.

The western historiographical tradition on the Ottoman-French alliance includes the following types of sources. First in importance are the French primary sources, written by those closely involved with the events at the time. Second, are contemporary accounts written by French authors who were not themselves directly connected to these events. Third, are contemporary accounts written by authors opposed to the French, who supported the Habsburg position, for example the Italian Paolo Giovio. Fourth, are French authors who wrote about the alliance during the following centuries, such as the historian Jules

Michelet in the nineteenth century. Each category of source requires separate evaluation to understand whose views are represented as well as the source's impact on the subsequent historiography on the alliance.

The first category, French primary sources, includes both documents and narratives. Charrière and Ribier collected French documents concerning French diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century.[32] For the Toulon episode, documents produced in that city during the winter of 1543–44 were collected and translated into French by M. Henry.[33] The records collected for the court case of the Baron de la Garde, found in the Bibliothèque Nationale, provide additional evidence for the French position during the sojourn of the Ottoman fleet at Toulon.[34]

French historical narratives of this period are also informative for exploring French views. Philippe de Commynes, who was a counselor of Louis XI and active in French diplomacy when Cem was in France, wrote his memoirs between 1489 and 1498.[35] During the sixteenth century, several individuals recorded their experiences as participants in the events of the Ottoman-French alliance. The *Memoires de Martin et Guillaume du Bellay* by the du Bellay brothers covers the period from 1513 until 1547.[36] Blaise de Monluc, a famous French soldier, first wrote his *Commentaires* in 1571, and they cover the period from 1520–1576.[37] The *Memoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux, Sire de Vieilleville*, a marshal of France, were written after 1571 by his secretary of 36 years, Vincent Carloix, and cover the period from 1528 to 1552.[38] Jérome Maurand wrote an account of his voyage with the Baron de La Garde in 1544, when he returned with the Ottoman fleet to Istanbul. This provides a French view of the return journey, which may be compared with the Ottoman account of this voyage found in the *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*.[39]

During the sixteenth century, one other major category of French primary sources was produced as a result of the Ottoman-French alliance: the travelers' reports written by the men who accompanied French ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire from 1536 until 1573. Guillaume Postel traveled to the Ottoman Empire with the embassy of Jean de la Forest in 1536 and with that of Gabriel d'Aramon in 1549–50. Pierre

Gilles, Pierre Belon, Jean Chesneau, Andre Thevet, and Nicolas de Nicolay were all associated with the embassies of d'Aramon from 1547 to 1553. Philippe du Fresne-Canaye accompanied Ambassador François de Noailles to the Ottoman Empire in 1573. These reports provide a variety of views of the alliance over time, from the 1530s to the 1570s. Since most of the authors were notable scholars from a variety of fields, they provide an important addition to the perspective of the policy makers who were adherents of the rulers.

The second category, contemporary accounts written by French authors not directly involved in the events, is illustrated by the works of Pierre de Brantome (1539?–1614). In the 1580s he wrote brief biographies of prominent Frenchmen and foreigners, many of whom had been active in the encounters between the Ottomans and the French.[40] He talked to many of the French participants, but he also made use of published works by foreign historians, such as Giovio. His biographies show an unresolved mix of viewpoints, as some individuals favored while some opposed the French foreign policy of military alliances with the Ottomans.

The third category, accounts written by contemporary foreign authors who opposed the French policy of allying with the Ottomans, is best represented by Paolo Giovio (1483–1553), a native of Como, which belonged to the duchy of Milan. French translations of Giovio's most important work, *Sui Temporis Historiae Libri*, began to appear in 1552.[41] In 1581 his *Commentarii delle cose di Turchi* was published in a French translation in Paris.[42] Giovio's works are often used by authors writing about the Ottoman fleet's sojourn at Toulon. When Giovio's account of the joint Ottoman-French naval expedition of 1543–44 contradicts contemporary French and Ottoman eyewitness accounts, it seems reasonable to conclude that Giovio's account is inaccurate. Moreover, this book will focus on discovering Ottoman and French views of the episode, as distinct from those writers who reflect the interests of their mutual enemies, the Habsburgs, so Giovio's account is of limited value as he relied on reports created by the opponents of the Ottomans and the French. When Giovio claimed that while the Ottoman fleet was in Toulon 'they complained in Provence that the Turks pillaged the earth, even seizing and putting in chains the

men of the country,'[43] the inaccuracy of the account is certain because it contradicts documents written by the inhabitants of Provence who were eyewitnesses to the Ottomans' actions.[44]

The fourth category, accounts written by French historians of the nineteenth century, is best illustrated by a history by Jules Michelet, a famous and influential nineteenth-century French historian. In his multi-volume history of France, he briefly mentions the events of 1543–44:

> Catholic France ... followed the flag of Islam, the flag of pirates and of slave merchants. The young Duke d'Enghien, united to Barbarossa, besieged Nice. In vain. The Algerians compensated by pillaging and abduction. Placed by us in Toulon, even in Provence they made their harvest of girls and their provision of galley slaves. The following year, again a great ravage; six thousand slaves abducted in Tuscany, eight thousand in the kingdom of Naples, especially a choice of two hundred virgins taken from the convents of Italy for the sultan.[45]

His account has more in common with Giovio's than with those of sixteenth-century French eyewitnesses, whose reports were nearly all published by the time he wrote this portion of his *Histoire de France*. But Michelet wrote history that reflects nineteenth-century French ambitions when he anachronistically identified Ottoman forces as 'Algerians' and 'pirates.'

Answering the question: why have contemporary French sources been mostly disregarded in modern historiography, requires exploring at least two issues. Part of the answer lies in the changing nature of international relations from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first. The other aspect concerns the changing nature of how the French wrote history from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. In France, the 'birth of history' occurred in the sixteenth century when a dual tradition developed separating history as a literary genre from historical research. One group of individuals favored writing historical narratives without quoting original documents or referring to sources. In contrast, the antiquarians or *érudits*, who were specialists in old things,

usually Greek or Roman, were interested in historical accuracy. In the early sixteenth century, the great French humanist Guillaume Bude represented the *érudit* tradition, while Nicole Gilles and Paolo Emilio represented the literary tradition.[46]

Many historians of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century were jurists who used skills acquired in their legal scholarship to revolutionize the writing of history in France for they valued the use of primary sources and eyewitnesses over legend. The political climate of the sixteenth century led many of them to research French origins, while others wrote about contemporary events. Writing contemporary history involved risk; Jacques-Auguste de Thou's *Histoire sui Temporis* was placed on the Index in 1609 because his view of events was considered controversial. De Thou's work described the joint Ottoman-French naval attacks in 1553 with no expressions of surprise or concern that the French with Ottoman support fought other Christians. 'The French fleet was joined to that of the Turks, in the Gulf of Lepanto, at the beginning of June, ... the largest number, under the command of Dragut, and the Baron de la Garde, attacked the island of Elba.'[47] Since de Thou was influential both as a president of the Parlement of Paris and as a historian, the suppression of his history indicates that early seventeenth-century political and religious authorities considered views of the past to have immediate relevance for their own policies.

The prominence of *érudit* history declined in the seventeenth century as Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV favored non-*érudit* authors who wrote polished prose that appealed to a wide reading public over the legalistic and learned writers who had dominated historical writing in the late sixteenth century.[48] They created the office of Royal Historiographer, whose duties were to record events during the reign of the monarch. Among many authors who depended on royal patronage, François Eudes de Mezerai wrote a massive *Histoire de France*, which was published with illustrations in three volumes between 1643 and 1651. Mezerai also undertook to prepare an illustrated *Histoire génerale des Turcs*. The two volume history, in planning from 1642 but not produced until 1662, includes previously published works by other authors concerning the Turks. Mezerai's own addition of about 200 pages largely concerns diplomatic relations between

the Ottomans and the French. For example, Merzerai elaborates for more than a page on why the French had allied with the Ottomans in 1625. He accuses the Habsburgs of envying the relationship between France and the Ottomans. 'The Spanish, perpetual enemies of this state [France] ... complain ... that this alliance is contrary to the law of God. ... The French reply ... by the example of the same scripture and by the example of *diverse histories* (emphasis mine) that this alliance is not only permissible, but also honorable and necessary.' Mezerai describes numerous instances when French ambassadors acted to the benefit of Christendom in general.[49] This conforms to a pattern evident earlier in the seventeenth century, when several publications supported the French diplomatic policy of allying with the Ottomans.[50] Mezerai was not an *érudit* historian; nevertheless, he obtained his information on Ottoman-French diplomacy from the Dupuy brothers, *érudit* relatives of de Thou.[51]

By the eighteenth century French culture had created a taste for 'philosophical history' which disdained antiquarian research erecting a barrier separating the *érudits* from the *philosophes*, whose works were praised and admired. The Comte de St. Priest, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1768–1785, wrote a history of French diplomacy with the empire from the time of François I to Louis XVI. Since he refers to the sources that he consulted, including an Ottoman history, his work can be considered an *érudit* history. His view of the Ottomans reflects the conditions of the eighteenth century, when France was more powerful than the Ottoman Empire. St. Priest claims that the peace of Belgrade (1739) was 'the masterpiece of French policy' because for 30 years it masked the true state of the Ottoman Empire's feebleness from Europe.[52] St. Priest's knowledge of the Ottoman Empire was extensive, but it was the writings of *philosophes*, such as Voltaire that were popular. Voltaire, author of many works in a variety of genres, did not feel compelled to use existing French scholarship on Islamic subjects when he wrote about these topics.[53]

During the nineteenth century, historians in France finally united the antiquarian and literary traditions, while continuing the tradition of using history for political purposes. François Furet states 'History is never innocent; it was less so than ever in nineteenth-century French

culture.'[54] History was expected to legitimize the Orleanist regime; to depict the nation-state, France, as the model for progress; and to support French imperialism in North Africa.

In the following chapters, this book provides numerous examples of history and other writings being employed for political purposes in regards to the Ottoman-French alliance. As relations between France and the Ottoman Empire altered, views of this alliance were modified to align with contemporary circumstances. The context for the views of the alliance needs to be briefly reviewed here and presented in more detail in Chapter 1. In the sixteenth century, French kings needed the Ottoman-French alliance as long as they fought the Habsburgs, so the French primary sources concerning the alliance are generally pragmatic and favorable, accepting and promoting royal foreign policy. When France became consumed by the wars of religion, and less interested in foreign relations, the alliance was not promoted as actively either through the appointment of ambassadors or by writing supporting it.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century when the situation in France had stabilized, Henri IV contemplated attacking the Ottoman Empire, not to promote religious aspirations, but because internal strife in the empire offered an opportunity to conquer its territories. After two years of considering this 'great design' Henri chose to attack the traditional French enemy, the Habsburgs, instead. When his son, Louis XIII, together with his chief minister Cardinal Richelieu, opposed the Habsburgs during the Thirty Years' War, writers were encouraged to support the renewed Ottoman-French alliance. During the long reign of Louis XIV, foreign relations with the Ottomans varied depending upon which territories the king wanted to conquer. In 1685–87, he sent a spy to the Ottoman Empire to gather detailed information for plans to attack Istanbul.[55] Louis XIV never attempted this conquest, but views of the alliance were subject to the current ambitions of the French monarch whether he hoped to win Habsburg or Ottoman territories.

In the eighteenth century the Ottomans needed diplomatic assistance from the French and the apparent weakness of the empire led Napoleon to attempt to conquer Ottoman Egypt in 1798. This brief,

unsuccessful expedition was a harbinger of nineteenth-century imperial expansion as the French occupied Algiers, nominally Ottoman territory, in 1830. As Europe in general, and France in particular, implemented plans to rule the Middle East and North Africa, history favored views of the past that were congruent with the current political situation.

Allying with infidels against Christians offended the religious sensibilities of some Frenchmen in the sixteenth century despite a long precedent for such alliances. Three hundred years later, the disparity between Ottoman and western European power caused sixteenth-century French views of their diplomatic relations to appear shameful and humiliating. The idea of relying on military support from Muslims of the Levant and North Africa was no longer acceptable. When the French began to conquer lands in Muslim North Africa and incorporate them into a colonial empire, the ideological pressure to forget French original sources and prefer their enemy's version of the events of 1543 became imperative. When Jules Michelet described these events in the 1850s, France had begun to create a colonial empire in Algeria, which the local inhabitants tenaciously and violently resisted until 1871. Sixteenth-century French views were obscured by nineteenth-century French imperial ambitions, which increased still further in the twentieth century after the First World War.

Viewing this alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first century necessitates modifying the perspective again. Beverly Southgate proposes that in post modernist history there may be room for different accounts of the past, none with special privilege but each providing illumination from its own perspective.[56] Past historiography has favored privileged views, eclipsing those that are less popular. Generally, both individuals and states have looked to the past, in the guise of history, for its uses in the present, thus adopting the perspectives that best promote current ambitions. A major shift in historiography must occur if multiple views of the past are to replace one view as the accepted historiographical mode. In the interests of promoting this shift, this book approaches the alliance from the Ottoman and French perspectives, exploring their views in order to enrich and diversify the historiographical record.

CHAPTER 1

OTTOMAN INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN ALLIANCES, DIPLOMACY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1453–1600[1]

The Ottomans conquered Constantinople in May 1453, finally eliminating Byzantine possession of the city and reinforcing the sultans' claim to be heirs of Roman imperial rule that stretched back to antiquity. That same year in July, French forces using cannon defeated an English army at the Battle of Castillon, eliminating English holdings in France (except Calais) and bringing to an end the Hundred Years' War. Although these military engagements occurred less than two months apart, a conflict between Ottomans and Byzantines as contrasted with one between French and English, if viewed as events that symbolize the ending of the medieval period in their respective regions, might seem otherwise unconnected. Viewed from another perspective, a different pattern emerges, in which these events form part of a web that included the formation of an Ottoman-French alliance in the sixteenth century.

Both the kings of France and the sultans of the Ottoman Empire were soon deeply involved in a contest for power in Italy. The Ottomans

won a foothold at Otranto in 1480, which was abandoned after the sultan's death in 1481. The French invasion of Italy in 1494 was shortly followed by their exit in 1495, although subsequent French kings invaded Italy several times. Thus the battles of 1453 were not isolated events of European or Middle Eastern history but embedded in historical trends that led up to the Italian wars of the sixteenth century. With the English expelled from France and the Ottomans in control of Constantinople, both the Ottomans and the French could and soon did turn their desire for expansion towards the Italian peninsula, parts of which they claimed they had inherited the right to rule. Italy was attractive both because of its wealth and because its political fragmentation left it vulnerable to conquest by its more powerful neighbors. But control of Italy was ultimately won by the sultan's and the king's rival of the sixteenth century, the Holy Roman Emperor.

While the stage appeared to be set for the Ottomans and the French to become unrelenting opponents until one of them defeated the other and gained control of the Italian peninsula, this course was disrupted by the creation of a Habsburg empire in the early sixteenth century. Charles of Ghent unexpectedly succeeded to all of the territories of his grandparents: Burgundy in 1515; Castile and Aragon in 1516, including the Spanish possessions in the Americas; Austria in 1519; as well as securing the election to the imperial title of Holy Roman Emperor that year.[2] Thus French monarchs beginning with Francois I now faced encirclement in Europe by the Habsburgs. Süleyman, who became sultan in 1520 and immediately resumed Ottoman expansion to the west, now faced a Habsburg threat in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. François I and Süleyman's alliance to counter this novel threat from the Habsburg ruler, Charles V, who also inherited claims to Italian territory, appears as the logical if not the inevitable response to this unexpected shift in relative power.

Thus the historical context needed to understand views of alliances between Ottomans and their contemporaries during the sixteenth century found in contemporary Ottoman and French sources requires connecting analyses of events and historical trends that often have been studied in isolation. This new analysis of events allows alternative patterns to emerge that challenge the assumptions of more traditional

accounts of these relations. In this historical outline of events, I propose to demonstrate that to accurately depict the history of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the histories of the other lands that surround the Mediterranean Sea, events must be analyzed to reveal the connections that drew these areas together rather than assuming that a religious or cultural divide separated them. While much of the historical literature has isolated the history of the Ottoman Empire from that of Latin Christian Europe, this does not reflect the views of sixteenth-century political theorists such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Jean Bodin, who analyzed the Ottoman Empire with other European states that competed for power.[3] The Ottoman Empire's extensive lands in southeastern Europe as well as trade and diplomacy linked the empire continually to the other powers that surrounded the Mediterranean Sea. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, rivalry over control of Italian lands enmeshed the Ottomans as well as the kings of France and the Habsburgs.

The Ottoman Empire played an integral role in European diplomatic relations from the second half of the fifteenth century through the sixteenth century. In the course of the fifteenth century, many Italian states formed alliances with the Ottomans to strengthen their positions against their neighbors in the power struggles in Italy. Their opponents criticized these alliances because Christians were forming alliances with Muslims against other Christians, rather than uniting together to launch crusades against infidels. But crusading rhetoric did not prevent states that were threatened by their Christian opponents from allying with the Ottomans. Rhetoric and reality did not coincide although one is now often mistaken for the other. When in the sixteenth century the French formed an alliance with the Ottomans against the Habsburgs, this was the continuation of diplomatic policies developed during the fifteenth century by the Italian states. Most states whether ruled by Muslims or Christians acted to promote political advantages even if some individuals within, as well as outside, these states opposed these policies on religious grounds. This brief outline of relations between the Ottoman Empire and several states in Europe demonstrates that political ambitions of rulers overrode religious scruples, although religious rhetoric was employed for reasons of policy.

Alliances between the Ottoman Empire and Christian states between 1450 and 1600 coexisted with the flow of crusade rhetoric. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople together with the proximity of Ottoman territory to Italy caused rulers who feared that Ottoman expansion threatened their own territories to demand military action against them. Despite this rhetoric, few European rulers seriously considered crusading against the Ottomans during the second half of the fifteenth century. Diplomacy and trade characterized relations between the Ottomans and these states rather than crusading warfare. Although popes continued to promote crusades, after 1494 they feared a new threat to Christian Europe, the rivalry between France and Spain for control of Italy, far more than an Ottoman conquest of the peninsula. The popes correctly perceived that this rivalry would transform Italy into a battlefield. Beginning in 1494 French kings fought to enforce their dynastic claims in Italy: Charles VIII (1483–98) asserted his claims to Naples and Louis XII (1498–1515) and François I (1515–47) claimed the duchy of Milan. Ultimately the French monarchs lost the lands they claimed and sometimes conquered in Italy to the Habsburgs, but, during their wars, the Valois kings of France formed alliances with the most powerful rulers who might assist them, the Ottoman sultans.

After Mehmed II (1451–1481) conquered Constantinople in 1453, he claimed to be the heir of the Byzantines and through them the Roman Empire with ambitions to universal sovereignty. Mehmed's continuing conquests in the Balkans increased conflicts with his neighbours, leading to changes in crusading rhetoric calling for a defensive war in the Mediterranean. Lionello Chieregato, the papal legate to France in 1488, stated: 'the holy apostolic see has not sent us here to argue the cause of Jerusalem, Asia or Greece, as in the days of your ancestors, but to beseech you on behalf of Italy, the towns, cities and peoples subject to the holy Roman church.'[4] Concern that outside powers would invade Italy, be they the Ottomans or the French or the Habsburgs, caused fear in popes and other Italian political leaders alike.

Mehmed II strengthened Ottoman naval power, thus Ottoman expansion was not limited solely to areas that could be reached by moving armies on land but also threatened territories that could be

more easily attacked by sea. Italian states such as the naval power Venice, although threatened by this expansion, preferred peace with the Ottomans so that commerce could continue without interruption. After conquering Constantinople, the Ottomans soon completed a commercial agreement with Venice, which was significant because only Venice had a permanent representative in Istanbul, their baillo, until 1536 after which the French were customarily represented there. However, Mehmed's expansion in the Balkans, where Venice possessed many territories, inevitably led to conflict. The dilemma for Venice was how to retain her possessions without fighting the Ottomans, since war interrupted trade. After losing a sixteen-year war with the Ottomans, in 1479 the Venetians signed a treaty which required them to surrender territories on the Adriatic coast and pay an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats, but their trading privileges were restored.[5] By defeating Venice, the greatest Christian sea power at the time, the Ottomans demonstrated that they had become a naval threat. When Mehmed attempted two more naval campaigns, his forces were unsuccessful against the Knights at Rhodes but succeeded in capturing Otranto in 1480, bringing to pass the worst fears of the popes, an Ottoman foothold in Italy. Ferrante, king of Naples, asked for, but did not receive, aid from his fellow Italian rulers to eject the Ottomans from Otranto. But Otranto was easily recaptured by papal and Neapolitan forces when Mehmed II died in 1481 because of the succession struggle between his sons, Bayezid and Cem. Cem unwisely fled to Rhodes after his defeat by Bayezid, whereupon the Knights of Rhodes seized the diplomatic opportunity offered to them to threaten the sultan with his brother.

Diplomacy and alliances during the first part of Bayezid's reign (1481–1512), when his brother was a captive in France and Rome, led to increased Ottoman interest in and diplomacy with Christian lands beyond Italy. Until Cem's death in 1495, plans were made to initiate a crusade with Cem at its head, and Bayezid sought diplomatic relations to limit this threat. These negotiations set the precedent for close ties between the Ottomans and states which felt threatened by their neighbors. When the king of France turned to the Ottomans for assistance against the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century, he

was following a well established pattern. The pope, Naples, Venice, and Milan had all previously requested Ottoman aid against their Christian enemies.

The Italian Wars, from the French Invasion of Italy of 1494

The wars in Italy that began with the French invasion of 1494 increasingly involved the Ottomans diplomatically. Eventually these wars became a contest between François I (1515–47), king of France, and Charles V (1516–56), king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, for control of Italy and preeminence in Europe. The Habsburg-Valois wars continued until 1559 when the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis between Henri II (1547–59) of France and Philip II (1556–98) of Spain ended them. The Ottomans followed events closely, maximizing the opportunities that these conflicts afforded for increasing their lands and prestige. The first phase of the wars, before 1519, was characterized by the sultans' close relations with various states of Italy. In the following period, Süleyman formed a military alliance with the kings of France. Although rulers and popes continued to call for offensive expeditions against the Ottomans, designating them as crusades, events in Italy preoccupied them.

After Cem's death in Italy after Charles VIII of France seized him from the pope, Bayezid was freed from the threat of an invasion involving his brother. But continuing French ambitions in Italy quickly led to a war that ultimately involved the Ottomans as well as Venice and Milan. Louis XII of France invaded Milan in 1499, at the same time that the Ottomans attacked Venetian possessions in the Morea. When history has been viewed as the study of individual nations or cultures, connections between areas and events that do not fit this framework often disappear from the historical record. In western historiography the wars in Italy have been analyzed as part of European history, whereas the wars in the Morea are seen as part of Ottoman, that is Middle Eastern, history. However, contemporaries viewed the French invasion of Milan in 1499 as directly tied to Ottoman attacks on Venetian possessions in the Morea.

The threat that both the Ottomans and the French posed to peace in Italy intensified diplomacy, as the rulers of the Italian states looked for possible allies since they anticipated conflicts with France, the Ottoman Empire, or their Italian neighbors. Lodovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, was accused of encouraging Bayezid to attack Venice. When Sforza informed Venice that he wanted to unite Italy against the Ottomans, he also informed Bayezid that the Venetians were bringing the French to Italy and that Louis XII planned to attack Ottoman territories in Greece after conquering Italy. When the marriage of Cesare Borgia, the pope's son, to a French princess was announced in May 1499, the pope deserted Milan and Naples, becoming an ally of France and Venice and accusing Sforza of inciting the Ottomans against Venice. Sforza was quoted as saying 'the Turk will reach Venice as soon as the French do Milan!'[6] This threat illustrates that contemporaries understood that the Ottoman attack on Venetian possessions and the French invasion of Milan were interconnected events.

Although in 1499 Louis XII sent the French fleet to the Levant to support the Venetians, the combined fleets achieved little, and the lack of effective naval assistance led to the surrender of Lepanto to the Ottomans. However at the same time that the Venetians were negotiating with the Ottomans to end hostilities, they also encouraged the pope to declare a crusade against the Ottomans.[7] Though the naval war was proceeding badly for the French, they were more successful in their invasion of Milan. Lodovico Sforza had explained his position to the Venetian envoy shortly before the war began, illustrating that no one doubted that the war involved the Ottomans in Italy as well as in the Morea:

> I am not afraid of the King of France: He has no just claim to my State; and, since he styles himself the Most Christian King, he ought rather to come to my aid against those who might wish to attack me. It is rumoured in Venice and Rome, and the Pope has alleged, that we are the cause of the Turk taking up arms; but the report is false. It is true that, on hearing of the alliance between Venice and France, we sent to the Turk to get him to caution the Signory against doing us an injury; but our envoy

> had barely started on his journey when the Turk began hostilities. In him the Signory will have on their hands an adversary who will be more formidable to them than the King of France will be to us, for we shall prevail against the King.[8]

As the war continued, both negotiations and the prosecution of the war reveal the centrality of the Ottomans to the conflict in Italy as well as in the Levant. Louis XII attempted to assist Venice diplomatically when in April 1500 he dispatched two envoys to Bayezid to negotiate peace. Despite Bayezid considering 'the King of France as a brother,' the French envoys threatened the sultan that if he did not make peace, Venice, France, and their allies would attack him. Nevertheless, war continued in 1500, involving more states than the previous year since the Hungarians agreed to fight the Ottomans. While the possibility of a crusade was frequently discussed in 1499 and 1500, the idea was only viewed favorably by those who were threatened by Ottoman power. Thus Pope Alexander VI, an ally of Venice and France against the Ottoman Empire, promoted a crusade in 1500. Likewise Venice and Hungary hoped a crusade would prevent Ottoman campaigns against their possessions. The pope also viewed the crusade as a way to divert the French and the Spanish from Italy. The diplomatic maneuvering in 1501 continued to strengthen the connections between events in Italy and the Ottomans. Venice persuaded Louis XII not to campaign in Italy but, instead, to support a naval expedition against the Ottomans. Louis agreed to send the French fleet, since he wished to be viewed as supporting crusading, and the French and Venetian fleets proceeded to attack Ottoman coasts and islands, but they achieved little except increasing their dissatisfaction with each other.[9]

Since Bayezid had maintained contacts with western states dating from the years Cem spent in France and Italy, he was aware of the opportunities that the struggle for Italy opened for Ottoman diplomacy. Thus, although fear of Ottoman power led to frequent crusading rhetoric, the concept that it was legitimate for Christian powers to ally with the Ottomans to ensure the state's survival became an accepted principle that was often put into practice. The Ottoman Empire began to be seen as an integral part of the balance of power among the

European states, and Ottoman alliances with Italian states set a precedent for the Ottoman-French alliance in the sixteenth century.[10]

During the next phase of the Italian wars, although crusade ideology was used as propaganda with virtually all the rulers of Christian Europe proposing launching a crusade, the situation in Italy dominated all other interests. The popes of this period, who were territorial lords of Italy, were no exception, for although they constantly called for a crusade, they were more interested in preserving their temporal power, despite genuine fear of the increased power of the Ottomans. During the next few years alliances were constantly changing, and self-interest was the origin of all policy. (See Table of Diplomatic Alignments.) But while different states sought alliances for many reasons, these were often expressed in terms of a crusade against the Ottomans. For example, the league of Cambrai formed in 1509 was directed against Venice, but its members claimed that one of its chief purposes was a crusade. They decided that if the Ottomans aided the Venetians against the league, they would attack the Ottoman Empire.[11]

Venice actively pursued Ottoman help against the Christian states who were her enemies during the war of the league of Cambrai, informing the Ottomans that the league was formed against Venice because they would not break faith with the Ottomans and that the league would attack the Ottoman Empire after eliminating Venice. They claimed that the sultan should help Venice militarily because this would be in his own interests. The Senate wrote that the Ottomans would be pleased to hear of a Venetian victory 'because they know very well that whatever our fortune may be, we shall have it in common with the most illustrious lord [Turk].'[12] Maximilian, the Holy Roman Emperor, also negotiated with the Ottomans to persuade them to attack Venice by promising them Venetian lands in Dalmatia and the Friuli and by claiming that this was an opportunity to seize Venice's remaining possessions in the Morea.[13] Although in 1511 European rulers knew that succession disputes in the Ottoman Empire made this an opportune time to attack there, preoccupation with Italy prevented this.

Diplomacy after 1513 conformed to a familiar pattern: the wars in Italy continued despite pleas for peace so that the infidels could be attacked. Crusading, that is fighting the Ottomans, only appealed to

Table 1 Diplomatic Alignments

Name of Diplomatic Agreement	Powers Aligned Together	Opposing	Stated Purpose	Date Formed
Holy League[a]	Spain,[b] Venice, Naples,[c] Milan,[d] Holy Roman Empire,[e] Pope[f]	France[g]	Ottoman Empire[h]	1494–1495
Treaty of Blois	France,[i] Venice, Pope[j]	Milan, Ottoman Empire	-	1499
unnamed	Milan, Holy Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire	Venice	-	1499
League of Cambrai	France, Holy Roman Empire, Spain, England,[k] Pope[l]	Venice	Ottoman Empire	1509
Holy League	Pope, Spain, Venice, England[m]	France	-	1511
Treaty of Blois	France, Venice	-	-	1513
Holy League	England, Holy Roman Empire, Pope[n]	France	-	1513
Peace of London	England, France,[o] Holy Roman Empire, Pope, Spain[p]	-	Ottoman Empire[q]	1518
unnamed	Pope,[r] Charles V,[s] Ferdinand,[t] England, Milan,[u] Florence, Genoa, Siena, Lucca, Venice[v]	France	-	1523
unnamed	Pope,[w] France, Venice	Charles V	-	1524–25
unnamed	France, Pope, Venice, England, Florence	Charles V, Ferdinand	-	1525
League of Cognac	France, Venice, Pope, Sforza,[x] Florence, England	Ottoman Empire	Charles V	1526
unnamed	France, Hungary {Zapolya}	Charles V, Ferdinand	Charles V, Ferdinand	1528
Treaty of Bologna	Venice, Sforza, Charles V, Pope, Ferdinand, Urbino, Savoy, Mantua, Montferrat, Genoa, Siena, Lucca	France {any Christian power threatening the peace of Italy}	-	1529
Schmalkalden League	Protestant princes of Germany {Elector of Saxony, Hesse, leaders}, Bavaria {Catholic but opposed Charles V}	Charles V, Ferdinand	Charles V, Ferdinand	1531

Concordat of Bologna	Pope, Charles V, Florence, Milan, Genoa, Ferrara, Siena, Lucca, Mantua, Savoy	Ottoman Empire, France	Ottoman Empire	1533
Capitulations[y]	France, Ottoman Empire	Charles V, Venice	Commercial pact	1536
Holy League	Venice, Pope,[z] Charles V	Ottoman Empire	-	1538
Treaty of Crespy	France, Charles V	-	-	1544
Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis	France,[aa] Charles V	-	-	1559
Capitulations[bb]	France,[cc] Ottoman Empire[dd]	-	Commercial pact	1569
Holy League	Spain,[ee] Pope,[ff] Venice	Ottoman Empire, Muslims in North Africa	-	1571

Note: This is not a complete list of all the diplomatic agreements of this period. These are diplomatic agreements which involved Italy or the Ottoman Empire, or related to the balance of power in Europe.

[a] Also known as the league of Venice, Setton, 2: 578.
[b] Ferdinand of Aragon (1479–1516).
[c] Aragonese kings of Naples.
[d] Ludovico Sforza, duke of Milan (1494–1500).
[e] Maximilian, a Habsburg, emperor (1493–1519)
[f] Alexander VI, Rodrigo Borgia (1492–1503).
[g] Charles VIII, Valois (1483–98).
[h] Bayezid II (1481–1512).
[i] Louis XII, Valois, house of Orleans (1498–1515).
[j] Joined the allies later.
[k] Henry VII, Tudor (1485–1509).
[l] Julius II, della Rovere (1503–13).
[m] Henry VIII, Tudor (1509–47).
[n] Leo X, Giovanni de' Medici (1513–21).
[o] François I, Valois (1515–47).
[p] Charles, Habsburg, king of Spain after 1516.
[q] Selim I (1512–1520).
[r] Hadrian VI, Dedel (1522–23), former tutor of Charles V.
[s] Holy Roman Emperor, 1519–56; and king of Spain, 1516–1556.
[t] Habsburg, brother of Charles V, ruler of Austria.
[u] Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan 1521–1525, 1529–1535.
[v] Joined later.
[w] Clement VII (1523–34), Giulio de' Medici.
[x] Sforza was to be given Milan under the terms of the League.
[y] This pact was negotiated between La Forest, the French ambassador, and Ibrahim Pasha, the grand vezir. It may never have been approved by François and Süleyman.
[z] Paul III, Farnese (1534–49).
[aa] Henri II, Valois (1547–59)
[bb] These are the first capitulations that it is certain were officially ratified.
[cc] Charles IX, Valois (1560–74).
[dd] Selim II (1566–74).
[ee] Philip II, Habsburg (1556–98).
[ff] Pius V, Ghislieri (1566–72).

those who had secular reasons for fighting Muslims, such as Ferdinand of Aragon in North Africa and Venice in the Aegean, where her possessions were threatened by Ottoman attacks. At the death of Louis XII, François I inherited the French throne with its dynastic claims to Milan and Naples. Realizing that François would try to recover Milan, those powers who opposed France, including the pope, formed an alliance against him. But the French defeated their enemies and regained Milan. Only then was François willing to consider crusading because he had achieved his ambitions in Italy.[14]

Pope Leo X's fear of the Ottomans increased when in 1516 Selim I (1512–20) defeated the Mamluks and incorporated Egypt and Syria into the Ottoman Empire. But conditions in Italy and the rest of Europe prevented launching crusades to the Levant. For as Henry VIII said to the Venetian ambassador 'My lord ambassador, you are sage, and of your prudence may comprehend that no general expedition against the Turks will ever be effected so long as such treachery prevails amongst the Christian powers that their sole thought is to destroy one another. … '[15] It was clear that rivalry among the Christian rulers would prevent a crusade, despite the threat that the Ottomans posed to Italy.

Universal Sovereignty

The ideal of universal sovereignty obsessed the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, France, and the Holy Roman Empire in the early sixteenth century. Although this concept had appeared before 1519 when Charles V was elected Holy Roman Emperor, both Louis XII of France and Selim I of the Ottoman Empire had been accused of seeking world domination, it became more prominent during the reigns of Süleyman and Charles V, since both of them ruled extensive territories contributing to their great military power.[16] It was François I's fear of Charles V's dominance in Europe that led him to seek a military alliance with Süleyman. The rivalry between Charles V and Süleyman and the rivalry between Charles V and François I directed the diplomacy and warfare in this period. Charles V's recent rise to prominence as the foremost ruler in Christian Europe, outclassing his French rival, increased other

princes' concerns regarding his claims to lead Christendom to a new level. The pope, Venice, and all Italy were drawn into conflicts, which eventually engulfed Europe and the Mediterranean world.

The rivalry between François I and Charles of Spain intensified when, at Maximilian's death in January 1519, they became candidates for succeeding him as Holy Roman Emperor. François I's supporters favored him for two reasons: first, he seemed to be the best candidate to protect Germany from Ottoman aggression. Second, Charles already ruled Spain, the Netherlands, Naples and Sicily, the Spanish territories in the Americas, and Austria.[17] Charles sent an ambassador to Selim in 1519 before the imperial election was decided, seeking to confirm the privileges of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and the rights of Christian pilgrims to visit the holy places. Selim received the Spanish envoy cordially, promising to grant Charles's requests if he sent an envoy to arrange a treaty between Spain and the Ottoman Empire. Later Charles and his supporters condemned François I's diplomacy with the Ottomans, but Charles sent an envoy to the Ottoman sultan before François did. Circumstances dictated which European ruler formed an alliance with the Ottomans; if François had been chosen as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles would have allied with the Ottomans. Although plans for a crusade were proposed as part of the election rivalry of François and Charles, the French court's enthusiasm for them diminished after Charles won the imperial election in 1519. The location of Habsburg lands, which were exposed to Ottoman attacks, in addition to possession of the imperial title made Charles the natural defender of Christendom against the Ottomans.[18]

François I and Charles V employed military forces, diplomacy, and propaganda as they battled for preeminence in Europe. They struggled almost continuously to control Italy until 1529, when the treaties of that year established an uneasy peace between them. Both rulers took advantage of the actions of their opponent when attempting to influence potential allies. Charles emphasized François I's alliance with the Ottomans, as well as claiming that in contrast he wished to crusade against them. François profited from the imperial sack of Rome in 1527 and Charles V's war against the pope. The popes believed a crusade would solve both the threat of Ottoman expansion, as well as conflict

in Europe, by occupying the French and the Habsburgs in wars outside Italy. The rivalry between François and Charles focused attention on western Europe, facilitating Süleyman's conquest of Belgrade in 1521 and Rhodes the following year. Pope Hadrian VI (1522–23) wrote to François warning him against thinking that Süleyman would be satisfied with Belgrade and Rhodes. After the loss of Rhodes, which was 'almost a French outpost,' François found it advantageous to appear to support a hypothetical crusade, although he was obsessed with Italy and Charles V.[19]

François I and Charles V continued their battle for mastery of Italy and dominance in Europe, despite Pope Clement VII's (1523–34) wish to make peace between them and then form a league against the Ottomans. Charles V's forces defeated the French 25 February 1525 at Pavia, capturing François during the battle. When the Venetian ambassador congratulated Charles on this victory wishing that 'he might ere long be crowned at Constantinople,' Charles claimed that he had 'never had any other wish but to pacify Christendom and turn my forces against the Infidel.'[20] After Pavia the French first sent an ambassador to Süleyman to request that he attack Charles V, claiming that if the imprisoned François were forced to agree to Charles V's terms it would 'make him [Charles] master of the world.'[21] Süleyman responded favorably and communication was established between the two rulers. When François formed a military alliance with the sultan, he disguised its true nature by requesting that Süleyman aid the monks in Jerusalem. François then claimed that the purpose of his diplomacy with the sultan was to protect Christian interests in Jerusalem.[22]

French diplomacy during the reign of François I slowly gained momentum as the king realized that he must make the most of any possible weapon in his rivalry with Charles V. In 1520 after his defeat in the imperial election, François only had permanent diplomatic representation in Rome and Venice. Because he desired Swiss mercenaries, he established a resident ambassador with the Swiss Cantons by 1522. After his defeat at Pavia and imprisonment in Madrid, the king and his mother established contact with Süleyman. This initial approach led to subsequent negotiations handled by Antonio Rincon

and, eventually, to an official embassy led by Jean de la Forest. French diplomacy with the Ottomans, which in the following decade resulted in an ambassador residing in Istanbul to promote French interests there, was among the earliest diplomatic initiatives that François formally established.[23]

The events of 1526, especially involving Hungary, intensified the confrontation between Süleyman and the Habsburgs. In January 1526 François agreed to the treaty of Madrid to regain his freedom, although the treaty was also supposed to allow for the elimination of the Lutherans and an expedition against the Ottomans. The treaty soon led to the formation of the league of Cognac, whose aim was to limit the power of Charles V, although Pope Clement stated that the league's purpose was peace in Europe and an expedition against the Ottomans who were attacking Hungary.[24] In August 1526 Süleyman won an overwhelming victory at the battle of Mohacs, during which Louis II of Hungary was killed. Consequently, Ferdinand, Charles V's brother, claimed the Hungarian succession, since he was married to Louis II's sister. This resulted in the Ottomans and the Habsburgs confronting each other directly in Hungary. Charles and François each blamed the other for the Ottoman victory in Hungary. In November 1526 when John Zapolya, a Hungarian noble, was crowned king of Hungary, all the members of the league of Cognac accepted this, but Ferdinand invaded Hungary, and in November 1527 he was crowned king. Süleyman claimed that the crown of Hungary belonged to him by right of conquest, but he supported Zapolya against the Habsburg Ferdinand. A treaty of friendship was concluded between Zapolya and Süleyman in February 1528, although Ferdinand also sent an embassy to Süleyman in May 1528 to arrange a truce.

In 1526–27 the pope, Charles V, Ferdinand, François I, and Henry VIII all claimed that they wanted peace, but war continued in northern Italy. The Venetian ambassador in Spain stated that 'the truce and peace desired by the Imperialists, so long as they have any hope of obtaining their ends, is to admit of no equals, choosing everybody to be subject to them, and themselves to be the masters of Italy and of the world.'[25] On 6 May 1527 the imperial army conquered Rome, which was sacked for eight to ten days. A Spaniard wrote to Charles

V that the Spanish and German troops sacked the city 'with as much cruelty and wantonness as if it had been plundered by Turks ... '[26] François found the imperial sack of Rome diplomatically useful when he invaded Naples in 1527. He employed Andrea Doria (1468–1560), a Genoese seaman, as a military leader, but when Doria became dissatisfied with his treatment by François in July 1528, he switched his allegiance from François to Charles, leaving François without much of a fleet in the Mediterranean. The French campaign ended in disaster, leaving the Habsburgs in control of Naples.

The wars in Italy paused in 1529 when Charles V and the members of the league of Cognac agreed to a series of treaties. Pope Clement promised to crown Charles as emperor and absolve those who were responsible for the sack of Rome. Charles signed treaties with Venice and Sforza at Bologna and formed a league of Italian states to ensure that François did not begin another war. When the Ottoman Grand Vizier Ibrahim heard of the treaty of Bologna he told the Venetians Zen and Gritti that 'the faith of Christians was writ in snow, that of the Sultan in marble, and [that] there must needs be but one monarch in the world, either the emperor or his own lord.'[27] After Charles was crowned as emperor in February 1530 and called himself Caesar, his rivalry with Süleyman intensified. François told the Venetian ambassador in May 1531 that Zapolya's envoy in Istanbul claimed that Süleyman 'detests the Emperor, and his title of Caesar, he, the Turk, causing himself to be called Caesar.'[28] While an uneasy peace existed in Italy, fighting between Süleyman and Charles V continued in both eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. François, while supposedly at peace with Charles, followed a secret policy of alliance with Süleyman against the emperor.[29]

The rivalry in the 1530s between Süleyman and Charles V for world dominion was recognized and encouraged by authors such as Paolo Giovio. In his *Commentario delle cose de' Turchi* he stated,

> And truly like as your majesty rules and governs more countries and kingdoms, than any other prince of the west, even so Süleyman ... far exceeds without comparison all kings of the east, which any history mentions: wherefore, many men think that

> God will now bring all the world again into one monarchy and make one governor of the whole. May it please him to make your majesty, in deed as in word, most mighty, noble, and renowned Caesar.[30]

Giovio who dedicated this book on the Turks to Charles V encouraged Christians to learn about the Turks in order to defeat them.

The diplomacy of the early 1530s resembles that of earlier years of the sixteenth century, in that alliances were constantly being made and broken as the various contenders for power tried to strengthen their position in relation to their rivals. François obtained Ottoman and Lutheran assistance by employing diplomacy in his rivalry with Charles V. Süleyman was informed both by diplomats and intelligence agents of the potential threat that the Lutherans posed to Charles V, and their cause was benefited by the emperor's need to provide for the defense of Austria.[31] Although Charles V proposed an expedition against the Ottomans, the Habsburgs wanted to negotiate a truce or peace with the Ottoman Empire in 1530. But Ibrahim Pasha informed Charles V's brother Ferdinand's envoys that both the pope and the king of France had asked the Ottoman Empire for aid after the sack of Rome. Although the Habsburgs were publicly condemning French diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire, they were attempting to arrange a truce with Süleyman themselves. In 1532, Ferdinand sent envoys to Süleyman for the fifth time in five years, and they were authorized to offer a tribute for Ferdinand's rights in Hungary of up to 100,000 ducats. After the unsuccessful Ottoman campaign of 1532 against Austria, Süleyman was willing to consider peace with the Habsburgs as he turned his attention to war with the Safavids of Iran.[32]

During this period, the claims of Süleyman, François I, and Charles V were often expressed in terms of universal sovereignty. The titles rulers gave to themselves and other rulers illustrate their rivalries. Charles V, in a letter to the sultan written in 1533, claimed the titles of king of Jerusalem and duke of Athens. The Ottomans objected because Süleyman actually ruled those two cities.[33] In Ottoman documents, Charles was usually referred to as the kıral {king} of Spain, while François I was usually called padişah {emperor} of France.[34]

Although Charles V's empire was far more extensive than the kingdom of France, this terminology emphasized that the sultan rejected Charles V's claims to universal sovereignty.

Charles V's conquest of Tunis in 1535 made the emperor appear to be the defender of Christendom, although he undertook it to protect his own territories. Consequently, François found himself isolated diplomatically, and he feared Charles in the role of the champion of Christendom. Therefore in February 1535, he sent an ambassador, Jean de la Forest, first to Hayreddin Pasha and then to Süleyman to propose a joint French-Ottoman campaign against Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, or Spain.[35] With this embassy, French diplomacy with the Ottomans entered a new phase that resulted in permanent French representation in Istanbul becoming expected by both parties.

Naval Warfare and Diplomacy

Naval warfare became increasingly important after Andrea Doria deserted François to become Charles V's naval commander in 1528, and his successes led Süleyman to appoint Hayreddin Barbarossa as Ottoman admiral in 1533. Thereafter much of the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles took place between their fleets in the Mediterranean. During this period joint Ottoman-French naval expeditions fought against the emperor or his allies. Thus the Ottoman fleet frequently appeared in the western Mediterranean as well as the eastern portion of the sea. Since a common enmity to Charles was the basis for negotiations between François and Süleyman, in February 1536, Jean de La Forest negotiated a treaty in the form of a commercial agreement with Ibrahim Pasha.[36] Consequently, after 1536, a French ambassador was usually resident in Istanbul. La Forest encouraged Süleyman to attack the emperor in response to his expedition against Tunis, but the naval war in 1537 was directed as much against Venice as against Charles V.[37]

An Ottoman attack on Corfu led Venice in 1538 to agree to an alliance, known as the Holy League, with the pope against the Ottoman Empire, which included Charles V. François I's fear that the forces of the league would be directed against France, as well as his hope

to regain Milan, led him to agree to peace with Charles V. François promised to join in the war against the Ottoman Empire and to give Charles financial support for this purpose. But François sent an ambassador, Antonio Rincon, instructing him in October 1538 to inform Süleyman in the most favorable way possible about his peace with Charles in order to preserve the friendship of the sultan.[38] In spite of the Holy League, the Ottomans successfully defeated the Venetians on land and sea in 1538. Hayreddin Pasha won the battle of Preveza, which was significant because the Ottomans defeated the combined fleets of Venice and Doria, the only ones capable of opposing them in the Mediterranean. The Holy League dissolved in 1539, and peace between the Ottoman Empire and Venice was concluded in October 1540 with the help of Rincon.[39]

François I's commitment to the Ottoman-French alliance was based on his own interests, while Süleyman always found it advantageous to maintain an alliance that contributed to divisions among the Christian powers. In the early years of the 1540s, François made and broke agreements with Charles V, while maintaining friendly relations with Süleyman through his ambassador, Antonio Rincon, until Rincon was killed by the emperor's governor of Milan in 1541. Rincon's murder gave François an excuse to renew the war against Charles V.[40] Rincon was replaced by Captain Polin, who negotiated for the Ottoman fleet to sail to the aid of France in 1543. After French and Ottoman forces besieged Nice in 1543, the Ottoman fleet spent the winter in the French port of Toulon. François made peace with Charles V in September 1544 with the treaty of Crespy, which required François to fight against the Ottomans. Since Ferdinand and Charles V desired peace with Süleyman, they made use of the French to approach the sultan. François soon regretted this treaty when he failed to gain the territories he desired but a truce was arranged between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans in October 1545. François I's rivalry with Charles continued until his death in March 1547.[41]

The new French king, Henri II, continued many of the diplomatic policies of his father in regard to the Ottomans, the German princes, and Italy. At first it appeared that the Ottoman-French alliance might be abandoned by the new king, but the alliance again led to joint

military actions against the Habsburgs. Henri's diplomacy with the Ottomans against the Habsburgs involved two popes in the 1550s. Hostilities began again in Italy with the war of Parma between Pope Julius III, supported by Charles V, and Ottavio Farnese, grandson of Pope Paul III, supported by Henri II. Pope Julius III informed Charles that, 'We fear these new preparations which the Turk is said to be making by sea and the alliance which he has with the French, ... and we can suspect that the king's armada and that of the Turk may be joined together, seeing that the French not only are not ashamed of this alliance but glory in it.'[42] In the summer of 1551 the Ottoman fleet attacked Sicily and Malta, and in August it captured Tripoli while the French ambassador, d'Aramon, was there. The French presence at Tripoli at the time of the Ottoman conquest was used as anti-French propaganda by Julius III and Charles V, although d'Aramon had gone to Tripoli at the knights' request and rescued some of the knights who were taken prisoner. Julius III threatened to preach a crusade against Henri II for receiving the Ottoman fleet in France and helping the Lutherans and English.[43] In 1551 d'Aramon encouraged Süleyman to attempt a combined naval attack the following year, and d'Aramon sailed with the Ottoman fleet in 1552. Since the attacks by the fleets were not coordinated, little was achieved, but the French fleet decided to winter in the Levant so that the combined fleets could sail west together in the spring.[44] While the French fleet wintered at Chios, Venice allowed the French to use Venetian galleys to send money for the fleet's support. With Ottoman help, the French gained control of most of the island Corsica, which was vital to Spanish communications with Italy.[45]

No sooner was the war of Parma settled than another war erupted in Italy between Henri II and Charles V, when the Sienese revolted against the Spanish with French support in July 1552. When Julius III tried to make peace between Charles V and Henri II, Charles complained that Henri incited his subjects to rebellion and solicited help from the Ottomans. The imperial army withdrew from Siena probably because of the arrival of the Ottoman fleet at Naples. For several years the Ottoman fleet sailed west every year, and the French fleet joined them.[46]

Pope Paul IV and Relations with the Ottomans

The kings of France were not the only rulers who solicited Ottoman aid against the Habsburgs in the 1550s for after Paul IV (1555–59), from the pro-French Carafa family of Naples, was elected pope he attempted to decrease the power and prestige of the Habsburgs with Henri II's support. When Paul IV sent an envoy to France to propose an alliance in 1555, he suggested a joint French-Ottoman attack on Naples and Sicily, if war occurred between the Habsburgs and the pope. In April 1556 Paul IV vehemently expressed his opinion of Charles V, whom he had known for over forty years, to the Venetian ambassador at Rome:

> a thirst for domination, an insufferable pride, a contempt for religion, for we will ask you, what other emperor but Charles would have held councils and so many diets with the intervention of heretics and Lutherans? ... Who would have dissembled so much as he has done for the purpose of reigning? ... Who but he sacked this city, and perpetrated that horrible impiety? for, although absent, he ordained and was gratified by those misfortunes of this Holy See and of all Italy. ... He believes that ... the world, must be his, and we have occasionally said to some of his adherents, if this lust of dominion and of mastery over all men ... proceeded from a wish to render cities and empires abounding in all things wealthy and fertile, it might perhaps be tolerated; but what province, what noble, well-stored, and wealthy city ever fell into your hands that did not remain miserable, impoverished, and starving and in such a state that worse could not be imagined.[47]

The pope fought Charles V and Philip II with French help, continuing the trend of invasions of Italy by Spanish and French forces. Paul IV was also willing to seek allies among the Protestants and the Ottomans in order to fight the Habsburgs. The pope's nephew, Cardinal Carlo Carafa, actively pursued diplomacy with the French and the Ottomans. In 1556 after the Spanish invaded papal territory, Pope Paul exclaimed

> We will deprive them of their kingdoms and empires; we will proclaim them excommunicated and accursed ... ; we will make a crusade against them, because both father and son are heretics; and we will extirpate that accursed race. ... This scum of the earth has, alas, commanded us, owing to our cowardice, ... You will soon see all Italy in arms, and a war the greatest and most important that ever was—even the Turks will come ... [48]

The pope proposed to call a crusade against the Habsburgs and fight alongside the Ottomans against them. In January 1557, Paul IV stated that he would accept aid even from Germany against the Habsburgs. When a cardinal expressed his belief that Germany would not wish to help the pope, the pope replied, 'The Turks will not fail us!'[49] When Carlo Carafa wrote Süleyman directly in March 1557, requesting all his resources for a fleet to attack Naples and Sicily, it was not the first time that he had attempted to obtain Ottoman assistance against the Spanish. In March 1557 Paul IV approved of Henri's relations with Süleyman, saying 'and we believe that this stir made by Sultan Soliman was induced by him, for they are one and the same thing, and have a very good mutual understanding together.'[50]

Paul IV knew that Carlo Carafa wished to use the Ottoman fleet against Philip in Italy and Sicily. The pope defended his willingness to employ the Ottoman fleet against the Spanish in Naples and Italy: 'it would have been lawful and indeed praiseworthy for us to call the Turks, Moors, and Jews for our defense, being invaded by those Imperialists without any cause, save because we did not choose by trusting them to render ourselves their prey, remembering what they did 30 years ago to Clement ... and we were present at the sack of this city.'[51] Clearly, Pope Paul IV condemned the policies of Charles V and his son Philip II, and, far from criticizing Henri II from allying with the Ottomans, he was attempting to form a military alliance with the Ottomans himself. Thus sixteenth century opinion regarding allying with the Ottomans was not monolithic in its condemnation of this policy. Popes, the head of Catholic Christendom, advocated various policies in regards to the Ottomans, including fighting in concert with them, depending on their immediate needs.

But in spite of his diplomatic and military efforts, Paul IV was forced to make peace in September 1557, although Henri continued to oppose the Habsburgs. In December 1557 Henri wrote to Süleyman requesting the assistance of the Ottoman fleet, to which Süleyman agreed if Henri did not make peace with his enemies. The sultan sent a large fleet, but the French did not meet it as arranged, and, after sacking Sorrento near Naples in June, the fleet headed for Minorca. When the French persuaded the Ottoman fleet to return to Toulon and Nice, it refused to support the French attack against Bastia on Corsica. After Henri II complained to Süleyman in August 1558 about the actions of the Ottoman fleet, the sultan tried to placate Henri.[52] Nevertheless, Henri made peace with Philip in April 1559, and the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis left Spain as the dominant power in Italy.

Although religious conflict among the Christians of Europe had been increasing since the 1520s, it was not until the 1560s that a civil war concerning religion erupted in France. After the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis ended the Habsburg-Valois wars, France's policy changed from occasional persecution of Protestants in France while allying with the Protestant rulers of Germany to more intense persecution of Protestants in France as a result of closer ties to Spain. When Henri II died in 1559, his son François II (1559–60) was dominated by powerful Catholic nobles. The first war of religion in France began in 1562 and conflicts continued for forty years. Despite civil wars, French kings continued to send ambassadors to the Ottoman sultans, and the sultans encouraged diplomatic relations. In 1561 Süleyman sent two letters to Charles IX (1560–74) in response to a letter from the French king, in which he said that he wanted to maintain friendship with the Ottoman Empire as Henri II and François II had. Süleyman responded, 'since it is [among] the ancient customs of our house and of our predecessor to receive all those who have desired our friendship, we are happy to accept that of your Majesty, and all the more so, for it goes back a long time. For our part we promise to maintain and to observe it without fail.' Süleyman hoped to hear from Charles IX frequently.[53]

Süleyman died in 1566 and was succeeded by Selim II (1566–74), who continued his father's policy of allying with France. Although by this time the original rulers who had formed the alliance were dead,

their successors continued their diplomatic policies with regard to the Ottoman-French alliance. Selim II confirmed Süleyman's promise to the French of an armada in 1567 to be sent against Corsica and to be used as the French wished. When in 1570 the Ottomans attacked Cyprus, which belonged to Venice, the Venetians responded by organizing the Holy League against the Ottomans in 1571, whose members also included the pope and Philip II of Spain. The French were invited to join but declined. The Holy League did not prevent the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, but its fleet defeated the Ottomans at Lepanto on 7 October 1571. The Venetians again tried to persuade Charles IX to join the league, but the French saw that Venice and Spain were already quarreling over who should take over Ottoman territories that they had not yet conquered.[54] François de Noailles, Bishop of Dax, the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in March 1572, was instructed to attempt to make peace between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and so destroy the Holy League. De Noailles explained to the boy king Charles IX the value of the alliance for both the Ottomans and the French,

> Observe how, sire, it is sometimes expedient for your service for them to add to the fruit that they take from your friendship, ... I had seen then the said Pasha the third day after I received your letters, ... I said to him that it was you, sire, who have kept the emperor and the German princes from entering the league against this state, and that you have sent two ambassadors into Germany expressly to turn this storm from the Grand Seigneur your good friend, and that, in truth, this was a good office done as necessary, which is able to be justly balanced with all of the pleasures and help that the house of France has already received here from that of the Ottomans;[55]

De Noailles left Istanbul in September 1572, after having negotiated an Ottoman-French military alliance against Spain, for Selim had sent a letter to Charles IX in August 1572, in which he promised to send two hundred galleys to Toulon every year as long as Charles fought Spain. When De Noailles heard about the St. Bartholomew's

Day massacre in France, he decided to return to the Ottoman Empire to prevent France's enemies there from using the incident to undermine French diplomacy. Soon after De Noailles returned to Istanbul, the Ottoman-Venetian treaty was signed, ending the Holy League.[56]

When Sigismund of Poland died in 1572, the Ottomans and French by means of concurrent diplomatic efforts persuaded the Polish nobles to elect Henri, duc d'Anjou, as king of Poland. In March 1573 the Divan had sent a letter to the Polish lords suggesting that Henri be chosen as king. But these negotiations resulted in few long-term benefits, for as soon as Henri was informed of Charles IX's death in May 1574, he immediately returned to France. The reign of Henri III (1574–1589), the last Valois king of France, was marked by one religious war after another, leading Henri III to neglect his diplomacy with the Ottomans. France continued to be represented in the Ottoman Empire for both political and commercial reasons and retained a preferential position with the sultan. The French king continued to be addressed as *padişah* while other European monarchs were given the title of *kıral*. According to article 3 of the Capitulations of 1581, the French ambassador had precedence over those of all other Christian monarchs, and article 12 states that all ships should trade under the French flag except those of Venice.[57]

The Habsburgs also continued to dabble in diplomacy with the Ottomans, such as in 1577–78 when Philip II was in the difficult position of pursuing secret negotiations with the 'enemy of the faith,' although he had been requested to remain as the defender of Christendom in Morocco. In August 1580 a truce was arranged between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs of Spain, which allowed Spanish rulers to concentrate their forces on northern Europe and the Ottomans to challenge their rivals in the east.[58]

During the wars of religion, the French still maintained the Ottoman alliance and the Ottomans continued to expect the presence of a French ambassador on their campaigns. Although changing circumstances limited the immediate value of the alliance, the Ottoman perceptions of its importance can be seen in the creation of a myth that earlier a French princess had become the mother of an Ottoman sultan, thus explaining why the Ottomans and the French were allies.

This story first appeared in Ottoman writings at the end of the sixteenth century and became increasingly elaborate in the works of the seventeenth-century Ottoman authors, Peçevi and Evliya Çelebi.[59] The Ottoman-French alliance continued in the seventeenth century despite changing political circumstances because the web of connections between the Ottoman Empire and the states of Europe continued to bind them together despite the troubles that both the Ottoman Empire and the other states in Europe faced in the seventeenth century. In the Ottomans' view, not just diplomatic ties, but those of blood, bound the kings of France to the sultans of the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER 2

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES: FOREIGN STATE SERVANTS IN FRANCE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE[1]

Traditional western historiography has often failed to recognize the connections between events in the Muslim and Christian Mediterranean world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that I have shown were closely related. Similarly it has portrayed this world as having boundaries between the Ottoman Empire and neighboring Christian states that individuals could cross only with great difficulty. This anachronistic perception of division impacts how we in the twenty-first century view the identities of individuals who moved between these Muslim- and Christian-ruled regions either temporarily as diplomats or soldiers, or who permanently migrated to a new location in search of opportunities for advancement. This perception of division distorts understanding of the interactions during this period, when individuals frequently passed between the lands of the Mediterranean despite religious differences. Some individuals temporarily visited foreign lands while others permanently found new career opportunities in serving foreign rulers. In this chapter, I consider identity as it relates to one group of individuals, those who were in the service of a ruler of whom they were not native born subjects or whose ethnicity differed from that of the ruler they served.[2] This

chapter does not present an in depth comparison of Ottoman and French administrations. It is a consideration of how some individuals in those administrations have been identified, those who we consider to be 'foreigners' although their contemporaries often identified them differently. While not implying that differences in administrative practice between France and the Ottoman Empire did not exist, I present the similarities between Ottoman and French employment of foreigners in state service.

The foreigners in state service to both the Ottoman and French governments were cosmopolitan individuals. They were especially prominent in cross-cultural encounters and frequently left records of their views of these interactions. Learning about the men involved in these encounters helps in evaluating their views of their allies. I do not claim that these are the views of everyone in Ottoman or French society but of specific individuals whose own experiences impacted their perceptions of their allies. A study of Ottoman-French interaction in the sixteenth century requires an understanding of how an individual came to have a French or an Ottoman political identity. Erroneous assumptions about identity colour our understanding of cross-cultural interaction and lead us to place individuals into categories that make sense to us, but may be anachronistic for an earlier time. In addition, concerns about identity vary from place to place. For example, European observations on identity, both during the early modern period and the modern period, exhibit a concern with ethnicity that was almost absent in the Ottoman Empire.[3]

During the sixteenth century the individuals who were most often involved in cross-cultural encounters frequently interacted with different groups of people within the borders of the states in which they lived, since the populations of early modern states were not homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language, or religion. These individuals often had a great deal in common with their counterparts in other states. For them, encounters with foreign 'others' were less strange than we imagine them to have been. Several groups of people were most likely to be involved in cross-cultural encounters: merchants engaged in long distance trade, artists, people who lived in frontier districts, diplomats, and other state functionaries. It is this last group, men who

served the state in various capacities, with which I am mainly concerned, for it is primarily their views of encounters with 'the other' that I have been able to discover. Within this group were a set of cosmopolitan individuals whose expertise and ambition led them to take advantage of the international opportunities during this period of rapid growth in state administration, when rulers sought to attract qualified individuals to run their states.

The careers of these individuals who sought and found employment with rulers of states that either were not states in which they were born or were rulers with whom they did not share an ethnic or religious identity, allow us to examine the connections between ethnicity, religious confession, and dynastic loyalty; the factors that went into creating the political identity of these men. The life histories of certain elite state servants enable us to evaluate which factors were important in developing a political identity, in these cases the type of identity that counted most. One aspect of the elite state servants' positions was that they were often required to work with their counterparts from other states in the fulfillment of their duties. An understanding of their lives helps us comprehend how their cosmopolitan background influenced their encounters with 'the other,' which resulted from their state service.[4]

Several examples of Ottoman and French 'foreign' specialists based on contemporary documents and historical accounts will increase our understanding of elite state servants as a group. First, I examine the careers of two Greek cousins from the Palaeologus family, who after the capture of Constantinople sought careers with non-Greek rulers and assimilated into their new environments. Georges Palaeologus de Bissipat, called Le Grec, went to France, while his cousin Hüseyn was employed by the sultan. Next, I compare the careers of two sixteenth-century admirals, Andrea Doria of Genoa, employed first by François I of France and then the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, and Hayreddin Barbarossa of Mytilene and Algiers, employed by the Ottoman sultan Süleyman. Finally, I present Christophe de Roggendorf, who began his career as a Habsburg subject, then sought employment with Süleyman, and finally served the kings of France for decades. These individuals

impacted the events examined in the following chapters and represent a larger group of 'foreign' state servants.

Identity in the sixteenth century was based on allegiance to a dynasty and its claims to territory rather than on allegiance to a territory itself. French kings in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ruled different lands than those that a present day map identifies as France. French kings attempted to incorporate Milan and Naples into their realm because they had inherited dynastic claims to these Italian territories.[5] The inhabitants of Milan were identified as French, if the king of France controlled the city. Richard Bonney emphasizes that, while nation states were developing at this time, the dynasty was the organizing principle of these states. The principle of inheritance gave rise to Charles V's large, heterogeneous empire in the sixteenth century.

The Ottoman Empire even more dramatically illustrates the difficulty of tying identity to territory, since it no longer exists. In its former territories are found many successor states, including the Republic of Turkey. But historians should not equate the Ottoman Empire with modern Turkey. The focus of loyalty in the empire was the Ottoman dynasty, and in this case the dynasty was at least as fundamental to the state as was the French dynasty in early modern France, since the Ottoman Empire covered much more extensive territories and the inhabitants were even less homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, shared history, and cultural traits. The Ottomans ruled these territories by right of conquest, not inheritance, since the capture of Constantinople in 1453 was the basis for the sultan's claim to be the rightful ruler of all the territories that had once been part of the Eastern Roman Empire. In 1480 at the start of the period studied here, the empire included territories in the Balkans and Anatolia. At the end, in 1580, the empire included most of Hungary, all of Anatolia and the Balkans, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Rhodes, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and parts of North Africa. The empire's peoples included individuals who were Turks, Arabs, Greeks, and Slavs, and whose religions included Islam, many forms of Christianity, and Judaism. Modern views of Ottoman identity struggle to label this mixture of peoples correctly.

Views of the Employment of Foreign Specialists in State Service

The Ottoman Empire's administrative practices have often been considered unique, differing both from those of other Muslim polities and from those of European political entities. They have rarely been studied comparatively with the object of noting similarities to practices elsewhere. The employment of foreigners in state service was common to both the Ottoman Empire and to the emerging states of western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[6] However, the employment of individuals in positions of responsibility within the Ottoman Empire who by birth were neither Muslims nor 'Turks' is often considered both highly unusual and an indication that Ottoman success was due to individuals who were in positions of authority having Christian origins. The contributions of individuals whose ethnic origins were not Turkish and whose religious background was not Muslim are seen as of fundamental importance to the greatness of the empire and their identity as Ottomans is considered 'artificial.'[7] Often these individuals are considered only as members of certain ethnic groups, assuming that identity and loyalty were solely in relation to ethnicity rather than to the state they served. When European rulers employed individuals who were not natives of their states in similar positions, this practice of recruiting skilled foreigners is interpreted differently, without implying the inherent inferiority of the indigenous population of the state. The issue explored here is how these individuals were viewed by contemporaries versus modern perceptions of their identities and contributions, emphasizing similarities rather than differences in the employment of foreigners in state service in the Ottoman Empire and in early modern Europe.

The issue of the attachment of an individual to a political entity, and the basis of his identification as a subject who owed loyalty to the ruler of that entity, is of fundamental importance to questions of identity. For example, the king of France often employed people who were not natives of France in his service. Although Italians were the most numerous group, the king also employed Spaniards, Greeks, and Croats as diplomats, soldiers, and administrators. As a reward for

their service, some of them were naturalized as Frenchmen. A similar phenomenon occurred in the Ottoman Empire where the Ottoman sultan employed Greeks, Slavs, Jews, and Italians as diplomats, soldiers, and administrators. These men often converted to Islam and became part of the ruling class of the empire. Although the cases are not identical, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a similar phenomenon was occurring in both France and the Ottoman Empire as well as in other places in Europe. Rulers of states whose bureaucracies were expanding, and so were in need of skilled specialists, recruited men from areas with long traditions of state service or from areas with the educational or training opportunities necessary to produce qualified functionaries. How the individuals who made up this elite, cosmopolitan, ambitious group are described either in contemporary accounts or in modern historical writing indicates significant differences in how we view an individual's changing allegiance from one ruler to another.

Ottoman Identity

With regard to 'national identity' the Ottoman case has long been considered problematical to say the least. What did it mean to be a 'Turk' or an 'Ottoman' in the sixteenth century? Contemporary sources may obscure rather than clarify the situation for a modern reader because sixteenth-century western authors did not use the term Ottoman when describing Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, they used the term 'Turk.' When they described the conversion of a person to Islam, they stated that he had 'turned Turk.'[8] To Christians living in western Europe at this time, 'Turk' was used not to describe an ethnic identity but a religious and political one. However, some authors such as Postel were aware that there were different sorts of Turks, that is to say Muslims, in the Ottoman Empire. He admired the simple faith of 'natural Turks.'[9] The term 'Turk' is also confusing in Ottoman sources. In Ottoman usage 'Turk' could be a pejorative term meant to designate a member of a nomadic Turcoman tribe whose people were often at odds with the Ottoman government.[10] On the other hand, some Ottoman authors used 'Turk' to refer to

Ottoman forces in opposition to Habsburg forces when describing the Ottoman-Habsburg conflicts.[11] In the Ottoman Empire, identity was problematic because the empire was a political entity ruled by a Muslim dynasty whose territories were in Europe, Asia, and Africa and whose subjects were Muslims, Christians, and Jews from many different ethnic groups. To confuse the issue still more, individuals could and did change their identities in many instances by changing their residence, political loyalty, or religion. Terms that we now use to denote national identity, in the sixteenth century could be referring to ethnic, religious, or political identity. When we use the same term, we are not necessarily referring to the same concept that a sixteenth-century individual was.

Cemal Kafadar addresses identity in the early Ottoman world and its distortion by present day concerns with national identity. He describes the Ottoman ruling class as being made up of Muslims. Some members of this ruling class were Muslim by conversion, who spoke Turkish, though not necessarily as a first language, and who joined the dynastic state of the Ottomans either voluntarily or involuntarily. Turks were one of the ethnic groups ruled by that class. Kafadar states that, "many individuals or groups changed sides and identities. Through conversion or enslavement, one could over time 'become a Turk,'" just as today one may become an American. He shows how nationalism was linked to 'racialism' in the early twentieth century. This is evident in the historiography that was developed in the era of national consciousness and nation state building. Kafadar suggests that we study the meaning of such terms as 'the Turks' over time and place. He is not suggesting that religious or ethnic identities did not matter, but rather that they were in flux and that the 'fluidity of identities' in previous periods is hard to comprehend today.[12]

Kafadar's work challenges other historians' views of Ottoman identity. Paul Coles describes the earliest Ottomans as 'having no identity themselves beyond that of a fighting force loyal to a particular commander, nothing was alien to them except peace.' He states that all empires are 'plunder machines,' but he continues 'in none has the assimilation and employment of alien manpower been carried to such

lengths.' He believes that the Ottoman Empire 'also attracted and made use of a stream of renegades and refugees from the European states' and that these men had to cross a 'racial' and religious frontier in pursuit of power and profit. Coles also states that 'during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this empire … differed in almost every essential respect from the European societies upon which it impinged. Any analysis of the structure of the Ottoman Empire in this period must concentrate upon these differences.'[13] In contrast, I will concentrate on their similarities.

A sixteenth-century Ottoman historian, Mustafa Ali, gives an insider's view of the elements that combined to form Ottoman identity.

> Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days of the Ottoman dynasty, who are not [generically] separate from those tribes of Turks and Tatars … are a select community and pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their state, are singled out for their piety [diyanet], cleanliness [nazafet], and faith [akidet]. Apart from this, most of the inhabitants of Rum are of confused ethnic origins. Among its notables there are few whose lineage does not go back to a convert to Islam … either on their father or their mother's side, the genealogy is traced to a filthy infidel. It is as if two different species of fruitbearing tree mingled and mated, with leaves and fruits; and the fruit of this union was large and filled with liquid, like a princely pearl. The best qualities of the progenitors were then manifested and gave distinction, either in physical beauty, or in spiritual wisdom.[14]

Mustafa Ali himself was the result of the union of the son of a convert with the granddaughter of a şeyh of a Sufi order.[15]

The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the empire was a fact of Ottoman life in the early modern period. Some Ottoman authors, for example Mustafa Ali and Evliya Çelebi, note that different ethnic groups are characterized by certain traits.[16] A degree of solidarity existed among members of a particular ethnic group. This can be seen both among the Ottoman elite who administered the empire

and among the corsairs of North Africa.[17] Sometimes difficulties arose for Ottoman officials when dealing with many diverse groups with their own languages and customs. To a degree various groups in the empire, differentiated by religion or ethnicity, had distinct careers open to them, but these distinctions were not absolute and unchanging. Although Mustafa Ali was born a Muslim and not of the military establishment (*askeri* class), through education he was able to enter the administration, supposedly closed to native-born Muslims. Other examples also show that there were not absolutely separate career paths for native-born Muslims and those who were products of the devşirme slave system. As the quote from Mustafa Ali indicates, the mingling of the various groups in the empire produced the people of Rum, who, in his view, were physically, morally, and intellectually outstanding.[18] Although many of the people who made up the elite of the Ottoman state were from non-Muslim backgrounds, a non-Muslim who wished to become a full-fledged Ottoman demonstrated his loyalty to the dynasty by conversion.

While conversion obviously had religious implications, its political ones were also significant. During the sixteenth century adherence to the religion of the ruler by the entire population began to be required in many Christian polities, while in the Ottoman Empire, this insistence on conforming to the ruler's religion was limited to those individuals who were employed by the state. Religious policies in Spain were in sharp contrast to those of the Ottoman Empire. After the conquest of Granada in 1492, Spanish rulers soon employed expulsion or forced conversion to deal with non-Catholic religious groups.[19] When conversion of the Spanish Muslims progressed slowly, the decision was made in 1499 to convert them forcibly, and they and their descendants were known as Moriscos. But when after 'conversion' the Moriscos continued to retain a distinct identity, they were seen as a threat to the integrity of the state. Eventually the rulers of Spain became convinced that expulsion of the Moriscos was the only way to effect confessional homogeneity. The Moriscos, whose entire way of life was under attack, rose in revolt several times during the sixteenth century. The Ottomans took advantage of this situation by attempting to coordinate revolts by the Moriscos with their own challenges to Habsburg power in North

Africa and Europe. Refugees from Spain who had fled to North Africa were among the most active groups there in promoting attacks on Habsburg Spain.[20]

Religion was an important element in determining an individual's identity in the sixteenth century. But religion as an element of political identity could be changed when the need arose. The Duke of Cleves, a prominent German Protestant ally of both Henry VIII and François I, was forced to surrender to Charles V in 1543. In return for the emperor's pardon, the duke had to renounce the Protestant faith, which he did.[21] In the duke's case, conversion had become a symbol of loyalty to a ruler or dynasty.

Another example of conversion's role in political identity is Babur, a descendent of Timur, who founded the Mughal dynasty of India. When he needed support against the Uzbeks in the battle for power in Central Asia in 1511, he accepted the aid of the Safavid Shah of Iran, Ismail, at the price of acknowledging him as his overlord and professing Shiism. Babur struck coins in the name of Shah Ismail and dressed as a kızılbaş. However, his acceptance of Shiism cost him popular support and, when he was defeated by the Uzbeks in 1512, he lost Samarkand. Since the alliance had failed to achieve his objectives, Babur again became a Sunni Muslim.[22]

During the sixteenth century many individuals changed their religion for political reasons. French noblemen, such as Antoine de Bourbon, became Calvinists and then Catholics again, basing their decision on the advantages they hoped to gain by the change. When being accepted as the king of France required a Catholic identity, Antoine's son, Henri IV, is reputed to have said, 'Paris is worth a mass.'[23] Changing from a Christian to a Muslim identity often caused no more pangs of conscience than changing religions within Christianity. Bennassar found that frequently the 'renegades' of North Africa believed either Islam or Christianity or both were acceptable. Muslim corsairs in North Africa frequently maintained contact with their Christian relatives, and these ties facilitated commercial transactions.[24] The Ottomans used the non-Muslim population of the empire as a source of manpower for the military forces of the empire. These men who were gathered by the *devşirme* were converted to Islam, not

as a way of increasing the number of Muslims, but to ensure their allegiance to the dynasty. Those who rose to the highest posts in the empire often had family who remained on the other side of the confessional divide. The confessional barrier remained unimportant in many instances, but, in the case of vital men in government service, conversion demonstrated a loyalty to the ruler, which was key to the functioning of the state.

While rulers of European states employed men from many different backgrounds, as the Ottoman sultans did, there was a difference in scale. The number of individuals in state service in France who were not natives of the country was not as large as the number of individuals in state service in the Ottoman Empire who were recruited either from the non-Muslim population of the empire or from individuals who came from beyond its borders. For in the Ottoman Empire, in addition to the administrative elite, large portions of the military forces were also recruited from the non-Muslim population of the empire.[25] Similarly, European rulers frequently employed mercenaries, who were generally not their subjects, to fight their wars. But in the Ottoman case, the Janissaries and kapıkulu cavalry were permanently part of the Ottoman military forces.[26]

French Identity

In France, questions about national identity have been tied to the origins of the French nation and the impact of the French Revolution on the beginning of France as a nation state.[27] This has led to the impression that the French Revolution was both the instigator and the completer of the process of creating a French national identity. Eugen Weber challenges this view by demonstrating that a French, as opposed to a regional or local identity, came very late at the end of the nineteenth century, if one looks at such things as a common language spoken by a majority of the people or a national economic integration.[28] Others argue that a sense of French identity came very early, even in the medieval period if one looks at the development of certain national heroes such as Saint Michael. Both these positions can be reconciled if one accepts that the formation of a French national

identity has been a long and continuing process of which the French Revolution was simply one important part. In France, the state made the nation, not the nation the state. The dynasties played the key role in the development of the state because, as the territories controlled by the ruler rather than by the great nobles increased, France became a territorial state where all the inhabitants were subjects of the king, whether or not they were his vassals, and so were united by a single political structure.[29]

Charlotte Wells' study of citizenship in early modern France shows that individuals who came to France from foreign countries were employed and assimilated in the kingdom, much as such foreigners were in the Ottoman Empire. From the writings of jurists and from French naturalization records, she demonstrates that citizenship in France did not require a specific ancestry. What was essential was an individual's decision to commit to France. Permanent residence was the only acceptable proof of this commitment. Wells points out that jurists were trying to clarify an individual's relation to the state when they defined one of the rights of the kings of France, the *droit d'aubaine*, which allowed the king to seize the estate of any foreigner who died in France. When a foreigner was naturalized he or she acquired certain rights, which all French subjects enjoyed: 'control of property, access to justice, and eligibility for public office.'[30]

As early as the fourteenth century it was recognized that it was a French citizen's duty and privilege to serve the state and reap the rewards of this service. Thus employment of Italians in tax offices was discouraged, but the king needed the foreigners' financial and technical skills.[31] Although the educated classes insisted that state offices should be held by those who were part of the kingdom, the number of foreigners in offices was high and always increasing. Service to the state by foreigners was repaid by the privileges of citizenship, which was obtained through naturalization. The theory behind this is significant: In the view of the French jurists of the sixteenth century, the basic component of citizenship was choice. One could decide to be French by choosing to live in France, since residence was the essential attribute of citizenship. If one were born French, that is of French parents in France, one could lose one's French status by moving abroad,

establishing a household there, accepting an office in a foreign government, or being naturalized abroad. Residence was key for both naturalized and native citizens.[32]

During the course of the sixteenth century, questions regarding the French status of certain groups arose, such as the status of residents of territories that had recently come under or out of French domination. Citizens of a territory such as Milan, which was gained and lost by France several times during this period, were considered French if they came to live in France after Milan was lost to French control. Also at the end of the sixteenth century, during the period of the civil wars, the status of the children of expatriates came into question, and only then did descent become important in the making of a 'natural' French citizen.[33] The question of the status of Italians in France was a troublesome issue in the sixteenth century. The definition of a 'foreigner' was not consistent in sixteenth-century France when assessing the Italians who had become a highly visible and influential community. It was clear that those Italians who came to France for a short period, associated only with other Italians, and made a fortune that they then took back to Italy, were foreigners. But opinions differed as to Italians who remained in France, assimilated to French society, sought naturalization, and exhibited an emotional attachment to their adopted country. While many considered them now 'French,' others required French birth for that identity. French rulers' political ambitions in the Italian peninsula greatly complicated the definition of Frenchness in a country in which the king had only gained control of Provence and Brittany in the late fifteenth century.[34]

Renegades or Refugees? Changing Views of Changing Allegiance

The difficulties of settling dynastic claims to territories that rulers had inherited frequently resulted in significant changes in borders as the result of military conflicts to enforce those claims. An individual might unexpectedly have faced radically altered circumstances leading him to reconsider to whom he should commit both his loyalty and his future hopes for advancement. Also inhabitants of territories that

a ruler inherited or conquered did not necessarily feel that they owed allegiance to a particular ruler simply because he now claimed to rule the territory where they lived. Consequently it is easy to provide many examples of state servants who changed their allegiance during this period for a wide variety of reasons, in addition to the five men whose biographies will be analyzed in more detail.

Philippe de Commynes was a Burgundian who deserted Duke Charles of Burgundy in 1472 and entered the service of Louis XI of France. Some modern Belgian historians consider his actions treasonous, but to other historians such a view is anachronistic for it presupposes that Burgundy was a nation capable of being betrayed. They maintain that all Commynes 'did was to break his personal obligations to a dynasty which had furthered not only his own career but that of his father and his grandfather.'[35] By switching masters Commynes became an intimate of the king he chose to serve, who gave him a pension of 6000 livres and the fief of Argenton. Commynes did not believe foreigners should be employed in state service, thus he did not regard himself as a foreigner in France.[36]

Charles de Bourbon, one of the wealthiest nobles in the kingdom of France, rebelled against François I of France, and then chose to serve the French king's arch enemy, the Habsburg Charles V. Bourbon invaded France as an imperial commander in 1524, afterwards dying at the head of the imperial troops that sacked Rome in 1527. Pierre de Brantôme, a sixteenth century French author who wrote brief biographies of both French and foreign illustrious men, viewed the duke as a great foreign captain, not a French commander.[37]

Brantôme's views on what constituted a French identity reveal the range of possibilities that identity encompassed at the end of the sixteenth century. Brantôme was a French nobleman with court connections who traveled widely. While he never obtained an important position, he remained at the courts of the final Valois kings of France until about 1589 when he suffered injuries as the result of a fall from his horse. He then retired to his chateau to write his memoirs of the illustrious men and women whom he had encountered. He gave orders at his death that his memoirs be published. A reliable edition by Ludovic Lalane was published in the nineteenth century for the

Société de l'Histoire de France. The first six volumes of this eleven-volume set of Brantôme's complete works focus on military men: commanders, admirals, rulers, and great nobles. Volumes one and two contain short biographies of great foreign commanders; volumes three and four those of great French commanders. Volumes five and six include Discourses on the 'Couronnels' of the Infantry of France and on Duels. The first four volumes provide separate brief biographies of individuals. Volumes five and six do not contain separate biographies, although individuals are treated in much the same fashion as in the first four volumes. Frequently, individuals are discussed in more than one volume. Organization was not Brantôme's strong point, juicy gossip was. (He also wrote about women, those who were 'illustrious' and those who were 'galante', that is to say, involved in love affairs.)

For Brantôme whether an individual was considered foreign or French depended not on where the person originally came from, but to whom he eventually committed his loyalty. If a man concluded his career in service to the French ruler then he was French, whether he was originally Italian or German. If he was born in France but then served another ruler, then Brantôme considered him to be a foreigner.

An example of a man whom Brantome would have considered French was Antonio Rincon, a native of Spain who revolted against Charles V in 1520 and escaped to France in 1521, where he served François I as a diplomat. He became a counselor and chamberlain of the king and, later, seigneur de Germoles.[38] He was assassinated in Italy by Charles V's commander Del Vasto's troops in 1541 while on a diplomatic mission for François to the sultan. Modern historians consider him either a refugee from Charles V's policies in Spain or a renegade.[39]

The brothers Piero and Leon Strozzi were pro-French Florentine refugees who were cousins of Catherine de Medici, wife of Henri II of France. Leon was a Knight of St. John and captain of the galleys of Malta, who from 1539 until 1551 served the kings of France. Hoping to be elected grand master he returned to Malta, but being unsuccessful he returned to French service until his death in battle in 1554. Piero Strozzi, who served the French kings as a diplomat and, primarily, as a

military commander, became a marshal of France. Brantôme included him with French commanders, not foreign ones.[40]

These men who served rulers who were different from those who ruled the lands of their birth are considered as refugees or renegades depending on the viewpoint of the historian studying them. But western Europeans who went to serve the sultan are almost universally known as renegades because they usually converted to Islam.[41] The biographies that follow demonstrate connections between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe in terms of the employment of foreigners in state service. The careers of two Greek cousins of the Palaeologus family after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 illustrate the options available to cosmopolitan individuals.

Hüseyn

The death of Mehmed the Conqueror on 3 May 1481 resulted in a struggle for the succession to the Ottoman throne between his sons, Cem and Bayezid. When Bayezid defeated Cem, he fled first to the Mamluks and then to the Order of the Knights of St. John of Rhodes. Cem sailed to Rhodes in July 1482, never to return to Ottoman territories. From 1482 until his death in 1495, Cem was the pawn at the heart of diplomatic maneuverings associated with crusade plans and power struggles in Italy. Hüseyn,[42] Bayezid's special negotiator, was entrusted with the most delicate diplomacy of the sultan, who was trying to minimize the effects of the Knights' possession of Cem. In 1482, Hüseyn was instructed to negotiate with the ambassador of Naples and with the *bailo* of Venice to ensure their cooperation with the sultan concerning Cem. After completing these negotiations, he was sent to Lemnos in the Aegean to set up an information network.[43] During this period when Bayezid had recently come to the throne, he was putting his own men into powerful political positions in order to pursue his policies. Hüseyn was unquestionably the new sultan's man.

In December 1482, Bayezid informed the grand master of the Knights that he required his aid to send an ambassador to France, where Cem was imprisoned. Hüseyn was chosen for this assignment,

and in April 1483 he arrived in Rhodes with 40,000 ducats, the first annual payment from the sultan to the grand master to ensure that Cem remained captive.[44] Hüseyn traveled to France, but he was unable to see either the king or Cem.[45] Louis XI was on his deathbed and did not wish to enter into relations with infidels, and the knights prevented Hüseyn from meeting with Cem. After this embassy in 1485, Hüseyn reported in a letter to the sultan that he had organized espionage in all areas.[46]

In April 1486, Charles VIII, now king of France, wrote a safe conduct for Hüseyn to come to France as the sultan's ambassador.[47] This letter provides surprising information about Hüseyn, for it reveals that he was first cousin to Georges Palaeologus de Bissipat, a member of the king's council and one of his loyal supporters.[48] Hüseyn's case exhibits the difficulty of relying on Ottoman documents to discover if an individual has changed his identity and what his former identity was.[49] Apart from this letter, we have no clues about Hüseyn's background. His signed letters to the sultan merely state that he is his humble servant Hüseyn, using the typical Ottoman official language when addressing the sultan. Without this French document we would know nothing of Hüseyn's family background. However, this information explains why Hüseyn was so valuable to the sultan. The diplomatic language of the eastern Mediterranean world was Greek, Hüseyn's native tongue.[50] He also had ties with Christians in the west through his cousin in France who was serving the French king. Hüseyn obviously had the skills and the connections to fulfill his duties effectively.

Hüseyn was one of the most important of the sultan's servants during this crucial period of Cem's captivity in France, as he was not only an ambassador but also the director of an information network from the island of Lemnos. His official position was *subaşı* of Lemnos. A subaşı was the official under a *sancak beyi* (governor of a sancak, the basic administrative unit of the empire) and responsible for maintaining order in his district. He held a *zeamet* (a fief worth 20,000 to 100,000 *akçe*s, the Ottoman silver coin, annually) and commanded a group of timar holders. In this case, his assignment to this island was made so that he could discreetly gather information both from Rhodes

and from France.[51] The relative insignificance of his official position did not reflect his actual importance in diplomacy and espionage.

The island of Lemnos was peacefully surrendered to the Ottomans in 1456, three years after the conquest of Constantinople. Only a few months later it was conquered by a papal force, which held Lemnos until 1458, when the Ottomans regained control of the island, which in 1460–64 was ruled by an Ottoman vassal, Demetrios Palaeologus. In 1464 it was conquered by the Venetians during the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463–79), but it was surrendered to the Ottomans in 1479 when peace was concluded. When Hüseyn was assigned to this island in 1482, it had only recently been returned to Ottoman control, and Hüseyn complained to the sultan of the conditions on the island that year. The location of Lemnos was strategically important since it is only 35 nautical miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles. It should have been simple for Hüseyn to travel to and from Istanbul, but at the time communications with Istanbul were difficult because of a lack of ships.[52]

From a tax register (*tahrir defteri*) of 1489 for Lemnos, we learn about the Ottoman military and administration organization at this time. There were 281 military men on the island of which only twenty were Janissaries and the rest were local Christian auxiliaries. All of the tax income of the island went to pay Lemnos local administrators. The bulk of it went to the governor, who held a fief worth 93,468 akçes per year.[53] The revenues that a servitor of the sultan received did not solely depend on the importance of the district to which he was assigned; his personal importance was also taken into account. Not every subaşı of Lemnos would necessarily be given the same monetary compensation. The amount would be determined to a degree by what salary he had received up to that time.[54] Hüseyn was receiving near the maximum that a subaşı could earn; this was probably because of his personal importance as the sultan's negotiator.

We know that there were numerous Italians and Greeks who were in the service of the sultan. Greek converts, many of whom were from the local nobility, were very important in diplomacy, since Greek was the diplomatic language of the Levant and many Greeks preserved their ties with Christians in the west. Hüseyn, a good example

from this group, created a network that spied on Rhodes and Europe. Another Greek employed by the sultan was Antonio Rericho, who was sent by Bayezid to Charles VIII in 1488.[55] Hüseyn had converted at some point in his career, as his name indicates. Antonio, on the other hand, appears not to have converted since he did not have a Muslim name, but he was still employed by the sultan for an important embassy. Conversion was not mandatory for all in the sultan's service.

In 1489 after Cem had been transferred to Rome, negotiations between Bayezid and the grand master concerning Cem's pension were conducted via Lemnos and Hüseyn. During this time of crisis, the sultan was taking diplomatic matters into his own hands and not leaving them to his viziers, so he employed his own man, Hüseyn. Though the grand master wanted to negotiate directly with Hüseyn in person, the sultan instructed the grand master to send his ambassador to Lemnos to negotiate with Hüseyn. Hüseyn, through correspondence with the grand master, negotiated a secret accord between the grand master and Bayezid. These negotiations may have prepared the way for subsequent Ottoman negotiations with the pope.[56] Bayezid relied on Hüseyn, whom the sultan had described in 1483 in a letter to Louis XI as 'my loyal servitor who is close to me.'[57]

George Palaeologus Dyshpatos, Known as Georges le Grec de Bicipat

Like his cousin Hüseyn, we know little about George Palaeologus Dyshpatos's early life. In April 1460, George first appears in French documents as 'our noble man Georges le Grec, counselor and chamberlain of the king and vicomte of Falaise.'[58] The office of counselor was not well defined, but the title principally implied the confidence of the king and the faithfulness of the counselor.[59] George was highly favored by two kings of France, Louis XI and Charles VIII. He was Louis XI's counselor, and in 1474 he was made the commander of Lisieux in Normandy. By 1475 George was also the captain of Orbec and the vicomte of Auge. During the campaign of that year, he received the command of the great royal ships, which came with a house in

Bordeaux and a pension of 800 livres.[60] George may also have been an ambassador, for in 1494 a 'George the Greek' is mentioned as the bearer of letters from the king of France to England, but he fell ill on the way there.[61]

It was in the French navy that George was especially prominent. He was, among other things, well-known as a captain in French service who preyed on merchant shipping. In 1476 he participated in an expedition against the Spanish, and in 1485 he was probably involved in a raid against the Venetian and Hanseatic League merchant fleets. In 1487 and 1491 the Council of Danzig blamed him for seizing two of their vessels. Also, George may have overseen the construction of a 'great ship,' *La Normande*, for the king and then been responsible for its maintenance.[62] The skills he brought to France seem to have been, among others, maritime. Many western governments sought Greeks with shipbuilding skills in the fifteenth century. Shortly before Louis XI's death in 1483, the king commissioned George to sail to the 'green island' to obtain a substance believed to be essential to restore the king's health. This was considered to be a long and dangerous voyage whose success was vital for the king's survival, so it is probable that Louis XI chose the best captain available.[63]

In 1476 Andronicus Callistus, a Byzantine scholar, wrote to George requesting his help in paying the fine for another Greek, George Hermonymos, who was imprisoned in London.[64] Hermonymos had been arrested because the Italian merchants in London believed that he was reporting the movements of their ships to George. Hermonymos and Callistus had been members of the household of Cardinal Bessarion, a Greek convert to Catholicism. Hermonymos had been chosen by Pope Sixtus IV to go on a diplomatic mission to London to negotiate the release of an imprisoned archbishop. After his own release, Hermonymos went to France, perhaps to enjoy the protection of Georges de Bissipat.[65]

In 1477, George was entrusted with a delicate mission. Alfonso V, king of Portugal, had come to France to make peace between France and Burgundy. When this appeared to be impossible, George was ordered to prepare the fleet to take Alfonso V home. While the fleet was being prepared, the king of Portugal disappeared because he feared

for his safety, so the sailing was delayed until he could be found. Then the fleet under the general command of George escorted him home. According to one source, Alfonso V was so pleased with him that he asked Louis XI to reward him by naturalizing George.[66] Whether this was done because of the king of Portugal's request or not, George was naturalized in November 1477. The naturalization reads in part:

> We have received the humble supplication of our well loved and loyal counselor and chamberlain, Georges de Bicipat called the Greek, chevalier, native of the land of Greece, captain of our great ship and of our city and castle of Touque; ... the said supplicant desires to serve us, he has come to our kingdom, where he has acquired goods, and we have taken him into our service; and because of these great goods and honors which he has found and known in our kingdom, and he has had in our service, he has decided to make his residence for all his life in our kingdom. ... [67]

The following year George married Marguerite de Poix and through her acquired fiefs in Normandy, where his other possessions were mainly located. He is mentioned frequently in documents in the following years. In 1486, King Charles VIII in his safe conduct for Hüseyn called George 'our well loved and trusted counselor.' When George died in 1496, he was counselor and chamberlain of the king; lord of Hannaches, Trouissereux, Blicourt, and Mazis; vicomte de Falaise; and captain of Toucques and of the great ship of the king, *La Normande*.[68]

We know that George was in contact with other Greek exiles because of the letter of 1476 that Andronicus Callistus, who claimed to have been a friend of George's parents, wrote to him.[69] Callistus's letter presented his view of George's position in relation to other Greeks and to the king of France.

> I am also eagerly desirous of gaining your friendship, you who are a man well born and my compatriot, and who has been honoured for his deeds in war and statecraft, and this while living

> in a foreign land in which there is great envy and little love towards foreigners. George [Hermonymos] ... was charged by the Italian merchants there with having sent letters to you, George, and revealing everything that they did against you. At that time it was the belief of these merchants that George was betraying their other activities to you in writing, so that traps and ambushes could easily be laid by you against them, to seize them. ... And now he comes to you, trusting in you, after God, and through you the most serene King of the French. ... act like your own father and your other forebears, ... I have explained also the things which your friend George has endured for you and the serene King: ... Bring succour to him, both from yourself and especially from the most excellent and serene King. The King is justified in helping the man. ... so much the more will he do it for one who deserves it through having suffered many evils on his behalf. But if indeed you add your rank and the freedom which you have to speak before the King (for I understand that you have the greatest power with him), he will be more eager for the good deed. ... you can be certain that I am a family friend. ... For everyone, however slightly they know the language of the Greeks, they all owe the greatest thanks to you, ... [70]

Callistus's letter indicates the difficult position of foreigners in France; George petitioned the following year to be naturalized in order to secure the advantages of his service to the king. George employed other Greeks in information gathering activities both for his own activities on the sea and also on missions for the king. Since Hermonymos had served the king of France, the king should assist him since he was imprisoned and in need of money. Callistus indicated that the Greeks in 1476 continued to use their connections to assist each other.

George Palaeologus Dyshpatos was from a prominent Byzantine family with influential connections. Several men with the Dyshpatos name had served as imperial ambassadors earlier in the fifteenth century, so his family may have had ties in the west before 1453. (George's father may also have been named George Dyshpatos. This earlier George Dyshpatos was deceased in 1469, and Cardinal Bessarion had

provided a dowry for his daughter.) George maintained his connection to Rome during his residence in France and secured knighthoods for his sons from Andreas Palaeologus, the heir in exile to the Byzantine throne, in 1481.[71]

We know more concerning George le Grec's family in France. His brother, Alphonse, also came to France and was known as a chevalier but did not receive the honors and rewards that George did from his royal service. From his marriage to Marguerite, George had three children, two sons and a daughter, who each married into the nobility of Normandy.[72] His younger son, Guillaume de Bissipat, who was also called 'the Greek,' was in the service of Louis XII, where he was a Knight of the order of the king, one of the first of the hundred gentlemen of the king's house, and then their captain. He was killed in battle in 1512 fighting Spanish and papal troops who were besieging the port of Boulogne in Normandy. He was known not only for his military ability but also for his learning.[73]

From what we know about George's family's circumstances we can make a few deductions. First, George changed his religion from Greek Orthodox to Roman Catholic. He built both a town house and a country residence with chapels, in one of which two of his children were buried. He married a French woman, Marguerite, presumably a Catholic, and their children married with the French nobility who were Catholic.[74] Second, George's prosperity was dependent on his service to the king, since he received most of his property as a reward for his service. His son who was also employed in royal service did well, while another son who seems to have lived on his inherited property was in financial difficulties. Third, George was well rewarded for his service and became French. This does not mean that people forgot his origin; both he and his son were known as 'the Greek.' But he was naturalized and his children inherited his property and intermarried with the surrounding nobility. One can trace his family for many generations in the French aristocracy. George certainly assimilated into his new country, and he owed his success to his employment in royal service.[75] George, like his cousin Hüseyn, enjoyed the trust of the ruler he served, and his loyalty was an essential attribute of his state service.

Two famous naval commanders of the sixteenth century, Hayreddin Barbarossa and Andrea Doria, were born in the second half of the fifteenth century. Their lives follow the same pattern as our fifteenth-century examples: their expertise was highly prized by the rulers they served and their service in behalf of Süleyman and Charles V respectively resulted in great personal success.

Hayreddin Barbarossa

The identity of Hayreddin Barbarossa, the most renowned Ottoman seaman of the sixteenth century, has been controversial since that time. Most western accounts regarding his background have their ultimate source in the work of a Spanish monk, Diego de Haedo, who wrote at the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century. His sources seem to have been his uncle's notes of the testimonies of former captives in North Africa.[76] This explains some of the inaccuracies of his account. Hayreddin left his own memoirs, which may also have their element of fiction, but, for the most part, they are a much more reliable account of his origins and exploits.

Hayreddin was probably born about 1466 on the island of Lesbos (Midilli). His father, Yakub, the son of a sipahi, was a sipahi who had settled on the island after participating in the Ottoman conquest in 1462. Yakub married a Greek girl and had four sons,[77] three of whom made a living in coastal trade. One of them, Oruç, after an encounter with the Knights of St. John on Rhodes, started *gazi* raids on Christian targets or became a corsair, depending on one's point of view. Oruç and his brother, Hayreddin, sailed westward fearing possible persecution from the new sultan, Selim, because Oruç had been a supporter of Selim's brother, Korkud, in their rivalry for the throne. Oruç and Hayreddin adopted the island of Jerba on the North African coast as a base in 1513.[78] Hayreddin performed numerous exploits but remained in the shadow of his brother until Oruç's death in 1518. During the next few years he gained control of several North African ports, including Algiers. Hayreddin sent an embassy to Selim requesting support, and the sultan accepted the overlordship of Algiers with Hayreddin as his governor. Hayreddin's fortunes on the North African coast during

the 1520s varied as he gained and lost control of several port towns. Andrea Doria, the Spanish admiral, unsuccessfully attacked him in 1530.[79] When Doria captured Coron in Greece in 1532, the sultan, Süleyman, decided he needed an expert to lead the Ottoman navy. He sent to Algiers for Hayreddin to come to Istanbul as the admiral of the Ottoman fleet.[80] Hayreddin led the Ottoman fleet to many victories until his death in 1546. In addition to being the admiral and the governor of the islands (*Cezair Beylerbeyi*),[81] he was a member of the council that governed the Ottoman Empire under the sultan.

Hayreddin's accomplishments were impressive, from the establishment of his power in North Africa continuing through the years when, as admiral of the Ottoman navy, he defeated the combined Venetian and Spanish fleets. But what is most interesting for the purposes of this chapter on identity are the various accounts of his ethnic origins. Hayreddin was born an Ottoman subject and he served the sultan faithfully, requesting Ottoman protection for Algiers and ruling it as an Ottoman governor. In Ottoman eyes he was not a 'foreigner', but some contemporary European Christians depicted him as one, and modern historians accept their view rather than Hayreddin's of his identity. According to Haedo, Oruç and Hayreddin were brought up as Christians on Lesbos but converted to Islam after becoming corsairs. Haedo also claims that Jacob, their father, was a Greek, a Christian, and a potter.[82] Other western authors claim that the brothers were from Cilicia and that their mother was from Andalusia in Spain.[83] According to the *Gazavat* (and therefore Hayreddin himself), Hayreddin was the son of a Muslim father and a Greek mother. Another significant source that reveals Hayreddin's self-identification is the inscription on the mosque he built in Algiers. This inscription dating to April 1520 states that he was: 'al-sultan al-mudjahid mawlana Khayr al-Din ibn al-amir al-shahir al-mudjahid Abi Yusuf Ya'kub al-Turki.'[84] Thus Hayreddin claimed that his father was 'Turkish.' Whether this inscription reflected the conflict with the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean where Turkish speaking seamen had been raiding Christian shipping since the 1490s or whether Hayreddin's father was descended from Turkish settlers in the Balkans is impossible to determine.

Brantôme related a story that he had heard about the origins of the Barbarossa brothers, although he stated that it was generally known that Hayreddin was from Lesbos. According to Brantôme, a French noble family claimed that the Barbarossas were actually from France, but, since they had gone to Lesbos and converted to Islam, it was thought that they were originally from there. He admitted that this claim was unlikely, but that if it were true Hayreddin brought honor to France.[85] Brantôme discussed Hayreddin's ancestry in his 'Discours' on French couronnels. When he described his exploits in his collection of biographies of great foreign commanders, he referred the reader back to what he had previously written concerning Barbarossa's ancestry. Brantôme considered Hayreddin both possibly French, because of his ancestry, and foreign, because of his service to Süleyman, the Ottoman sultan. While historians continue to debate the ethnic origins of the Barbarossa brothers, Hayreddin remained loyal to the Ottoman sultan despite offers from Charles V to persuade him to enter his service. Charles V apparently approached Hayreddin before the battle of Prevesa in 1538, and the French suspected that the Spanish were making offers to him again in 1544, but he was not swayed from his Ottoman allegiance.[86] Hayreddin was one of many corsairs who, while their ethnic origins remain unclear, by the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth were certainly Muslim and fully Ottoman.[87]

Andrea Doria

Andrea Doria, born in 1466 into a noble Genoese family, became a *condottiere* who served many rulers, among them Pope Innocent VIII and then Ferdinand and Alfonso of Naples. He fought in the Aragonese forces that forced the French to abandon Naples, but later he went to the French court of Louis XII, who gained control of Genoa in 1499. During the following years, Doria's career and Genoa's fortunes were in a constant state of flux depending on who predominated in Italy. In 1512 the French were expelled from Genoa and a Genoese, Fregoso, became doge until the French returned in 1513. Doria was made commander of the galleys of Genoa in 1513 as the Genoese

tried to improve their weak naval forces. (Genoa contributed nine galleys for a raid against North Africa in 1516, two of which were commanded by Doria.) In 1522 Doria entered French service, but in the same year Charles V took Genoa and deposed the French faction in the city. Andrea Doria, employed by François I, helped the French defend Marseilles when it was besieged by Charles de Bourbon, employed by Charles V, in 1522. After François I was captured at the battle of Pavia, Doria served Pope Clement VII until 1527 when François was freed and Doria helped him capture Genoa from the imperial forces. But soon thereafter, he became dissatisfied with his treatment by François I, and in 1528 he deserted the king of France for the emperor Charles V, taking with him his fleet of twelve galleys. Doria may also have realized by 1528 that he was backing the wrong ruler and that he had more to gain by supporting the rising fortunes of Charles V. With the help of imperial forces, he drove the French out of Genoa, after which Charles V made him Captain General of the Sea.[88]

Doria was an ambitious man, not a patriot in the modern sense,[89] who sold his services to the highest bidder. Sometimes his personal interests coincided with those of Genoa and sometimes not, for instance when he besieged his native city while in French service. By the terms of the agreement between Doria and Charles, Genoa's 'independence' was guaranteed by imperial arms, but no imperial garrison was allowed in Genoa. Doria ruled Genoa (1528–60) under Charles V, and he personally owned many of the galleys that were in Spanish service. He was paid for the use of his galleys, and in addition he was given an annual allowance of 12,000 ducats which served as his salary. He was also given special trade concessions so that he, and his great-nephew who followed him as Captain General, made a fortune. In 1538 he led a fleet of Spanish, Venetian, and papal galleys at the battle of Preveza, which ended in an Ottoman victory. Until his death in 1560, he continued actively to lead fleets in naval actions against the Ottomans. Doria was at the same time the ruler of Genoa, the Captain General of the Spanish fleet, and a 'naval entrepreneur' in business for himself.[90] That there were conflicts of interest relating to his multiple identities is clear from the complaints of the Venetians about his conduct while commander of the fleet of the Holy League in 1538.[91] But

the Spanish kings, whom he and his relatives served, were satisfied with the arrangement, which met their needs, and it continued until the battle of Lepanto in 1571.

Both Hayreddin and Doria gained great prestige, wealth, and power because of the naval needs of their respective sovereigns. Naval warfare had become one of the main areas of rivalry between the Ottoman and the Habsburg rulers, who both strengthened their fleets by attracting naval entrepreneurs to their service. Both admirals had proven their worth and gained a position of authority before ultimately tying their destiny to service to a ruler of a more powerful state. Doria became the ruler of his native city, but he and the other Dorias who followed him governed it under the king of Spain. Hayreddin was assigned as governor of a province that included, in addition to the territory he had conquered in North Africa, the islands and coasts of the eastern Mediterranean.[92] His son Hasan was given Algiers to govern shortly before Hayreddin's death, but when Hasan proved unsatisfactory Süleyman replaced him. In each case the identity of these admirals had multiple facets.

Christophe de Roggendorf

My final case history is that of Christophe de Roggendorf, who was born in 1510. He was the son of Wilhelm von Roggendorf, one of Ferdinand of Austria's chief counselors and his lord high steward. Wilhelm, who was known as the defender of Buda and Vienna when they were attacked by the Ottomans, died in 1541 from wounds he received fighting the Ottomans.[93] Christophe, a hereditary grand master of Austria, served in the armies of Germany, but, after he had a dispute with his wife, Elisabeth d'Oetting, the emperor Charles V ruled in her favor and she received most of Roggendorf's property.[94]

As a result of this decision, which he believed wronged him, in September 1546 Roggendorf went to the Ottoman Empire with 40,000 ducats to offer his services to the sultan, because the sultan was the most powerful of Charles V's enemies. In October, Roggendorf was received by Süleyman and made a member of the *Müteferrika*, an elite group in the palace generally composed of the sons of pashas

and vassal rulers. Except for men in the müteferrika, only slaves could enter the palace organization, but the müteferrika included freeborn Muslims and Christians. Roggendorf was given 100 akçes a day, (about two écus) and was not pressed to change his religion. In January 1547, he promised the sultan that he would raise his friends and partisans in order to make the Ottomans the masters of Vienna. When d'Aramon, the French ambassador, arrived in May, he joined with Roggendorf to try to persuade the sultan to attack Charles V. D'Aramon sent information to François I that Roggendorf was the greatest enemy the emperor had, and to gain revenge he was encouraging the sultan to attack Vienna.[95]

During the following months, Roggendorf became dissatisfied with his position in the Ottoman Empire, and in September he tried to leave Istanbul because he had not received the advancement he hoped for.[96] He felt he was being pressured to become a 'Turk,' or Muslim, since he had been informed that he would receive a post in Baghdad if he would convert, but he hoped to remain a Christian and to have a position where he could attack Charles V. Chesneau, a member of the French embassy wrote, 'Also, they tried to solicit and persuade him to become a Turk and that if he were a Turk, the said Grand Seigneur would make him one of his great captains, indeed greater than Louis Gritti, the bastard son of a Duke of Venice and that otherwise the Grand Seigneur could not be sure of him, nor give him any office.'[97] Before his escape attempt, Roggendorf informed d'Aramon that he wished to enter French service. Roggendorf traveled as far as Crete before a Turkish corsair recognized him and brought him back to Istanbul where he was imprisoned by the sultan for four months. D'Aramon obtained his release by requesting it on behalf of the French king.[98]

In February, Roggendorf was allowed to go to France where he was given a pension from the court of 4000 livres from this time on. In 1549 Henri II made him a gentleman of the king's chamber, and he held this post until 1569. In December 1549 he was given the 'les d'Hyères in Provence as a marquisate. He served the kings of France as an infantry commander and an envoy, and he also performed secret commissions for which he was richly rewarded. In 1561 Charles IX made him a knight of the order of St. Michel. He continued to receive

gifts of money from Henri III and was still alive in 1585, although, because of his extravagance, he was reduced to poverty. Brantôme included him in his volume on Great French captains.[99]

Roggendorf's biography illustrates sixteenth-century views of loyalty and conversion. When he felt that Charles V had wronged him, he did not hesitate to take his services to the emperor's most powerful enemy, Süleyman, the Muslim sultan of the Ottoman Empire. But Roggendorf was unwilling to change his religion, which Süleyman demanded as a sign of his loyalty, so Süleyman refused to give him a significant position. Roggendorf then sought employment by Charles V's next most powerful enemy, the king of France. When he was unable to leave Süleyman's territory through his own efforts, the French ambassador was able to arrange his release on behalf of Henri II of France. After Roggendorf came to France, he was able to fulfill his ambitions through employment by the kings of France. Apparently this was a mutually satisfactory arrangement for Roggendorf remained in France, honored and paid by French kings. Toward the end of his long and eventful life when Brantôme wrote Roggendorf's biography, he considered him to be French and, according to the standards of the time, he was. He resided in France, gave loyal service to the Valois kings of France, and received in return offices and honors.

The biographies of these five men, Hüseyn, George de Bissipat, Hayreddin Barbarossa, Andrea Doria, and Christophe de Roggendorf, show some common characteristics in terms of service to the state. With the possible exception of Hayreddin Pasha, none of these men was ethnically from the same background as the leader he ultimately chose to serve. This did not prevent these men from successfully pursuing careers serving these rulers and reaping the rewards of their loyalty and expertise.

Hüseyn and George, Greek cousins, were both employed by non-Greek rulers who appreciated their skills and connections. After the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople brought the Byzantine Empire to an end, they had to find careers serving in the administration of other states. Both cousins were employed in situations that required delicacy and loyalty. Both were involved in obtaining information and

controlled networks of informants. Hüseyn and George were highly trusted by the Ottoman sultan and the kings of France respectively and were richly rewarded for their efforts.

If we were unaware of Hüseyn's background, we might assume that as a 'Turk' from the Ottoman Empire when he was sent to France in 1483, he had had no previous contact with western European Christians.[100] As more pieces of the aspects of his identity are added to our knowledge, we shift in our interpretation of how he would have fulfilled the sensitive portions of the responsibilities entrusted to him by Bayezid. The first piece that then impacts all of our assumptions regarding Hüseyn's identity is learning that his first cousin was a highly regarded Greek in the service of the French king.[101] Then we comprehend that in George's family, and therefore in Hüseyn's, there were men who had performed embassies to western Europe during the first half of the fifteenth century,[102] consequently we realize that Hüseyn came from a family that had had international connections in western Europe for years. These connections were maintained after the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. George had contacts with many Greeks in the west and most likely in the east as well. Hüseyn had apparently been in contact with George before Charles VIII issued the safe conduct in 1486, since the document mentions the intervention of George in the matter.[103] Also Hüseyn had previously negotiated with representatives from Venice and Naples, as well as the grand master, a Frenchman. He skillfully conducted negotiations with Christian Europeans during a dangerous period for Bayezid, whom he served faithfully.

Hayreddin Barbarossa and Andrea Doria's careers also have a great deal in common. Hayreddin's father was a member of the Ottoman ruling class on the island of Lesbos. Hayreddin's early years were spent on a Greek island ruled by the Ottoman sultan. His own family life reflected this political situation: his Muslim father married a Greek resident of the island. After sailing to the western Mediterranean, Hayreddin spent many years with his brother carving out a base of operations in North Africa, which he submitted to the Ottoman sultan in exchange for protection. Eventually Hayreddin returned to the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire as the admiral of the Ottoman

fleet. Hayreddin's expertise also allowed him to conduct diplomacy between Süleyman and François I as well as lead their joint military operations.

Doria's family was part of the old nobility of Genoa, and he spent his early years in Genoese territory before he left to pursue a career as a condottiere in Italy, where he found employment with Italian rulers, the French, and later the Spanish. He gained power in Genoa and was able to rule it under the sovereign that he chose to serve, but Genoa was not in a position to remain independent of the great states that fought for control of Italy. Doria eventually became the admiral for the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, who was also king of Spain and ruler of most of Italy.

Finally, Roggendorf has the distinction of having served all the most powerful rulers of his time, the Habsburg emperor Charles V, the Ottoman sultan Süleyman, and the Valois kings of France, Henri II, Charles IX, and Henri III. When he deserted Charles V after the bond of personal loyalty was broken between them, he sought advancement with the emperor's enemies. He first hoped to obtain his objectives with Süleyman but was unwilling to show his loyalty to the sultan by converting to Islam. No such difficulty hindered his second attempt with Henri II of France, from whom he obtained the positions and rewards that he desired. It is significant that the impediment to his success in the Ottoman Empire was his unwillingness to convert, which Süleyman demanded as a sign of his loyalty.

Cosmopolitan individuals such as these five men were most often involved in cross-cultural relations, as they moved fairly freely from ruler to ruler, looking for the best match for their ambition and abilities. As shown by these individuals, a person could decide to serve a ruler, move to his territory, and, if the arrangement was mutually satisfactory, the individual could be adopted into his new country. The key was the loyalty that the individual brought to his service to the ruler. If the person was able and loyal, the rewards were great. The individuals discussed here were given positions, land, and money. Contemporaries viewed them as belonging to their new state. Brantôme categorized those men who chose to be French in his great French captains because they met the contemporary criteria of what it meant to be French. In

contrast, those who were born in France but decided not to be French were considered by him to be foreigners, because the choices they had made caused them to forfeit their French status. What mattered was the decisions that they made, not their ancestry or birth. Ottoman practice was similar: whatever the ethnic or religious background of the men in the sultan's service, they were considered to be Ottomans if they were loyal to the ruler and state they chose to serve. Hüseyn and Hayreddin and the many others like them were Ottomans and they served their rulers and state faithfully.

Dynastic loyalty, that is loyalty to an individual ruler, was the key to elite political identity during this period. Religious identity was becoming a part of this political identity as conversion, whether from Christian to Muslim, or Protestant to Catholic, came to be required as a sign of political loyalty. While more Christian Europeans were attracted to the Ottoman Empire than Ottoman Muslims to Christian Europe, the possibility of such a relationship was there, as evidenced by Charles V's attempts to employ Hayreddin. Having succeeded in attracting Doria from François, he viewed the other great seaman of the time as another possible servant of the Habsburg dynasty. Thus rulers competed for those individuals who would enhance their power, while their potential state servants chose the political identity that would fulfill their own ambitions. Rivalry among the powerful rulers of the sixteenth century did not occur solely on the battlefield but also in the recruitment of the most able men to increase the power and prestige of the ambitious monarchs. Losing in this competition through failing to properly reward these key individuals doomed a ruler to fall behind in the quest for power.

CHAPTER 3

SULTAN CEM: A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE INFIDELS

The death of Mehmed the Conqueror in May 1481 led to a struggle for the Ottoman throne between his sons Cem and Bayezid, and subsequently to an Ottoman-French encounter in the fifteenth century. In this chapter, I argue that these fifteenth-century contacts set a precedent for the diplomatic relations between Süleyman and François I in the sixteenth century. The Ottoman sultan Bayezid sent ambassadors to the kings of France and offered to assist Charles VIII against his enemies. Although Charles VIII did not accept this Ottoman initiative, in the sixteenth century François I would form an alliance with Süleyman and request his aid against his foes.

When Bayezid defeated Cem, Cem fled first to the Mamluks and then to the Order of the Knights of St. John of Rhodes. Cem sailed to Rhodes in July 1482, never to return to Ottoman territories. From 1482 until his death in 1495, Cem was the pawn at the heart of diplomatic maneuverings associated with crusade plans and power struggles in Italy. The Knights sent him to France where he remained their prisoner until the pope agreed to make the grand master of

the Knights a cardinal, then Cem was taken to Rome in 1489 and became the pope's captive. Charles VIII of France invaded Italy and took possession of Cem in 1495 after he entered Rome on his passage to Naples. Shortly thereafter, Cem died at Naples while in the custody of Charles VIII's army.

Cem's sojourn in France and Italy from 1482 until 1495 is a unique example of an Ottoman-French encounter, since Cem was a contender for the Ottoman throne whose adventures had diplomatic significance. In addition, one of Cem's Ottoman companions described his life among the infidels, providing an Ottoman view of the events of these years when Cem was the focal point of Ottoman and Christian European diplomacy. This description provides a fascinating, Ottoman view of the intersection of religion and politics in the final decades of the fifteenth century.

Traditional western historiography on relations between the Ottomans and western Europe during the final two decades of the fifteenth century has relied almost exclusively on western sources.[1] Taking into account Ottoman views of Cem's experiences modifies the traditional perspective of Ottoman relations with European Christians found in western sources. The Ottoman-French alliance of the sixteenth century is often considered an unprecedented development in the history of diplomatic relations between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, rather than a logical progression from those relations between the Ottomans and their western neighbors in the fifteenth century. Cem's experiences demonstrate the Ottomans' extensive involvement in international relations with western Europe in the fifteenth century. These relations in the late fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth century were dominated by conflict in the Italian peninsula. After 1494, France's military expedition to Italy intensified this focus, as the peninsula became the prize that the Valois kings of France, the Habsburgs of Spain, and the Ottomans all desired.

Cem: From Ottoman Prince to Pawn in Renaissance Diplomacy

Due to Ottoman expansion during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Ottoman Empire was feared by its neighbors, Muslim and Christian

alike. The Knights of Rhodes, who had suffered an Ottoman siege in 1480, sought to limit their vulnerablity. Also in 1480, the Ottomans gained a foothold in Italy at Otranto; consequently the pope was prominent among Italian rulers who endeavored to contain Ottoman power. Finally, Ottoman expansion to the east threatened the Mamluks in Anatolia. Mehmed's death in 1481 and the civil war that followed between his two sons provided a respite for these rulers whose lands were threatened by Ottoman expansion.

At the time of Mehmed's death, Bayezid II (1481–1512) gained the support of the Janissaries and those elements of the administration and the state that had been disaffected by his father's policies. Bayezid arrived in Istanbul and was proclaimed sultan,[2] while Cem reigned briefly at Bursa and gathered troops with which to fight his brother. Cem proposed dividing the empire, suggesting that Bayezid rule the Ottoman provinces in Europe, Rumeli, while he ruled the provinces in Anatolia. When Bayezid refused to consider this division, the fraternal contenders' forces met at the battle of Yenişehir where Cem was defeated. Cem and his remaining supporters fled to Konya and then to Egypt.[3]

Upon his arrival in Cairo, Cem was favorably received by Kaytbay, the Mamluk sultan, who entertained him frequently at his palace. Cem made the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. After returning to Cairo, Cem was persuaded by men sent by Kasim Bey, of the Karaman dynasty, and by Mehmed Bey, of Ankara, to attempt to conquer some Ottoman territories rather than to remain in exile in Mamluk lands.[4] In the spring of 1482, Cem returned to Anatolia, but his supporters were again defeated by Bayezid.[5] In the negotiations that ensued, Bayezid offered to provide Cem with an allowance if he resided in Jerusalem, but Kasim Bey encouraged Cem to go to Rumeli, hoping to force Bayezid to withdraw troops from Anatolia and to give Cem a few provinces.[6] Cem decided to go to Rumeli by way of Rhodes, and so he dispatched Frenk Süleyman Bey, because of his linguistic abilities, to the Knights of Rhodes to negotiate a safe conduct in July 1482. This safe conduct would ensure Cem's liberty and allow him to arrive and depart from Rhodes as he wished, for which Cem promised to reward the Knights in proportion to the assistance he received. The Knights

responded by issuing two safe conducts: one in the name of the grand master, Pierre d'Aubusson, and one in the name of the Order.[7]

Cem, accompanied by approximately thirty men, sailed to Rhodes, and the grand master informed Pope Sixtus IV that he had offered Cem refuge because of the advantages this gave Christendom. He suggested forming an expedition to aid Cem because 'his brother who is without courage' would be unable to resist. He further explained that even if this expedition did not occur, the Knights would still keep their faith 'because a promise made, even to an enemy and to an infidel, must not be violated.' The grand master informed his correspondents that Cem had chosen to come to Rhodes and was free to leave when he wished.[8]

Despite Cem's supposed freedom, the Knights deliberated as to whether to detain Cem on Rhodes or send him to France, although according to documents from the Archives of the Order the Knights sent Cem to France at his own request. Before he sailed, Cem gave the grand master authority to negotiate with Bayezid in his name as well as a treaty promising benefits to the Knights of Rhodes if he were successful in becoming sultan.[9]

Only after Cem had departed did the Knights dispatch ambassadors to Bayezid, from whom they obtained a favorable treaty because the Knights possessed Cem. Bayezid sent an ambassador to the grand master, d'Aubusson, who negotiated an accord that in return for 45,000 ducats every year, the grand master would ensure that Cem did not trouble Bayezid. The Ottoman ambassador informed the sultan that he had concluded an agreement with the grand master because he had received a letter written in Turkish with the signature and seal of Cem from d'Aubusson, which declared that the grand master had authority to negotiate Cem's affairs with Bayezid.[10]

Cem reached Nice (in the territory of the duchy of Savoy) in October 1482 where he remained for over three months, although he was anxious to leave for Hungary where he had been told he would be transported after coming to France. While Cem remained at Nice, the Knights gradually began to separate him from his Ottoman companions. During these months when Cem waited for permission to proceed to Hungary, many parties were bargaining with each other to obtain

possession of him. Finally, Louis XI of France agreed to allow Cem to travel to France. After spending several months in the domains of the duke of Savoy, Cem eventually met the duke, who tried to release him from the Knights, but they transferred him from Savoy to France in June 1483.[11]

As the Knights completed their plans to convey Cem to France to reside in their fortresses, Bayezid's ambassador to the grand master, Hüseyn Bey,[12] arrived in Rhodes in April 1483 bringing a treaty concerning Cem as well as 40,000 ducats and a letter from Bayezid. The sultan requested that the grand master assist Hüseyn Bey in his journey to the king of France to seek permission for Cem to remain in France guarded by the Knights.[13] Hüseyn Bey traveled to France accompanied by one of the Knights and with their support, but the *Vakı'at* claims that when Hüseyn Bey went to Chambery to meet with Cem, the Knights with 'thousands of tricks' prevented Hüseyn from seeing him. Commynes' evidence provides additional support for this assertion.[14] In fact, Hüseyn Bey was not allowed to meet with either Louis XI or Cem. The king's mortal illness in the summer of 1483 explains why he refused to receive Hüseyn, but it does not explain why Hüseyn Bey was prevented from approaching Cem.[15] The Knights prevented contact between Cem and any Ottoman ambassadors sent by his brother in order to prevent a fraternal accord, although Bayezid may have already concluded that his only release from the problem of Cem would be Cem's death.[16]

More evidence that the Knights were deliberately withholding Cem from contact with Ottomans concerns Paolo da Colle, an Italian, who worked for Lorenzo de Medici and at times for Bayezid. He was allowed to see Cem in August 1483. But Da Colle was unsuccessful in arranging for Ismail, an Ottoman, to meet Cem, and Ismail was made a captive by the Knights. Da Colle dispatched a report to the sultan after this meeting, and soon thereafter Cem was moved to Le Pouët.[17]

Hüseyn Bey's mission to the king of France, although unfulfilled because of the king's sickness and death, was an unprecedented effort by an Ottoman sultan to establish diplomatic relations with a French king.[18] Bayezid's letter to Louis XI on behalf of Hüseyn and his mission indicates that he considered the French king to be a ruler of

comparable power to an Ottoman sultan. Bayezid addressed the king as 'sultan of the Franks' and later stated that the king was a great sultan and that the king and the Ottoman sultan were companions. Bayezid hoped that there would be friendship between them such as existed between the Ottoman ruler and other great sultans and that they would exchange ambassadors.[19] Bayezid stated that he desired the king's friendship because he had learned that almost no other ruler among the infidels surpassed the king of France.[20]

When Louis XI (1461–83) died in August 1483, the Knights separated Cem from most of the remaining Turks in his retinue because the Knights feared unrest during the interregnum. The removal of his retinue confirmed that he was a prisoner, not a guest. Cem was transported from fortress to fortress every few months until he was imprisoned at Boislamy for two years. Boislamy was in the region of France that was the 'ancestral homeland' of the grand master, where the grand master could be assured of the support of his family, and which was inaccessible from the Mediterranean Sea or the Rhone River, preventing any possible intervention from Italy or Savoy.[21] The Knights always feared that Cem would try to escape or that he would be seized; so in 1484 the Knights began to construct a tower especially to accommodate Cem at the castle of Bourganeuf. Cem was transferred to the tower at Bourganeuf in 1486 where he remained until he left France in 1489.

During this period when Cem resided in France, negotiations continued about how he might be used most effectively against the Ottomans. In 1486, the grand master agreed to transfer Cem from the custody of the Knights to the pope in exchange for becoming a cardinal, but the pope could not persuade Charles VIII (1483–98) to allow Cem to be removed from France until 1488. One of the arguments employed to persuade Charles VIII to allow Cem to depart from France was that, according to the agreement Cem had concluded with the Knights, he was free to go where he wished.[22] Another argument used with Charles VIII was a religious one. When the papal ambassadors met with Charles VIII and his council in January 1488, Leonello Chieregato exhorted the king to follow the example of his ancestors and to retake the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels. He informed Charles

VIII that Italy was in danger and that he should allow Cem to be given to the pope so that the sultan would not attack the territory of the Church. He asked the king not to refuse, especially when the grand master 'who had made the prince Cem a prisoner' also wished it.[23] Despite the safe conduct agreement between Cem and the Knights, Christian rulers considered Cem the Knights' prisoner and viewed him as a pawn controlled by the knights and the kings of France.

In March 1488 Charles agreed to allow Cem to be transferred to the pope's custody on certain conditions. In January 1489, while these arrangements were in process, Antonio Rericho, an ambassador from Bayezid, arrived at the French court. Charles VIII met with him to discover what Bayezid would offer him to keep Cem in France. Bayezid promised to give Charles VIII the Holy Sepulcher and the city of Jerusalem, which he claimed he would soon conquer from the Mamluk sultan. He also offered the lance that pierced the side of Christ (the head of the lance was then kept in the treasury of Sainte-Chapelle in Paris) and other sacred relics, and Bayezid offered to pay 50,000 ducats annually to cover Cem's expenses. If the king wished to send ambassadors to Bayezid, he would receive them and assist Charles against his enemies. Bayezid also promised to maintain peace with all Christians. Rericho encouraged Charles to dispatch ambassadors to the sultan to ratify this accord because the sultan threatened that if the king did not agree to these terms, the sultan would make peace with the Mamluks and together they would destroy the Christians. Rericho added that he had secret communications for the king. The king informed Rericho that he would give him his response later. The king's council was divided as to whether to accept Bayezid's offers or to allow Cem to proceed to Rome. When the knights learned that the king was considering withdrawing his permission for Cem to depart and was sending a courier to delay their journey, they sailed immediately for Rome in March 1489.[24]

After Cem's transfer to papal custody, where he remained for almost six years, Pope Innocent, instead of the grand master, received a pension from the sultan for keeping Cem a prisoner. In spite of this, in 1490 Innocent attempted to initiate a crusade by holding a congress during which he claimed that, because the Christians held Cem, this

was the most favorable time for them to attack the Ottomans. But conditions in Europe, especially the death of the king of Hungary, made the congress unsuccessful. Late in 1490 Innocent VIII welcomed Bayezid's ambassador, Mustafa Bey, to Rome and allowed him to meet Cem in the company of the pope's nephew who spoke Turkish.[25]

His successor as pope, Alexander VI, continued his policies with regard to Cem, but during his papacy Charles VIII of France invaded Italy to enforce a dynastic claim to Naples and gained possession of Cem. Charles VIII frequently asserted that the conquest of Naples was the first stage of a crusade against the Turks.[26] He thus linked his expedition against Naples with a crusade and, therefore, with Cem. Throughout the time he lived in Christian custody, Cem was associated with any proposed crusade projects.[27]

Charles VIII entered Italy with his army in September 1494. The French army advanced swiftly through Italy, although a league was being formed to oppose them.[28] Bayezid and Alexander VI exchanged envoys and letters in order to prevent this invasion that threatened them both, but the letters were captured and Charles VIII employed them to discredit the pope, as they stressed the 'good and true friendship' between the pope and the sultan. They also enumerated the consequences to Bayezid if Charles captured Cem: that the French would set out on an expedition against the Ottomans. These documents included letters from Bayezid to the pope, in which the sultan wrote that he was happy to have the pope's friendship. Since all of the Italian states were willing to have cordial relations with the Ottomans, the pope's friendship for Bayezid was not unusual; however, it was unprecedented for a pope to request an Ottoman sultan to assist him against the king of France.[29]

When he advanced to Rome, Charles removed Cem from the pope's custody and while the French forces progressed to Naples, Cem fell ill. The illness progressed rapidly and Cem died while in custody of the French army in Naples on 25 February 1495.[30] Cem's body, however, was not returned to the Ottoman Empire until 1499, when the sultan finally buried his brother in Bursa.

This outline of events surrounding Cem's life among the Christians provides evidence that during Cem's captivity diplomatic negotiations

concerning Cem multiplied the interactions between Ottomans and western Christians. Many Italian states engaged in active diplomacy with the Ottoman sultan, and these interactions became increasingly frequent during the fifteenth century.[31] This motivated Bayezid's attempt to establish diplomatic relations with France in order to ensure that Cem remained a prisoner in French territory rather than appearing on the Ottoman frontiers. Bayezid, who was familiar with Italian affairs, now sought to obtain information about the French king, for he had learned from Hüseyn Bey that the king of France was arguably the most powerful western Christian ruler. Three documents in the Topkapı archives indicate that, in 1482, Bayezid learned rapidly about the French and their power because this information affected him directly.[32] Since Cem resided in French territory, Bayezid desired the cooperation of the French king. Louis XI (1461–83) exhibited no interest in Cem: though he refused to assist Cem despite his offers to benefit Christians, neither was he willing, at the end of his life, to enter into diplomatic relations with Bayezid.

French policy altered under Charles VIII (1483–98), as the French became familiar with constant diplomatic maneuvers attempting to obtain Cem, which eventually they used to extract favours from the pope when they decided to transfer Cem to Rome. However, the French also considered how they might benefit from retaining Cem themselves, as they weighed offers from Hungary, the pope, and the Mamluks, who all desired Cem, as well as one from Bayezid who offered to pay the king more to detain Cem in France than he was officially paying the grand master.

After Cem's transfer to Rome, the Ottomans exhibited less interest in the French until news of their projected expedition to Naples and their plans for a crusade reached them. The Ottomans understood that if the French captured Naples, they could easily cross to Ottoman territory, since the Adriatic Sea is only two hundred miles wide and Ottoman forces had traversed the sea in 1480 and conquered Otranto. The Ottomans again acquired information about French resources and plans, as evidenced in a document from the Topkapı archives, which contains information that Ottoman informants sent to the sultan concerning the French expeditionary force, including lists of the numbers

of the French effective forces and the names of French ship captains.[33] This document indicates that, when Charles VIII regained possession of Cem, Bayezid's long held fears concerning Cem appeared to be on the point of being realized. Although Bayezid had hoped to persuade Charles to retain Cem in France in 1488, he certainly opposed Cem accompanying Charles VIII's expedition to Naples in 1495. Bayezid had desired Cem's death for years, but this desire increased in the final months of Cem's life as the French swept through Italy in the direction of ports allowing an easy crossing to Ottoman territory.[34]

French sources indicate that throughout this time the sultan desired to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with France. For example, while Commynes served in Venice as the French envoy after the announcement of the formation of the Holy League against France, the Ottoman ambassador to Venice came privately to visit him and remained for four hours in Commynes's chamber attempting to foster friendship between the king of France and the sultan.[35] This ambassador must have received his instructions before Bayezid learned of Cem's death. Commynes's report reinforces the evidence of the Ottoman documents that the sultan continued to attempt to form an alliance with the king of France, even when the sultan knew that the king was planning a crusade against him.[36]

The outline of events just given came from analyzing many western sources as well as some Ottoman sources, but the most complete view of relations between the French and the Ottomans from Cem's perspective is found in the account of his life written by one of his faithful Ottoman companions. While Ottoman documents and some Ottoman historical works provide Bayezid's perspective, the author of this work reveals the view of this diplomacy as experienced by exiles.

Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem

An account of Cem's misfortunes, the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,*[37] was written after his death by a member of his retinue who had shared his imprisonment in France and Italy. This account provides a fifteenth century Ottoman's view of the workings of 'Renaissance Diplomacy,' revealing a tale of intrigue, deception, corruption, and betrayal. In the

Vakı'at Christians, especially the Knights of Rhodes, are the primary deceivers and betrayers, but some Ottomans are traitors, while a few Christians are loyal to Cem. Several Frenchmen, including Charles VIII of France, are viewed favorably by the author. Because of the centrality of Cem to the diplomacy of the period, this Ottoman view of Cem's experiences while in the power of Christians provides an important Ottoman perspective on Muslim interaction with Christians.

In addition, the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* is also an Ottoman traveler's report. The author's travels with Cem allowed him to observe and describe some aspects of life in France and Italy, although his opportunities to observe these foreign lands were limited by his captivity. The author traveled through the French countryside and visited many towns and fortresses. He traveled through the Alps in the winter, after residing three months on the Mediterranean coast of France. He journeyed to Rome and lived in that city during the reigns of two of the most notorious popes of the Renaissance papacy, Innocent VIII and Alexander VI. And he observed the French invasion of Italy in 1494. It is interesting to note that this Ottoman author's descriptions of 'the other' closely resemble accounts by Frenchmen who traveled in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century.[38]

The similarities between the *Vakı'at* and French travelers' reports can be used to compare western views of 'the other' during this period to an Ottoman view of 'the other'. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for western Christian Europeans, the Ottomans were a fascinating and sometimes threatening 'other.' While familiarity has made the western views of 'the other' acceptable, that position can be challenged when Europeans are the ones who are considered alien and unfamiliar and their actions viewed with suspicion and amazement. One of the most fascinating aspects of the *Vakı'at* is the view through Ottoman eyes of historical phenomena generally observed exclusively through western European sources.[39]

The *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, is the 'most detailed and reliable' source concerning Cem's life. It was written by an anonymous Ottoman who was an eyewitness to most of the events that he described.[40] There is no other comparable Ottoman source that describes such significant phenomena of the fifteenth century as the intrigue of Renaissance

diplomacy, the corruption of the Renaissance papacy, and the impact of the French invasion of Italy. The *Vakı'at* was copied in the sixteenth century during the reign of Süleyman and given the title *Gurbetname-i Sultan Cem*.[41]

In the *Vakı'at*[42] the author related in detail events that he considered significant and briefly summarized long periods that to him were of lesser importance. The work concentrates on Cem's life after he left the Ottoman Empire; consequently Cem's birth, childhood, his father's death, the civil war with Bayezid, his flight to Egypt, his pilgrimage, and his final defeat in the civil war are covered briefly in the first seven pages. The remainder of the work concerns his experiences as a pawn held by Christian rulers for almost thirteen years. The events that are recounted in the most detail are the grand master's perfidy, Cem's attempt to escape from Bourganeuf, his relations with Pope Innocent VIII, the election of Pope Alexander VI, the French invasion of Italy, and Cem's relations with Charles VIII. The author recorded Cem's experiences with three of the highest-ranking officials of Latin Christianity, the grand master of the Knights of St. John and two popes. Because of their treatment of Cem, none of these three is viewed favorably in the *Vakı'at*. However the author praised some Christian rulers, such as the Duke of Savoy and Charles VIII of France, who he believed wished to aid Cem.

The author explained why he wrote this account of Cem's experiences at the beginning and again at the end of the work, stating that he hoped that those who read this account would remember Cem and have compassion for him. He also believed there should be an accurate account of Cem's life. He stated that he wrote in simple language in order to reach a larger audience, but, although Saddedin relied on this account, it remained unknown outside the palace.[43] The *Vakı'at* was written in 1514, five years after Idris-i Bidlisi's *Haşt Bıhişt*.[44] The author may have wished to correct the impressions made by Idris-i Bidlisi, who wrote during the reign of Bayezid and whose main source of information was Mustafa Pasha, Bayezid's ambassador to Innocent VIII. Mustafa's view of events differed greatly from that of Cem's companion in exile. Throughout the text the author of the *Vakı'at* strove to explain why Cem acted as he did, placing Cem's deeds in the most

favorable light. Also he viewed the king of France's conduct more sympathetically than that of the popes, in contrast to the *Haşt Bihişt*.

The *Vakı'at* was composed shortly after Selim had successfully gained the Ottoman throne by rebelling against his father and eliminating his brothers. The problem of Ottoman successions and the civil wars that often followed the death of a sultan were of crucial importance to Ottomans at this time. The *Vakı'at* briefly raised such concerns as the unitary nature of sovereignty in the Ottoman empire, the threat of foreign intervention by external powers that a succession struggle made possible, and by implication the law of fratricide.

Although the author did not intend to present a view of Christians or to describe the diplomacy of the late fifteenth century, through the events it chronicles, the *Vakı'at* presents this author's views of Latin Christians and his views on diplomacy and the major events of the time. Because he resided in France and Italy with the captive prince, he recounted events from the perspective of Cem's imprisonment rather than that of Bayezid and his diplomacy in Istanbul. This source presents the view of an Ottoman who had extensive contact with western Christians in their own lands, after interacting with them in an unprecedented manner.

Cem and the Mamluks, 1481–82

The *Vakı'at*'s description of Cem's treatment by the Mamluk sultan during his residence in Mamluk lands contrasts with the description of his treatment by the Knights of Rhodes. During his journey through Mamluk territory in 1481, he was entertained with respect.[45] Upon his arrival in Cairo, Cem was invited to the Mamluk sultan's palace where he dined frequently. Sultan Kaytbay informed him that he should consider himself as his son and not be troubled by his situation.[46]

When Cem decided to return to Anatolia to attempt to gain control of the empire, he requested permission from the Mamluk sultan to depart from Egypt. Kaytbay bestowed his consent although many of the beys in Egypt disagreed with this decision. Kaytbay stated that Cem had come of his own choice and that he should not be prevented from leaving when he desired to depart.[47] The author of the *Vakı'at*

used the conduct of the Mamluk sultan as a standard to judge the later actions of the grand master of the Knights.

Cem and the Knights of Rhodes, 1482–1483

According to the *Vakı'at*, after Frenk Süleyman Bey, Cem's ambassador to the Knights of Rhodes, had succeeded in his mission, he doubted the sincerity of the Knights' intentions and endeavored to persuade Cem not to proceed to Rhodes. But when he declared to Cem, 'I do not consider it right to go to them,' Cem replied, 'The infidels will keep their promise.'[48] During the voyage from Anamur on the southern coast of Anatolia to Rhodes, Cem was received respectfully and treated as a sovereign. Cem displayed his trust in the Knights while on board the ship by refusing to allow his food to be tasted, although his hosts had started to take this precaution.[49]

When Cem arrived in Rhodes, he was greeted by the grand master and the Knights before being conducted to the residence of the French Knights, which had been prepared for him with every luxury. Although Cem initially was accorded the respect due a sovereign, he soon realized that he was a captive. Cem may have been aware of the discussions among the Knights concerning his future, but he was not consulted as to his intentions. Cem wrote from Rhodes pleading with Bayezid not to allow him to remain as a slave of the infidels. By this time, Cem may have concluded that Süleyman Bey was correct to be apprehensive about requesting asylum from the Knights.[50]

Although documents of the Order state that the Knights decided to dispatch Cem to France at his own request, these documents are contradicted by the author of the *Vakı'at,* who claimed that the grand master tricked Cem by stating that Cem's interests would be served best by traveling to France and then to Hungary.[51] At a feast given by the grand master for Cem the day before his departure, Cem approached d'Aubusson to say farewell, and he bestowed on him a signed and sealed treaty that promised that if he regained his heritage, he would grant freedom of commerce to the Knights of Rhodes, give 300 Christian slaves to the grand master every year, and pay 50,000 écus to the Order for his expenses. Cem also gave the grand master

a document granting him authority to negotiate with Bayezid in his name.[52]

When Cem departed from Rhodes, thirty of his people and about twenty Muslim prisoners whom he had purchased accompanied him. There were also three hundred soldiers placed in the ship by the grand master as well as some Knights and Guy de Blanchefort, the grand master's nephew. When they arrived at Kos, Cem wished to visit the island, but the Knights hesitated to allow him to do so. They finally agreed only because the island belonged to Rhodes. After this he was not allowed to go on shore at any other place.[53] These restrictions during the voyage reinforced Cem's conviction that he was a prisoner of the Knights.

After reaching Nice in October 1482, Cem and his retinue remained there for over three months. The *Vakı'at* stated that soon after their arrival, Cem told the Knights to make preparations to go to Hungary, but they informed Cem that because the French king was powerful, they must obtain his permission before traveling. When they suggested Cem attach one of his men to their party that was departing to negotiate with the king, he agreed with the stipulation that they should exert themselves to minimize the delay. They promised Cem that they would only be absent for twelve days. The *Vakı'at* related that after two days on the road, the Knights left Cem's envoy, Hatibzade Nasuh Çelebi, in a village on the way. Back in Nice, the Knights promised Cem every day for four months that they would leave the next day and attempted to distract him by entertaining him with the girls of the city.[54]

While Cem waited at Nice, the Knights gradually began to separate him from his Ottoman retinue. They especially sought a pretext to imprison or kill Frenk Süleyman Bey, because he spoke the 'Frenk' language.[55] They wanted to separate him from Cem because with his linguistic capabilities he could inform Cem concerning the Knights' intrigues. In order to save him, Cem told the Knights that he would imprison him in his own treasury, but Frenk Süleyman Bey dressed in 'infidel clothing,' that is clothing of the area, and fled to Rome.[56]

The *Vakı'at* recorded that Cem finally left Nice on 6 February 1483 because plague had broken out in the city. Cem and his retinue

traveled through Savoy to the capital, Chambery, but the duke of Savoy was abroad visiting his uncle, the king of France.[57] During the journey, Hatibzade, who had been waiting in a village for months, was returned to Cem. After Chambery they proceeded to 'Rumilly,'[58] which belonged to the Knights of Rhodes. The *Vakı'at* stated that the Knights seized two of Cem's men, dressed them in 'infidel clothing,' and, telling Cem that it was necessary to send an envoy to the king of Hungary and to ascertain the safety of the roads, separated these men from Cem. Since Cem and the rest of his retinue never heard any news of the fate of these two men, the author of the *Vakı'at* stated that the knights had lied when they suggested sending them to Hungary. But the knights tried to appease Cem by assuring him that the following summer he would go to Hungary.[59]

While Cem was at Rumilly, the local lords of the district who desired to see 'the son of the Turk who had conquered Constantinople' visited him. The author of the *Vakı'at* was surprised that none of them brought gifts for Cem, as was customary among Ottomans, except one who gave him a string of onions. When the fourteen-year-old duke of Savoy returned from visiting the king of France, he met Cem at Rumilly and received an expensive gift from Cem. Shortly after this the duke of Savoy tried to release Cem from the Knights, but they transferred him from Savoy to France, eventually settling at Le Pouët near Montelimar.[60]

Cem in France, 1483–89

When Louis XI of France died on 30 August 1483, the Knights separated Cem from most of his retinue because they feared unrest until the new king began his reign. Although Cem protested, he was informed that no harm would come to any of his followers, who were taken to Villefranche where Hüseyn Bey, the sultan's envoy, joined them before they set out for Rhodes in early November. They encountered stormy weather at Zante, which prolonged their voyage so that they did not arrive at Rhodes until 28 January 1484. The author stated that their hardships from the cold weather, hunger, and thirst were impossible to describe.[61]

After Cem's retinue was sent away, he was moved frequently among several fortresses until he finally arrived at Boislamy, a fortress belonging to Antoine de Blanchefort, nephew of the grand master, where he remained for two years. Although the *Vakı'at* states that all of Cem's men were taken from him, it later reports that Celal Bey became sick and remained at Bourganeuf while Cem was moved from place to place, so it appears that at least one of his companions remained in France. At one of the fortresses where Cem stayed in 1483–84, he developed a friendship with the daughter of the lord of Sassenage.[62] Cem was probably lonely and despondent by this time since the removal of his retinue left him with few companions.[63]

The *Vakı'at* relates a further instance of the grand master's perfidy, claiming d'Aubusson informed the Mamluk sultan and Cem's mother that he was willing to deliver Cem to them if they would provide the expenses. In this manner he extorted 20,000 gold pieces. Moreover, during Cem's brief stay at Rhodes, the grand master had bribed Cem's head of chancellery so that he had placed Cem's cipher on several letters - whenever any Christian ruler inquired about Cem, d'Aubusson sent answers supposedly from Cem saying that he was remaining with the Knights by choice. The author clearly believed that the grand master imprisoned Cem for financial reasons and was willing to resort to any method to achieve financial gain.[64]

The author of the *Vakı'at* recorded that while Cem was at Boislamy he became depressed and made plans to escape. One of Cem's men, Sufi Hüseyn Bey, dressed in 'infidel clothing' and spent three years in the service of the lord of Bourbon preparing for Cem's escape.[65] Since the escape attempt occurred in 1486, Hüseyn Bey must have left Cem in 1483 perhaps just before or at the same time that Cem was separated from most of his retinue. Since the Bourbon lands included the area of France where Cem was held prisoner, Hüseyn Bey could have remained in Cem's general vicinity. Celal Bey, who was also in France, helped to plan Cem's escape.[66]

The Knights feared that Cem would escape or be taken from them, so they had constructed a tower, at great expense, especially to accommodate Cem at the castle of Bourganeuf, which belonged to Guy de Blanchefort. When Cem was transferred from Boislamy to Bourganeuf

in the late summer of 1486, his escort met a French lord. Fearing that the lord would attempt to capture Cem, his escort returned to Boislamy and waited until the next day to travel to Bourganeuf.[67]

The author of the *Vakı'at* recorded that, the day after they arrived, Hüseyn Bey visited Bourganeuf to help plan Cem's escape. The next time he came he met five of Cem's men, including Ayas Bey and Sinan Bey, whom the grand master had recently sent back from Rhodes to Cem with the news that he would be transferred to Rome and then Naples.[68] Together they planned that the escape would take place in thirty-one days. Hüseyn had the assistance of an infidel lord, presumably the duke of Bourbon, who had provided 20,000 gold pieces so that Cem would come to him after his escape. Also Hüseyn agreed to provide thirty or forty men with horses and weapons, presumably also furnished by the duke.[69]

According to the *Vakı'at* the plan for escape was as follows: Every day when Cem and his companions walked for pleasure, ten or twelve men guarded Cem. On the day of the escape, Cem's men were to pretend to play in order to take the crossbows from the guards and kill them. They would then meet Hüseyn, mount horses, and escape. All the Ottomans swore to carry out this plan, except 'a two-faced hypocrite' who made excuses not to swear. While they prepared for the escape by gathering local clothing to make themselves inconspicuous, the Ottoman traitor provided detailed plans of the escape to the 'infidels'.[70] The 'infidel' lord became angry and decided to kill Cem's companions[71] until he was dissuaded by one of the lords, probably a Knight of Rhodes, who knew Turkish. He argued that they were tricking the French king by claiming that Cem chose to remain with them, and if they killed all his men it would be clear that the Knights were deceiving him. It was in the Knights' best interests to maintain the deception, so they must not take actions that would reveal their duplicity to the king. He also pointed out that since Cem remained in their custody, they could kill Cem's companions one by one later.[72]

Cem's companions, unaware that they had been betrayed, expected their plans to succeed. Two days later, while Sinan Bey stood at a window with Cem, the Knight who knew Turkish summoned Sinan Bey to come down. When the Knight pretended to be in on the escape

plan, Sinan Bey, denied everything. The Knight then informed him that one of Cem's men had revealed it to the Knights. Sinan returned to Cem and informed him of the situation. The Knights gathered together, waiting for a time when Cem was alone with Sinan Bey. Then they reproached Cem verbally while they seized the weapons and supplies of Cem's supporters. After this the Knights guarded Cem with seventy or eighty heavily armed men day and night, searching Cem's room and bed frequently. For two years he was prevented from leaving his prison, and he became extremely despondent.[73]

Cem's Relations with Popes Innocent VIII and Alexander VI, 1489–1495

The next episode that the *Vakı'at* discusses in detail is Cem's experiences after he was transferred to the pope's custody in 1489. In addition to the *Vakı'at*, a spy's report found in the Ottoman archives describes Cem's arrival in Rome, stating that the pope made three cardinals that day: the grand master, the pope's nephew, and André d'Epinay. Before Cem was led through the city to the Vatican, he was greeted with great respect by an ambassador from the Mamluk Sultan. Many people gathered to see the son of the conqueror of Constantinople, and all of the notables greeted him except the pope. In the procession he was accompanied by the French ambassador, Monsieur de Faucon, who had been in charge of the escort that protected Cem on his journey from France.[74]

The author of the *Vakı'at* recorded that before Cem's meeting with the pope, the Knights of Rhodes informed him how he should greet the pope. Since it was the custom for Christian rulers to kiss the pope's foot, Cem should do it, or at the very least kiss his knee, as the Holy Roman Emperor did. Cem replied that Christian lords did not kiss the feet of Christian kings and that when Christian rulers kissed the pope's foot it was not because of his political power, which was not that great, but because of his religious authority, which Cem did not recognize. He refused to do anything that showed contempt for Islam. In addition, he informed them that although he had come to the Knights with a safe conduct, he had been imprisoned for years

and finally conveyed to Rome. Since he was their prisoner they could do what they wished, even kill him, but they could not persuade him to kiss the pope's foot.[75] According to the *Vakı'at*, when the pope was informed, he still agreed to meet Cem. The next day when Cem was conveyed to a public consistory attended by ambassadors from many countries as well as the pope and the cardinals, he approached the pope, who kissed Cem in two places on his neck and welcomed him. Then Cem was sent from the council and feasts were held for two or three days.[76]

During discussions of what to do with Cem, several possibilities were considered including transferring him to the fortress of Orvieto. Guy d'Aubusson and the Knights suggested that Cem return to Rhodes, but the pope decided that Cem would be safest in Rome. According to the spy report, Cem also refused to be taken from Rome to Orvieto.[77] He may have believed that by remaining in Rome he might persuade the pope to assist him.

The author of the *Vakı'at* described a private meeting between the pope, Cem, and the cardinal of St. Pierre-aux-Liens when the feasts were concluded.[78] The pope and the cardinal inquired of Cem what his intentions had been in departing from Ottoman territory. Cem replied, 'I did not propose to come abroad, indeed I requested passage from the Knights of Rhodes to cross to Rumeli. After I came to Rhodes with a safe conduct, the Knights of Rhodes broke their promises; they did not let me continue on my way. They have imprisoned me for seven years.' He also informed the pope that he expected him to be just, to show mercy on his troubles, and to send him to Egypt to his mother and his sons. According to the *Vakı'at*, the pope pitied him and they wept together. The pope replied that it would be possible for him to proceed to Egypt if he relinquished his plans for the sultanate, but it would be preferable for him to go to Hungary for the sake of his future. Although Cem and the pope met several times, neither was satisfied by the other's attitude.[79] When the pope continued to insist that Cem should proceed to Hungary, Cem replied that if he were to do so, he would be forced to attack Muslims with the Hungarian army. Then the Ottoman ulema would consider Cem an infidel. Cem insisted, 'I will not give up my religion for the sultanate of the world, let alone

the Ottoman countries.'[80] The pope became incensed at Cem's unwillingness to support his crusade plans and spoke obscenely to Cem in Italian. Cem, who had learned Italian, replied in that language showing that he had understood the pope's degrading remarks. The pope was ashamed that Cem had understood him, and he made a thousand excuses, before he dismissed Cem with a pleasant manner.[81]

When Mustafa Bey came to Rome in 1490 as an ambassador to Innocent VIII, his meeting with Cem was described by Stefano Infessura.[82] According to this account, Cem was seated on a throne in his apartments in the Vatican. He was accompanied by his Ottoman retinue as well as by two nephews of the pope, one of whom was the archbishop of Arles. This meeting reveals the nature of Cem's relations to the pope and the sultan. Cem insisted on receiving the ambassador in a very formal manner and being seated on a throne. Although he was a captive, he was treated as befitted his rank since he retained the potential to appear on the Ottoman frontiers as a candidate for the Ottoman throne. Mustafa acknowledged this by approaching Cem with great respect. Also the ambassador indicated that he was not a threat to Cem's life by showing that the letter he brought from Bayezid could not be poisoned; there were continual rumors that agents had been sent to poison Cem.[83] Since Cem met with Mustafa in the presence of two of the pope's nephews, one of whom spoke Turkish, it was impossible for him to have a private conversation with Bayezid's envoy, eliminating the possibility for Cem to enter into private arrangements with either his brother or his brother's envoy. Although Cem was now the pope's prisoner and not the Knights', essentially the situation between Cem, Bayezid, and the leaders of Latin Christendom had not altered.

After Cem had been in Rome approximately three years, Innocent VIII died on 25 August 1492. The author of the *Vakı'at* included a description of the election of the new pope, which was reported to him. This description enabled him to vividly portray the deceitfulness and intrigue of the infidels. Rumors of bribery surrounded this election, and Alexander, the Borgia pope, remains proverbial for nepotism and corruption. According to the author of the *Vakı'at*, the pope was chosen in the following manner: Forty cardinals gathered in the papacy's

church,[84] which was closed so that no one could enter. The cardinals met every morning, using bribery to gain the support of other cardinals until there were only two groups left. Then the smaller group supported the larger group, and one of the cardinals became the pope. After they indicated that a pope had been chosen, the church was opened and the cardinals conducted the pope with honor and respect to St. Peter's. Then they took him to the Vatican and sent couriers and letters to all countries saying that a new pope had been elected. After a week they conveyed him to St. Peter's, where they placed the papal crown on his head. Then there was a procession where he distributed gold and silver to the poor and granted absolution. He was then conducted to the church of St. John de Lateran.[85]

According to the *Vakı'at*, at that church a new pope would be seated on a chair with a hole in it so that his testicles would hang down. Then a papal steward would thrust his hand under the seat in order to ascertain that the pope was male. After grasping his testicles he would announce that the pope was a man and tell the good news, which spread with a great clamor through the city. The *Vakı'at* recorded that the reason for this custom was that once a woman had become pope. Since everyone was shaved so that no one had facial hair, they were not aware of this until she became pregnant from fornication with a youth and gave birth. In order to prevent a repetition of this scandal, this custom was created.[86]

During this period it was generally believed that a woman had become pope in the ninth century, and many authors reported seeing 'the rite of verification of virility' at the investiture of many popes. Bernardino Corio, humanist historian of Milan, reported the performance of the rite at the coronation of Alexander VI in 1492.[87] By including a description of this rite, the author of the *Vakı'at* certainly meant to discredit the dignity and religious authority of the pope, nevertheless he did not invent the story. His description resembles other accounts, among them that of Laonicos Chalcocondyle in *Sur les affaires turques*, in which he reported the rite at the election of Nicholas V in 1460. Whether the many reports of this rite can be taken as proof that it actually was performed is questionable, for as Boureau states, 'This ritual, presented by authors often close to the papacy as an authentic

element of the pontifical coronation, is never attested by official prescriptive texts; … ' But 'up to the seventeenth century spectators saw, believed they saw or believed that they saw hidden the rite of verification of papal virility.'[88] The author of the *Vakı'at* recounted what he and many others believed occurred at the coronation of popes.

After discussing the election of the pope in detail, the author of the *Vakı'at* mentioned little about how Cem passed the following years, merely recording that during the papacies of Innocent and of Alexander, Cem was a prisoner in Rome for six years.[89] From other sources we learn that Cem was closely guarded both because it was feared that he might be poisoned and because Cem continued to attempt to escape. Cem may have enjoyed more liberty during Alexander VI's papacy than he had with Innocent VIII since he made friends with Juan, duke of Gandia, son of Alexander VI, and together they rode around Rome. Once on 5 May 1493, when Alexander joined them, the duke of Gandia dressed in 'Turkish' clothing with a turban on his head.[90]

Cem and Charles VIII of France, 1495

After the author of the *Vakı'at* stated that Charles VIII dispatched ambassadors to both Innocent and Alexander in an attempt to have Cem returned to France, he then explained why Charles had made no effort to see Cem while he resided in France. According to this account, the Knights of Rhodes had bribed Charles VIII's ministers of state to keep him from thinking about Cem,[91] because they believed that only as long as they retained Cem, would Rhodes be safe from an Ottoman attack. Whenever the king demanded to see Cem, they claimed that Cem refused to see the king and asked why he was not allowed to remain in France by his own choice.[92] Likewise when Cem asked to speak to Charles, they told him that the king of France did not want a Turk setting foot in his city and had forbidden Cem to set foot in his country. Cem's captors claimed that they did not take him to the king for fear that the king might harm him.[93]

The author was aware that ambassadors had come from Hungary and from the pope requesting custody of Cem and that the king had

decided to send Cem to Rome. According to the *Vakı'at*, when the king allowed Cem to be taken to Rome, he assigned a *kapudan*[94] to guard Cem. While they sailed, Cem and the kapudan talked, and during one conversation, the kapudan inquired if Cem had ever visited Paris. Cem replied that this was impossible, since the Knights of Rhodes had told him that the king did not want a Turk to set foot in his city. The kapudan informed Cem that this account was false, and he then told Cem what the Knights of Rhodes had said concerning Cem to the king. It was evident that the Knights of Rhodes had deceived both Cem and the king. The kapudan swore that when he went to the king, he would inform him of this duplicity. The kapudan brought Cem to the pope, and as he was about to leave, the pope presented Cem with two white palfreys, one of which Cem gave to the kapudan. The kapudan returned to the king and one day mounted the palfrey to hunt with Charles. The king asked about the horse, and the kapudan replied that it was a gift from the pope to Cem and then from Cem to himself. The kapudan 'was faithful to the oath that he swore to Cem,' and he told the king how he had been deceived. The king dismissed from office the men who had misrepresented the situation to him.[95] When Charles VIII again dispatched the kapudan to the pope requesting to regain custody of Cem, the pope put the kapudan off with various excuses, but the kapudan became 'Cem's sincere friend.' When he returned to the king, his praise of Cem increased the king's affection for Cem. Finally, after learning of all the false pretexts and the dishonesty of the pope and the Knights, the king gathered an army and turned against Rome.[96]

According to the author of the *Vakı'at*, Charles VIII invaded Italy because of Cem. Charles himself claimed that he was invading Italy as the first stage of a crusade. Obviously Charles VIII's claim of initiating the first phase of a crusade against the Ottomans is incompatible with his portrayal in the *Vakı'at* as invading Italy because he had learned of Cem's fine qualities from the kapudan and realized that the Knights of Rhodes and the pope had been deceiving him. Charles knew that he needed custody of Cem if he were to launch a crusade against the Ottomans, but the author of the *Vakı'at* never mentioned Christian plans to attack the Ottomans until after Cem's death.[97]

According to the *Vakı'at,* Cem was imprisoned by the pope in the Castel S. Angelo when Alexander learned that Charles was approaching with his army.[98] The lord of Naples had reached an agreement with the pope, and he and his army attempted to oppose the king of France when he approached Rome. When the lord of Naples was unable to resist the French outside of Rome, he returned to Rome with his army and they prepared for a siege.[99] While the king of France besieged Rome, he dispatched an envoy to the pope claiming that he had come on pilgrimage and inquiring why the pope prevented him from visiting Rome. The pope replied that the king could enter Rome if he left his army outside the city. Eventually the king of Naples withdrew from Rome with his army heading for Naples,[100] but Charles continued to besiege Rome and eventually captured the city. The pope fled to the fortress where Cem was imprisoned, and the king besieged it.[101] The king sent his uncle, Monsieur de Bresse,[102] to the pope to request Cem, but the pope refused. Finally, when the pope realized that he had to make peace with the French, he met with the king at the Vatican. The pope brought Cem to this meeting. While the three of them were speaking together the pope inquired of Cem, 'The king of France wants to take you and depart, what do you wish my lord [beyim]?' Cem answered that he was not the pope's lord but his prisoner and that it did not matter whether the king took him or he remained the pope's prisoner. The pope was ashamed that Cem spoke like this in front of the king of France. The pope said that Cem and Charles were both sons of *padişah*s.[103]

According to the *Vakı'at*'s account of the invasion, three or four days later on 28 January 1495, the king met with the pope again and asked for Cem. This time Cem was immediately delivered to the king of France, who sent him to his own house. The pope claimed that he had not sent Cem before because his son and Cem were friends and did not wish to be separated. He asked that his son be allowed to accompany Cem. The author did not understand why the pope's son, Cesare Borgia, left with the French. Charles VIII left Rome 28 January 1495. After remaining at Velletri four or five days,[104] the king advanced to Montefortino, which he besieged when it did not submit to him. After it was captured, the men and women of the city were killed.[105]

The king then traveled to Monte San Giovanni, a fortress that was considered to be impregnable, but after a few hours, it was captured and those who were inside were killed.[106] From this time on, all of the fortresses that the French approached submitted to them, although the king of Naples and his army continued to advance two days in front of them.[107]

Cem's Death

The author of the *Vakı'at* stated that while the French army continued its victorious advance, Cem became ill at the city of San Germano on 17 February 1495. Cem's illness rapidly progressed until in a few days he could no longer travel on horseback but had to be moved by litter to Capua. By this time Cem's face, eyes, and neck had swelled, but he remained conscious and spoke. The French brought many doctors to see him, who prescribed many treatments without improving Cem's condition. The king of France visited Cem, inquired concerning his health, and promised that if Cem recovered, he would send him wherever he wished to go.[108] Charles VIII and Cem then moved to Aversa on 20 February 1495, but there Cem began to be delirious, only regaining consciousness from time to time. The next day when Cem traveled to Naples, he exerted himself to mount a horse.[109] At Naples the doctors discovered how weak Cem's pulse was and informed the king. When the king visited him and asked how he was, Cem replied that he was well. The king then said, 'My lord, bear up, be of good cheer, as of now you are free. Don't imagine yourself as a prisoner.' Cem thanked the king and God for his freedom, but he had always prayed that if the 'infidels' planned to use him as an excuse to attack the people of Islam, God would not allow him to live. Finally, his prayer was answered and after reciting the *şehadet*, he died on 25 February 1495.[110] According to the *Vakı'at,* Charles VIII was sincerely concerned about Cem's welfare and treated him well. However Cem's prayer being answered at this time indicates that the author was aware that Cem's presence with the French signaled a possible crusade.

Cem's Muslim companions, who were present during his final moments, prepared his body according to Muslim ritual immediately

after his death. They washed the corpse, shrouded it in Cem's own turban, prayed over Cem, and then informed Charles VIII that Cem had died. The doctors whom the king sent to embalm Cem put his internal organs in a box, which was buried in King Ferrante's garden. They treated the body to preserve it, covered it with a wax cloth, and finally placed it in a lead coffin. Sinan Bey and Ayas Bey were appointed guards over the body. The king was advised to conceal Cem's death from Bayezid in order to obtain money from the sultan, so the French tried to conceal Cem's death. Cem had feared that something similar would occur, so he had instructed his men to spread the news of his death and to take his body home so that the Christians could not attack the Muslims in Cem's name.[111] In spite of the king wishing the news to remain secret, the Florentine ambassadors learned of Cem's death that very day and dispatched the news to Florence. The Council of Ten in Venice learned of it on 27 February and immediately informed the sultan.[112]

Cem had asked his men to inform Bayezid of his death so that the sultan would bring his body home. He also wanted Bayezid to provide for his family and those followers who had remained in his service. Sinan Bey, Ayas Bey, and Celal Bey made plans to follow Cem's instructions. Ayas Bey made arrangements with a Christian Albanian to take him to Rum, but he was unable to get past the guards.[113] Then Sinan decided to leave. He dressed in local clothing, shaved his hair and beard, and taking Cem's will, he set out. But the French heard of his escape and imprisoned him for approximately two months. Finally, when the king realized he could not prevent knowledge of Cem's death from spreading, he informed Sinan Bey, Ayas Bey, and others of Cem's retinue that they could choose where they wished to go. The king offered to give any of Cem's men who desired to remain with him an allowance, but if they preferred, they could proceed to Rum or to the Magrib. He also informed them that he did not desire to retain Cem's possessions but wanted them to be delivered to Cem's heirs. After this Hatibzade and some others attempted to go to the Magrib and Egypt so that they could take Cem's possessions to his heirs, but instead they also went to Rum, where they delivered Cem's belongings to the divan. The *Vakı'at* then stated that this was a true account of Sultan Cem.[114]

Viewing Islam and Christianity

The author of the *Vakı'at* carefully recorded the differences he discerned between the actions of Muslims and of 'infidels,' in this case Christians. Cem's actions as a Muslim are the primary examples that the author provides as evidence for Muslim praiseworthy behavior. One of the reasons the author included many examples of Cem's faithfulness to Islam is because he feared that Muslims would judge Cem harshly since he had requested assistance from the Knights, who were infidels, in his contest with his brother. Throughout this record, the author shows that Cem never wavered in his faith, although he had made an error in judgment by trusting the Knights of Rhodes.[115]

The author used several incidents to demonstrate that Cem had not become an infidel. For example, when Cem gave alms to the poor Christians in Rome, Christian observers thought this indicated that Cem was inclined to accept Christianity. One day when Innocent VIII was talking to Cem, he admired Cem's charity to the poor and invited Cem to become a Christian. He told Cem that if his son came from Egypt, the pope would make Cem's son a cardinal. Cem, who was upset by the pope's words, replied, 'I requested the way to Egypt from you. Is it the false way that you show to me?' Cem hoped to return to Egypt where he would be reunited with some of his family, but not at the price of giving up his beliefs and risking his reward in the hereafter. He told the pope that he would not turn from Islam even if he were offered the sultanate of the entire world, let alone a cardinalship or the papacy. He informed the pope that if he believed Cem was inclined to Christianity because of his alms to poor Christians, then he was mistaken, because in Islam one gave alms whether the poor were Muslims or not. The pope and the Christian lords who were present admired Cem's steadfastness in his religion and his compassion to the poor. They approved of Cem's faithfulness to the religion that he loved, and they apologized for having suggested that he convert to Christianity.[116] This was not the first time Christians had approved of Cem's steadfastness in observing the laws of his religion. When the Knights offered him wine, he told them it was forbidden in his religion, and they admired that he did not drink it. In fact the grand

master told Cem, 'It seems good to me that a person is faithful to his own religion.'[117]

Another example of Cem's faithfulness to Islam was when Cem refused to kiss the pope's foot. He did so because he did not wish to perform an act that might be denigrating to his religion. Also in his conferences with Innocent VIII, he refused to go to Hungary because he feared that if he accompanied a crusading army that attacked the Ottomans, he would be considered an infidel by the Ottomans. He refused to give up his religion for temporal power, even for the Ottoman sultanate. Finally, Cem prayed that if the Christians ever attempted to use him as an excuse to attack Muslims, God would not permit it.[118]

Another way that the author showed his and Cem's faithfulness to Islam was through his descriptions of the Christian religion. Whenever the author of the *Vakı'at* referred to something associated with Christianity, he was generally derogatory. He described an 'idol' fashioned of crude silver belonging to a church in a fortress, which was destroyed by fire when it was transported to another place. The author also described another fortress's church that was full of iron fetters, where they proudly incarcerated the prisoners of the district. The author was shocked that Christians would use sacred space for such mundane purposes.[119]

The author of the *Vakı'at* was especially critical of the popes who were the spiritual leaders of Latin Christianity. Pope Innocent VIII was described as wearing jeweled clothing, a jeweled crown, and jeweled rings on his fingers. The pope appeared to be magnificent, but in truth he was coarse and despicable. He spoke crudely to Cem when he thought Cem could not understand him. The description of the papal election of Rodrigo Borgia exemplifies the contempt the author felt for the pope, the supreme head of the Catholic Church. After recounting how the pope bought the election, the author described him as a dog. Then he related the method of ensuring that the pope was male and the reason for it.[120] The pope might be rich and powerful, but he did not inspire religious veneration from this author. His condemnation of Innocent VIII and Alexander VI was directly related to Cem's experiences in Rome, rather than to a general disapproval of Christians. The

author's representation of the papacy and individual popes resembles contemporary European anti-papal literature.[121]

The author mentioned twice that Christians believed that the pope could pardon sins, a power that Muslims believed belonged to God alone. When the Knights tried to persuade Cem to kiss Pope Innocent's foot, they explained to Cem that people hoped to be forgiven by the pope. Cem replied that he hoped to be forgiven by God, not the pope, and that he did not need anything from the pope. After Borgia was elected, the *Vakı'at* described the papal procession during which the pope forgave the sins of the people who lined his path. He stated that those who were not present 'were deprived of that dog's pardon.'[122] The author emphasized that neither he nor Cem recognized the pope's spiritual authority.

Despite the author's generally negative descriptions of Christians and Christianity, he described some individual Christians as honorable and worthy of respect because their actions indicated that they were compassionate or trustworthy. The author praised the duke of Savoy who tried to rescue Cem from the Knights, the kapudan who kept his word to Cem and informed the king of the lies of the Knights, and Charles VIII who invaded Italy to rescue Cem from the pope. While the author described the actions of most Muslims favorably, he included the example of Cem's disloyal companion, who betrayed the escape plan to the Knights. This indicates that the author was judging individuals by their actions, and not concluding that all Muslims behaved well and all Christians evilly because of their religious beliefs. Although in the *Vakı'at* not all Muslims were good nor were all Christians evil, the contrast between the two religions was clearly demonstrated. Islam inspired Cem's devotion even when his well-being was threatened by that devotion. At the head of the Christian religion were coarse, deceitful men, whose conduct inspired nothing but contempt.[123]

In the *Vakı'at* Christians were often described in a manner reminiscent of how Christians during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries described Turks, as avaricious, untrustworthy, and uncivilized. One Christian example of Turkish barbarity was Turks slaughtering the inhabitants of the towns they captured, as the author of the *Vakı'at* recorded the French army doing in Italy. Both Ottoman descriptions

of Christians and Christian descriptions of Ottomans may accurately reflect events that occurred. When one's own group performed dubious actions, they could be justified, but when 'the other' performed the same actions, they proved their uncivilized nature. Just as the *Vakı'at* did not condemn the actions of all Christians, in the French traveler's reports, even the most negative ones, usually some Turks are cited as exceptions to the rule of Turkish 'barbarity.'

One of the most significant aspects of this Ottoman account of Cem's experiences is the discrepancy between the politically correct rhetoric surrounding events, which was frequently expressed in western sources, and the realities of power politics during these events. Although many Christian leaders claimed that religion was the motivating factor in the negotiations surrounding Cem, political expediency was what motivated most of them. While western rulers claimed to want Cem so they could lead a crusade, those rulers who actually controlled Cem used him as a bargaining counter with the sultan to obtain money and protection from Ottoman attacks. The Grand Master Pierre d'Aubusson, Pope Innocent VIII, and Pope Alexander VI used Cem to exert pressure on Bayezid and as a source of income, but they never proceeded beyond the most elementary planning stages in launching a crusade. The only western ruler who gained control of Cem while actively pursuing military objectives, Charles VIII of France, has had his claims that he was launching a crusade after conquering Naples dismissed as rhetoric. But France was not threatened by Ottoman expansion, and leading a crusade would have enhanced Charles VIII's prestige as a ruler. As for Bayezid, he realized that Cem represented a threat to his control of the Ottoman Empire and sought, usually successfully, to buy off those rulers who might use Cem against him.

Cem's sojourn in Rhodes, France, and Italy was the occasion for deceit, intrigue, treachery, and betrayal. But Cem himself was not innocent of intrigue. For instance, before traveling to Europe, Cem may have tried to deceive his brother. Although after Cem's military defeat he professed to desire his brother's forgiveness, Cem returned to Anatolia and consorted with rebels and enemies of the Ottoman

state.[124] Then he sought the aid of the Knights of Rhodes, although he suffered for this decision. But the author of the *Vakı'at* considered Cem's errors to be those of judgment, not deception. By not heeding the wise advice of Frenk Süleyman Bey, he foolishly became a tool that halted Ottoman expansion.

The death and burial of Cem mark the end of the first phase of Ottoman-French interaction, but the fifteenth-century encounter indicated what the future would hold. Cem's death left Bayezid free to expand the Ottoman Empire. Bayezid's son Selim added greatly to Ottoman territory by defeating the Mamluks and incorporating their lands into the empire. Bayezid's grandson, Süleyman, conquered Rhodes in 1522, forcing the knights to find a new home. The Ottomans remembered the French, who they understood were a major power as opposed to the Italian states they had dealt with previously. The Ottomans were well aware that, however briefly, the French had been able to subdue all the territories of Italy they had approached.[125] The French kings had begun the wars for control of Italy, which continued until the middle of the next century as part of the rivalry between the Valois kings of France and the Habsburgs of Spain. The precedent of Italian diplomatic relations with the Ottoman sultan as well as Ottoman attempts at diplomatic relations with the French set the stage for the more extensive Ottoman-French interaction of the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman sultan and the French king would form an alliance against their mutual enemy, Charles V.

CHAPTER 4

ALLIES WITH THE INFIDEL: JOINT OTTOMAN-FRENCH NAVAL OPERATIONS[1]

The analysis of events of the fifteenth century surrounding the captivity of Cem may be construed as forming the prologue to the study of the interactions of the Ottomans and the French in the sixteenth century. Contemporary and historical views of the sixteenth-century alliance between Muslim Ottomans and Christian Frenchmen focusing on the most dramatic manifestation of the alliance, the wintering of the Ottoman fleet in the French port of Toulon, 1543–44, exhibit the culmination of previous trends. This episode, and the diplomacy associated with it, led to the creation of abundant sources by a wide variety of individuals and groups documenting the events. Surprisingly, contemporary Ottoman and French sources expressing their views of this campaign have had minimal impact on subsequent Western historical studies of their alliance. As a result of this neglect of Ottoman and French sources, historians have accepted and perpetuated a distorted view of both this specific campaign of 1543–44 and more generally of the alliance, a view projected largely by the Habsburgs, foes of the alliance. Chapters 4 and 5 have two related purposes: first in chapter 4, to reconstruct the events of 1543–44 relying on contemporary Ottoman and French sources in order to present a more accurate and complete view of this episode; and second in chapter 5, to analyze

the historiographical implications of the neglect of the most relevant sources describing this alliance to understand how and why the distorted view developed and endured.

In the spring of 1543, the Ottoman fleet sailed west from Istanbul accompanied by the French ambassador in order to support François I of France in his war with the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, also king of Spain. Both French and Ottoman sources present this event in these terms: the king of France requested aid, and Süleyman sent his fleet to assist him. Ottoman sources have rarely been studied to discover Ottoman perspectives, despite the existence of two Ottoman chronicles that include detailed accounts of this event, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve İstunibelgrad* (*History of the Conquest of Şikloş, Estergon and İstunibelgrad*) by Nasuh Matrakçı[2] and *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa* (*The Exploits of Hayreddin Pasha*) by Muradi.[3] Matrakçı was a participant in the 1543 campaign, and Muradi made use of informants who went on the campaign as well as Ottoman archival material. In addition, Süleyman's correspondence[4] with François I and with his admiral, Hayreddin Pasha, reveals his methods of directing campaigns and controlling events. These contemporary Ottoman chronicles, written almost immediately after the campaign of 1543–44, are the most reliable sources for reconstructing the events from Ottoman perspectives. Nasuh Matrakçı's chronicle has only recently become accessible to western historians since it was locked in the Ottoman sultan's treasury of valuable manuscripts. Muradi's account of the events is found in a unique manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. In addition to these two manuscript histories, a document from the Topkapı palace archives provides essential information. This document is the report of a man sent from France to the sultan, shortly after the Ottoman fleet arrived in French waters.[5]

While Ottoman and French views of the events of this episode are similar to each other, they are not identical. Sixteenth-century French participants' views can be discovered in a variety of sources, many of which were published in the nineteenth century. These sources, many of which are readily accessible, have been neglected by scholars studying this alliance. They range from decrees of François I, court records, memoirs, archival records from Toulon, and letters.[6] Individually, none

is as valuable as the Ottoman chronicles, but as a group, they make for a rich collection expressing a variety of French perspectives in support of the alliance. French and Ottoman sources agree in so far as they view their joint campaign as initiated by François I, who needed assistance against the Habsburg threat of Charles V. François I requested the Ottoman fleet from the more powerful Süleyman, who graciously dispatched his fleet under the direction of Hayreddin Barbarossa to assist the French king against their mutual enemy. The Ottoman expedition to the western Mediterranean that followed, including the fleet's wintering in France in 1543–44, allowed Ottomans and Frenchmen to meet in unusual circumstances. The interaction that resulted from this encounter was consequently more complex than that which occurred when a few Frenchmen traveled in the Ottoman Empire or an occasional Ottoman envoy journeyed to France. Not only did a large number of Ottomans sail to France, they fought alongside Frenchmen, inhabited their houses, and ate their food. By examining both French views of the Ottomans and Ottoman views of the French that developed as a result of actual contact as allies rather than theoretical perspectives related to ideals of either Christian or Muslim holy war, this study demonstrates that for both groups, assessing the positive and negative aspects of the alliance was more complex than a simple Muslim vs. Christian dichotomy.[7]

Ottoman-French Naval Cooperation, 1533–1538

The Mediterranean Sea had become an arena in which naval warfare between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs grew increasingly important. This rivalry intensified when the foremost naval commander in the western Mediterranean, Andrea Doria of Genoa, left the service of François I and entered that of Charles V in 1528. Doria's capture of the Ottoman port Coron in the Morea in 1532 led Süleyman to appoint Hayreddin Barbarossa as his grand admiral in 1533.[8] Thereafter much of the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles took place between their fleets in the Mediterranean, in addition to warfare in Hungary. The Ottoman fleet frequently appeared in the western as well as the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Ottoman expedition of 1543–44 was the

second attempt by the Ottomans and the French to combine their fleets in operations against Charles V and his supporters. An earlier naval campaign in 1537 revealed how daunting logistical difficulties could be when trying to coordinate operations at great distances.

Negotiations for joint Ottoman-French naval action were initiated in July 1533 when François met with an envoy sent by Hayreddin Pasha at Puy in France. Because of this embassy, when Hayreddin captured Tunis in 1534, the Spanish claimed that he had done so with the encouragement of François. In November 1534, another embassy from Hayreddin Pasha met with the king at Châtellerault and accompanied the king to Paris in the midst of general curiosity. This led to a three-year truce between Hayreddin Pasha and François. A petition from Hayreddin Pasha informed Süleyman concerning the negotiations that were needed to achieve this diplomatic agreement, which also promoted commerce by granting merchants the right to travel between France and the Ottoman Empire.[9]

François was isolated diplomatically since neither the pope, Henry VIII, nor the princes of Germany were in a position to support him against the emperor. In February 1535, François sent Jean de la Forest, a French knight of St. John, as his ambassador first to Hayreddin Pasha and then to Süleyman in order to propose a joint French-Ottoman campaign against Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, or Spain.[10] La Forest warned Hayreddin that Charles V was preparing to attack him in North Africa. The emperor's successful campaign against Tunis in 1535 gave him control of Hayreddin's fleet and encouraged him to believe that he could eventually conquer Istanbul.[11] Although when La Forest arrived in Istanbul the sultan was absent on campaign in Iran, in February 1536 La Forest negotiated a treaty with Ibrahim Pasha, which was a commercial pact masking a secret alliance against the emperor. This agreement stated that François I sought help from the sultan to defend himself against his enemy because he was 'tormented by the continual wars of the emperor Charles V.'[12]

When Süleyman returned, La Forest encouraged him to attack Charles V in retaliation for his expedition against Tunis, since Hayreddin Pasha was under Ottoman protection. According to the agreement between Süleyman and La Forest, the Ottomans and the

French were both to wage war in Italy in 1537: François in Lombardy, and Süleyman in the kingdom of Naples. Also the Ottoman and French fleets were to join together in naval warfare. The French diplomats, Jean de La Forest, Charles de Marrillac (his cousin and a member of his embassy), and Jean de Monluc, who had also been sent to consult with Hayreddin Pasha, all endeavored to ensure the success of these joint operations.[13]

In accordance with these plans, Lutfi Pasha left Istanbul in May with 160 galleys, while Hayreddin Pasha followed a few days later with sixty large vessels, and Süleyman accompanied by La Forest went by land to meet them at Avlona.[14] There, La Forest received news concerning the king's activities, which he reported to the sultan. François claimed that he had captured most of Flanders, but he left when he learned from La Forest that Süleyman had set out on campaign in accordance with his promise. The king was then at Lyon waiting for the army that he would use to attack Italy. La Forest was also informed that the king had ordered his fleet of thirty galleys, twelve bastardas, and a number of barchas[15] and cogs to proceed to meet the Ottoman fleet. But the Ottoman fleet had not tarried at Avlona; they had sailed west and immediately started attacking the coasts of Apulia.[16]

Although the Ottoman forces were already at Avlona in July, the French fleet under Saint-Blancard accompanied by Charles de Marillac, who had recently returned from Istanbul, did not sail east from Marseilles until 15 August 1537. When Saint-Blancard finally appeared with the French fleet on 10 September, he could not persuade Süleyman to provide ships to raid Apulia, Sicily, and Spain. Süleyman had sailed on 19 August from Avlona to besiege the island of Corfu, a Venetian possession. Süleyman lifted the siege and departed from Corfu on 15 September accompanied by Marrillac as ambassador to Istanbul in the place of his recently deceased cousin, who had died at Avlona at the beginning of September.[17]

In 1537, the attacks by the French and the Ottomans were not coordinated with each other as proposed in the agreement between La Forest and Süleyman. François attacked Picardy and Artois in March and April 1537, leaving for Lyon in May, but when Charles V counterattacked in northern France, the troops intended for Italy were recalled.

By the time François left for Italy, it was too late to coordinate his campaign with Süleyman's. In September when the French fleet finally arrived near Cephalonia, Zante, and Corfu, they could not persuade Süleyman to plunder the coasts of Apulia, Sicily, and the Marches of Ancona, although Hayreddin had attacked Calabria and Apulia earlier in the summer. In October, when the French finally invaded Italy and reconquered Piedmont, the Ottomans were fighting in Hungary where they defeated an Austrian army in October 1537.[18]

The French fleet wintered at Chios, at that time ruled by Genoa, because storms prevented their return to France. The French admiral, Saint-Blancard, traveled to Istanbul in February with part of the French fleet to request provisions and money because he lacked sufficient funds to purchase supplies in Chios. The sultan and Hayreddin Pasha provided money, biscuit, meat, wine, and fruit, in addition to materials to repair his ships as necessary. The ships with Saint-Blancard left Istanbul in April 1538, arriving in France in June.[19]

After the attack on Corfu, the Venetians, who had been neutral, agreed to join the Holy League in an alliance with Charles V and the pope, thus combining their fleet with Doria's. Venetian efforts failed to prevent Hayreddin from defeating the fleets of the Holy League at Preveza 27 September 1538.[20] Thus the Ottomans established their naval power in the Mediterranean with only minimal assistance from the French.

Ottoman Expectations While on Campaign

Relying on Habsburg sources, the Ottoman-French campaign of 1543–44 has been portrayed in traditional western historiography as devastating for the south of France, with the Ottomans ravaging the French coast until François I sent them back home. Certainly there were tensions between the allies, but this negative view of the alliance originated with Habsburg propaganda and does not reflect how the French and the Ottomans perceived the campaign. Exploring how they viewed their relationship and the problems they encountered necessitates evaluating a number of controversial issues that arose during this episode and their representation in French and Ottoman

sources. These issues include diplomacy, logistics, leadership, and military organization as it relates to preparations for campaigns.

Certainly one factor in Ottoman military effectiveness in the sixteenth century was the painstaking preparation taken before any campaign, which was not characteristic of the Ottoman's French allies. This contrast in organization impacted their perspectives concerning this campaign, from the initial stages of planning to the final homecoming of the fleet. The Ottomans, as was typical, provided provisions and pay for their forces. The French, as was more typical of western Europe, lagged far behind in providing for the needs of military forces. Warfare had become increasingly expensive since the fifteenth century, and the French and their Habsburg opponents were always short of money. The Ottoman military policy was to lavish resources on campaign preparation to an extent inconceivable in western Europe. However, this campaign presented unusual difficulties for the sultan: because he sent his naval forces so far from Ottoman territory, he was forced to rely on the French to help feed as well as pay his men. In addition to the sailors on the galleys, Ottoman forces on this expedition included both Janissaries and *sipahi*s. Janissaries were infantry, and they received a salary from the central government. *Sipahi*s were cavalrymen on land campaigns and marines on the sea who received *timar*s, grants of land revenues in return for military service. The *sipahi*s administered fiefs from which they made their living and met their expenses while on campaign. When they were absent longer than the usual half-year campaign season, they experienced financial hardship. On a sea campaign they were expected to bring a six-month supply of biscuit, the mainstay of the naval diet on campaign. If the fleet did not return within six months, this caused provisioning difficulties.

In terms of leadership, this episode contrasts the statesmanship of the sultan with that of the king of France. From the primary sources, it is evident that Süleyman determined the general parameters of the campaign; François I could only make those decisions that Süleyman determined were his to make, although modern western accounts of the episode portray it otherwise.[21] Süleyman dictated the timing of the dispatching and recalling of the Ottoman fleet through contact with Hayreddin Pasha, the Ottoman admiral, using Ottoman messengers

throughout the months the fleet was in the western Mediterranean. Ottoman forces were frustrated by their lack of suitable employment during the campaign because of French lack of preparations and direction. Essentially François I failed to utilize the fleet to accomplish a significant conquest as well as not providing adequately for its needs. Hayreddin Pasha and Antoine Escalin des Eymars, Baron de la Garde, known as Captain Polin, the French ambassador who accompanied the Ottoman fleet and essentially led the French forces, struggled with the contrast between French and Ottoman military expectations. Their relations were strained as they tried to span the distance between Ottoman organization and direction versus French incompetence and vacillation. Captain Polin and Hayreddin Pasha frequently clashed over potential military targets because 'French' territory was immune from attack.[22]

In contrast to Habsburg views, those expressed in Ottoman and French primary sources deal with the very real issues of these logistical difficulties. Habsburg propaganda painted a picture that is incompatible with known Ottoman military policy regarding the behavior of their military forces. While western European troops were likely to plunder friend and enemy alike, the Ottoman military was strictly forbidden to harm their own territory or that of an ally.[23] An analysis of the campaign of 1543, beginning with the diplomacy that preceded it, delineates the contrast in views clearly.

Diplomacy Leading to Joint Ottoman-French Military Operations in 1543

The naval campaign in 1543, during which the Ottoman and French fleets joined to attack Charles V, was the result of French diplomats requesting the Ottoman fleet. Matrakçı acknowledged the importance of diplomacy by beginning his account of the expedition with the arrival of the French ambassador at the court of the Ottoman sultan.[24]

In July 1541, Antonio Rincon,[25] French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire since 1530, disappeared with his companions while enroute to the Ottoman Empire from France. The urgency of French interests

demanded that another ambassador be chosen to represent France in Istanbul, although it was still uncertain what had become of Rincon, who had been murdered. Pellicier, the French ambassador in Venice, described the qualities an ambassador to the Ottoman Empire should possess: patience, modesty, prudence, and knowledge about both the state and war, so that he would be able to give his advice and opinion. In addition, he should possess authority, be energetic, and be able to 'invent, propose, and respond suddenly according to the exigence of affairs. ... ' He should also know Italian and be well furnished with presents so that he could be effective.[26]

Captain Polin, Baron de la Garde, one of the more colorful characters of the period was chosen.[27] Polin was given the same instructions as Rincon: he was to request in the king's name that the sultan prepare a large fleet to make war on the sea and the coasts against the emperor, Charles V. When Polin arrived in Venice on 27 July 1541, he attempted to persuade the Venetians to join an alliance with France and the Ottoman Empire. He was unsuccessful, so he proceeded in August to find the sultan who was on campaign in Hungary. After joining the sultan, Polin was instructed to inform him that François had contributed to Süleyman's success in Hungary because he had diverted the emperor's forces. Polin then requested the Ottoman fleet; Süleyman promised to respond after his return to Istanbul. When Polin returned to Venice in February 1542, he reported that the sultan had promised to attack on land and sea that year. Polin hurried on to France, reaching the court on 8 March, where the English ambassador Padget observed the elation of the king and his council at Polin's success.[28]

François soon dispatched Polin to the sultan with the same instructions as before, but when he arrived in Istanbul, he was informed that it was too late in the season to send the fleet that year. After prolonged negotiations between Polin and the Ottomans, the fleet was promised for the following campaign season. Polin remained in Istanbul, making frequent visits to the arsenal to observe the progress of the sultan's preparations for his fleet. But François, acting on the assumption that the sultan's fleet would support him in 1542, had declared war on Charles V on 10 July. Although French galleys intercepted Spanish

troops during their transport from Italy, French naval forces could not compete with the Spanish fleet and relied on the expected aid of the Ottoman fleet.[29] Consequently, the French offensives in Luxembourg and at Perpignan both failed.

In January 1543 François wrote to the German diet of Nuremberg, complaining of the murders of Cesar Fregose and Antonio Rincon and stating that the emperor falsely claimed that he had found letters on their bodies from François asking for the sultan to attack Christians. François denied responsibility countering that Charles V's expedition against Hayreddin in North Africa, not François's requests, led the Ottomans to attack Christians.[30] Although François denied requesting Ottoman aid against Charles V, the reason no letters were found on Rincon and Fregoso was that Guillaume du Bellay, then governor of the Piedmont, had persuaded them to confide their letters to him so he could dispatch them to Pellicier in Venice, because he feared for their safety.[31] The king lied when he claimed that he had not encouraged the sultan to attack Christians, for François wanted Süleyman to fight Charles, but he also desired the favorable opinion of the German princes. However in 1544 Charles persuaded the diet of Spires to grant him aid against the French and their Ottoman allies in the Mediterranean.[32]

Outward Voyage of the Ottoman Fleet

In accordance with François I's wishes, in April 1543 the Ottoman fleet sailed from Istanbul with the French ambassador, Captain Polin, on board, and the sultan departed 6 May at the head of an army to fight in Hungary. Before his departure, Süleyman sent a letter to François, expressing his views about the expedition of 1543. 'Because of the entreaty of your envoy Polin, I have ordered Hayreddin, my admiral to listen to your instructions and to form his enterprises to the ruin of your enemies. You will allow them to depart after they have happily executed them, my army is to return during the same season.' Knowing that François had made treaties with Charles in the past and deserted his Ottoman allies, he continued, 'Be on guard that your enemy does not deceive you [again], he will never be reduced to make

peace with you because he recognizes that you have enough resolution to constantly make war against him.'[33] Süleyman knew that François would desert the alliance if he could achieve his ambitions by a treaty with Charles.

The itinerary of the voyage of the Ottoman fleet from the eastern to the western Mediterranean is recorded in two sources, in *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve İstunibelgrad* by Matrakçı and in the letter of a Venetian agent sent from Corfu to Venice. According to Matrakçı, the fleet left Istanbul 12 Muharrem 950/17 April 1543, sailing to Gallipoli, Eğriboz (Euboea), Lepanto, and then to Porto Figu on Levkas, where they waited for a favorable wind for several days.[34] Then they sailed on the open sea to 'Kalavrete,' possibly Calabria,[35] and then to Reggio, opposite Messina, Sicily. After besieging Reggio and sacking it, three days later they sailed to Stromboli and then to Antibes.[36] Most western authors have relied on a letter sent from Corfu to Venice, 15 June [1543] for the dates and locations of the Ottoman fleet's voyage, despite its chronological inconsistencies. However if the date of departure is corrected from May to April, the letter agrees fairly well with Matrakçı's account.[37] The fleet was well supplied, especially with artillery; the letter writer from Corfu claimed there were seven pieces of artillery per galley, as well as anchors, sails, cables and tents, and five great banners of silk.[38]

Except for the siege and capture of Reggio, Matrakçı does not describe what occurred when the fleet sailed up the Italian coast, but other sources recorded the fear that the Ottoman fleet inspired in many Italians. Claudio Tolomei wrote to a friend from Rome on 30 June 1543.

> ... We have here the Turks at Ostia and at Porto. All of Rome is in confusion today, the day of Saint Peter. It seems that Barbarossa has calculated his arrival expressly to do honor or reverence to this saint. ... I am convinced that without the letter that Captain Polin wrote, three quarters of Rome would quit the country, ... Captain Polin informed us that there is nothing to fear, because the Grand Turk has expressly ordered Barbarossa not to molest the lands of the Pope ... I am sending you a copy

of the letter, so that you can better see the esteem in which the Sultan Süleyman holds the Holy See. And take heart, because it may be that he will become Christian as prophesied. Certainly he wants the Christians to have the best things, since he wants them all for himself, if possible.

This morning, the last day of the month, word has come that Barbarossa has set sail for Civitavecchia, where it is thought that he will do no more evil and will demand only some provisions, paying for them honestly, as he has done in the other places where he has passed… .

From Rome the last of June 1543.[39]

As Tolomei indicated, Polin had informed Hayreddin that the pope was a French ally and that papal lands were to be spared. Ottoman and French sources repeatedly stated that the Ottomans did not attack the territories of allies or friends of allies. The Italian Tolomei corroborated that this policy was followed on this campaign. Polin wrote to the governor of Teracina on 27 June 1543, assuring him that Süleyman had ordered Barbarossa not to attack the domains of the king of France or his allies.[40]

This view of Ottoman policy has not been made part of the standard narrative, even by those who quote Tolomei directly. Kenneth Setton, a historian of relations between Christians and Muslims in the medieval and early modern periods, omitted the section of the letter that stated that Hayreddin Barbarossa had been paying for the provisions that he had demanded en route. Setton's source, Dorez's edition of Maurand, included the entire letter. By deleting this part of the letter, Setton reinforced the view originating in Habsburg propaganda that the Ottomans indiscriminately ravaged all the lands they encountered on this campaign, whether friend or foe.[41]

Waiting for François I

After the Ottoman fleet arrived at Antibes, the French ambassador went to consult with the king because Polin had promised the sultan that all the necessities for the Ottoman fleet—food and munitions as

well as additional ships—would be ready for them at Antibes or the Iles d'Hyeres on their arrival. Nothing, in fact, was prepared when they arrived. While the Ottomans awaited Polin's return, the French leaders at Marseilles invited Hayreddin to visit the city.[42]

The entire Ottoman fleet arrived at Marseilles on 20 July 1543, according to a report from the French archives. The fleet consisted of 110 galleys, forty *fustes*, and three great *nefs*[43] full of artillery and munitions, as well as 25,000 to 30,000 men. The Comte d'Enghien, wellborn but inexperienced, whom François I had appointed as his commander in the Mediterranean, went to meet Hayreddin in order to conduct him to the royal lodgings in Marseilles.[44] In the *Gazavat*, Muradi stated that the people of Marseilles greatly desired to see Barbarossa because the French soldiers did not want to fight alongside Barbarossa until they had evaluated him in person. When it was known that Barbarossa was coming to the city, people came from all directions to Marseilles to see him, even bringing their families to enjoy the spectacle. Both Ottoman authors noted the honor shown to Hayreddin by the French. Matrakçı stated that Hayreddin was given complete honor and respect and was not neglected 'even as much as a hair.'[45] Both the Ottomans and the French wished to observe each other and discover what their allies were like. In the *Gazavat*, Muradi frequently noted the curiosity that people of all social levels had to see Barbarossa.[46] The Frenchman Vieilleville, who accompanied d'Enghien, noted that there was almost an exodus from the court in Paris to see Barbarossa. There was an 'infinity of gentlemen' who wished to go to Marseilles because they desired to see 'this army and the manner of the Turks.' This was an occasion that might not occur again. In fact, 'if they had taken all those who talked of it, they would have taken all the youth of the court.'[47] The impression from these sources is that a festival atmosphere characterized this meeting.

Hayreddin then sailed back to Toulon to await the return of Polin.[48] About twenty days later, Polin brought the king's message to Hayreddin that he wished the Ottoman fleet to help the French attack Nice. Nice was in the territory ruled by the Duke of Savoy, uncle of François I but ally of Charles V. Shortly before the Ottoman fleet arrived in French waters, the constable of the citadel of Nice had

humiliated the French. Together with Andrea Doria, he had arranged to capture French ships by pretending to surrender the citadel to the French if they sent four galleys.[49]

Süleyman's Orders

Süleyman left on campaign to Hungary shortly after the fleet sailed west, but he maintained contact with Hayreddin, François I, and the French ambassador Polin, despite the distance, through messengers dispatched between them. Süleyman informed Hayreddin and the French of his decisions regarding the Ottoman fleet's future activities based on the information he received from them. Muradi, in the *Gazavat*, included some of the correspondence between Süleyman and Hayreddin, in the form of *hüküm*s {orders} sent to Hayreddin; they included detailed information that Hayreddin had sent to the sultan.[50]

Süleyman began the first *hüküm* to Hayreddin by reviewing what the sultan knew concerning the voyage and the fleet's activities while awaiting François I's orders.[51] Süleyman knew that the king wished to capture Nice, but until French troops could be gathered to assist in the siege, the French requested that the Ottoman fleet attack other fortresses without French support. Hayreddin had written as they commenced these operations.[52] At this early date he reported to the sultan that since they had been delayed by contrary winds and winter was near, the Ottoman fleet would be forced to spend the winter in France. Süleyman informed Hayreddin that he had also received letters from François I and Polin; François I promised not to make peace with Charles V, while Polin promised to care for the fleet and to provide provisions and also requested that the fleet be available to serve the French the following spring.[53]

In addition to letters from Hayreddin, Polin, and Francois I, an example of how the sultan remained informed regarding events in France is found in an undated document in the Ottoman archives, which recorded the interrogation of a French agent.[54] When the man was asked concerning the location of the French 'padişah'[55] when 'the ambassador left the imperial [Ottoman] fleet,' he answered that he was in Flanders. He reported that the king had captured many fortresses

and stated that the Duke of Cleves had captured extensive territory belonging to Charles.[56] He also claimed that the French had been successful in the Piedmont, capturing a fortress near Milan. After discussing all of the French dispositions for the war, the agent was then asked concerning the Spanish king; he replied that Charles was in Aspre {Spires}. The man was questioned regarding aid from England for Charles V and also concerning the emperor's meeting with the pope; he replied that Charles and the pope had met at Bologna and that the pope had sent troops to assist Charles.[57] Finally the man was questioned regarding the Ottoman fleet. When he was asked whether any ships of the levend {irregular} forces had supported the imperial fleet, he replied that twenty-two ships had arrived, including five galleys from Jerba.[58] He was also questioned about Venice, replying that the Venetians had forty or fifty galleys at Corfu and that the lords of Zante had sent fruit to the Ottoman fleet when it passed. This man had departed from France soon after the arrival of the Ottoman fleet in French waters.

Despite multiple sources of information, the sultan still needed more specific information regarding plans for the well-being of the fleet. The sultan questioned Hayreddin as to how the fleet could pass the winter in France as well as how to provide for the army's provisions and pay. In his letter, he confirmed that he was attempting to maintain the usual Ottoman financial arrangements for the fleet, to provide provisions and to pay salaries. Süleyman was concerned with the adequate care of his fleet and emphasized that if the French could not provide this, then the fleet was to winter in Ottoman ports. Polin, in a letter to the sultan, claimed that winter provisions were more abundant than he, Polin, had requested previously. This was untrue; when the Ottoman fleet arrived in Toulon, nothing had been prepared for them.[59]

Süleyman then informed Hayreddin that he had written to both François I and Polin and advised them of his views on this matter.

> Now it is impossible for the pay of the soldiers who are with my imperial fleet or for the fleet's needs to be sent by land or by sea by any means from here because of the great distance. For you {the French} I am committing the charge of all the fleet's and

> army's affairs to the Beylerbey of Algiers [Hayreddin Pasha]. You should make arrangements with him so that if you prepare my army's salaries and provisions, the fleet's oarsmen's needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees fit. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial fleet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friendship, provision my army as necessary to keep it from harm and hardship.[60]

If the French provided the fleet with supplies and also paid the men's salaries, then the Ottoman fleet could remain in France until the following spring. If not, the fleet was to return to Ottoman ports. When François I retained the Ottoman fleet in France until the spring of 1544, he was committing himself to paying their expenses, in provisions and in salaries.

Süleyman relied on Hayreddin both to negotiate arrangements with the French and to ensure the well-being of the fleet. Süleyman instructed Hayreddin that when Hasan, one of Süleyman's translators, arrived, if the king had agreed to pay the Ottoman forces' salaries and provide provisions, then fine, Hayreddin had the pay register giving the rate of pay for the men. However, if the French had not agreed to these terms, Hayreddin must decide the proper course. The sultan deliberated over the best course of action should the French refuse to supply and pay the fleet, but he expected Hayreddin both to preserve the well-being of the fleet and to be in position to fight the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean in the spring. The sultan closed the letter warning Hayreddin to ensure that no harm befell the Ottoman fleet in any way while it was sailing.[61] This letter from Süleyman to Hayreddin Pasha emphasized that the safety of his fleet was of the utmost concern to the sultan. Given the huge expense involved in outfitting a fleet, the sultan's concern was certainly justified.[62] Süleyman's expectation that the French should contribute to the necessities of the expedition was reasonable, since the Ottoman fleet was at the disposition of the king of France.

The letter from the sultan to Hayreddin corrects distortions in many accounts of this episode that result from relying on Habsburg sources or misreading the contemporary French sources. For instance, Ernest Charrière stated, 'In return for gold, he obtained the departure of the Ottoman fleet [in 1544]' and continued, 'The memoirs of Vieilleville give an idea of the sacrifices imposed upon François I, in spite of the kingdom's precarious finances.'[63] Vieilleville indeed discussed paying the Ottomans, not in 1544 but in 1543 after the siege of Nice, when Vieilleville stated: 'Hayreddin bade farewell to M. d'Enghien, without performing additional services [for the French]. He and the other leaders of the Ottoman forces were paid more than 800,000 *écus*, which was a great deal for what they had accomplished. Thirty-two treasurers at Toulon worked continuously for three days, well into the night, counting out sacks of one thousand, two thousand, and three thousand *écus* each.'[64] This could not refer to the spring of 1544 because d'Enghien was not in Marseilles with the French fleet during the winter and certainly was not there in the spring.[65] Charrière's misinterpretation of Vieilleville suggests that the Ottomans had made unreasonable financial demands on the French, but the sultan's letter reveals that he expected the French to contribute to the expenses of the expedition while the fleet was in France, since he could no longer do so because of the distance.

Regarding Süleyman's correspondence with Hayreddin Pasha, Setton once again reveals both his bias (by his tone) and the dangers of relying solely on western sources when he states, 'On the whole Barbarossa's success in the western Mediterranean was obviously nothing to write home about, and Barbarossa did not do so.'[66] Setton's source, the Venetian archives, was not privy to the correspondence that passed between the sultan and his admiral, nor necessarily cognizant of how the sultan evaluated the success or failure of this expedition.

The Ottoman-French Siege of Nice

The events of the siege of Nice exhibit the leadership challenges that arose during this campaign. Hayreddin was the more experienced military leader, but he was constrained by the sultan's command that

he please the French. Although in theory d'Enghien was commanding the French forces, in fact the responsibility for most decisions lay with Polin. He and Hayreddin frequently disagreed as to the best way to conduct the siege, and their priorities differed. Naturally, Hayreddin was bound to follow the instructions that he received from the sultan, but they included the order to maintain a good working relationship with the French. Polin was trying to achieve French objectives without angering Hayreddin or using more of France's resources than absolutely necessary.

Polin first sought to negotiate the surrender of Nice without a siege. The Duke of Savoy's commanders at Nice prolonged these negotiations to gain time for reinforcements to arrive. Once the siege began, Polin requested that the Ottomans not use cannon because he did not want the buildings damaged. But since the siege did not commence until the second week of August and the fighting season was rapidly passing, eventually the Ottomans employed cannon to breach the walls, and they captured the outer fortress on 22 August. Once again the duke's commanders at Nice tried to gain time by informing Polin that they would surrender the citadel to the French on condition that he arranged for the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces. Hayreddin believed that this was a trick, saying, 'What will be, will be, but God knows best,' and ordered the Ottoman troops to withdraw to their ships. As soon as this happened, the troops in the citadel resumed fighting and refused to surrender. Polin had to beg Hayreddin to return to the siege, and d'Enghien was soon forced to ask to borrow ammunition because the French had run out.[67]

These delays were crucial to the failure of the siege. The Duke of Savoy negotiated with the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V's commander at Milan, for additional troops, which Doria transported from Genoa to Nice. At this time a storm threatened the area, and Hayreddin judged the harbor at Nice insufficiently sheltered for the Ottoman navy. Hayreddin considered the safety of the fleet more important than the capture of Nice, so he withdrew it to a safe harbor at nearby islands. The French were forced to raise the siege, and they burned the city as the advance troops of the duke of Savoy and del Vasto appeared. Doria lost four galleys in the storm but the Ottoman fleet

escaped harm. Although Nice remained under the control of the Duke of Savoy, the Ottoman fleet was instrumental in the French gaining many other towns in the area.[68]

Negotiations for the Ottoman Fleet to Remain in France

As mentioned above, Western historiography depicting Ottoman actions in France in 1543–44 has relied on sources with a Habsburg bias instead of using French and Ottoman sources. The Ottomans considered it unacceptable to harm the lands of an ally, so Ottoman sources were inherently less likely to mention negative behavior on the part of Ottomans than French sources were. Thus it is essential to study records written by the inhabitants of Toulon in particular, and other areas of the south of France in general, to gain an accurate assessment of Ottoman actions in that city.

The decision for the Ottoman fleet to remain at Toulon caused a flurry of negotiations between the king and his leaders in Provence, between the civic leaders of Toulon and the king's representatives in Provence, and between Hayreddin Pasha and the French. This alone is indicative of Ottoman policy. If the Ottomans had envisioned ravaging France to obtain supplies, there would have been no need for prolonged discussions about who was to provide what when. During these negotiations, Hayreddin informed Polin that he proposed to depart as a ploy to obtain a firm commitment from the French to provide for the fleet. Polin countered that he had François I's command to supply the fleet and, even more persuasively, that 'the noble order of the sultan requires you to depend on us. And afterward, whatever time that we agree to your going, we will give you permission to go. You should go at that time.'[69] By retaining the fleet, the French admitted responsibility for its welfare; Polin and Hayreddin had already agreed on what was necessary for the wintering of the Ottoman forces, and the possibility that the fleet might need to winter in France had been discussed before leaving Istanbul. Only after negotiations between Polin and Hayreddin were completed did the Ottoman forces proceed to Toulon. On 9 October François I instructed Polin and d'Enghien to do whatever was necessary for Barbarossa to winter in Provence.

The king promised to provide everything on condition that Barbarossa both repaid the French when he received his salary and stood ready to serve the king in the spring.[70] During the siege of Nice, Hayreddin had informed François I that if he wished to keep the fleet in his service, he must immediately furnish the men's pay and other needs; otherwise, he wished to sail to Istanbul. As early as 8 September, François I had sent orders to empty Toulon so that the Ottomans could winter there.[71] Evidently, what was at stake was not whether the fleet remained in France for the winter but who was ultimately responsible for its supplies and expenses. Since Süleyman could not provide for the Ottomans at such a distance, the French promised to do so, but Hayreddin was then required to spend his salary reimbursing them. Neither the French nor the Ottomans would have found it acceptable for the Ottoman forces to live off the land by raiding the local inhabitants.

Royal *lettres patentes* of 8 September 1543 were sent to Louis Adhémar, Comte de Grignan, the governor of Provence, commanding the people of Toulon to leave the city. The councilors of Toulon recorded on 16 September that after receiving the king's command, they decided to send a commission to Grignan to arrange matters. Knowing the king's financial difficulties, they immediately planned to raise 20,000 *écus* for expenses in conjunction with the Ottoman fleet's sojourn in Toulon. On 25 September the commission to Barbarossa reported that it had negotiated with d'Enghien, who stated that it was not necessary for all of the inhabitants of the city to leave; heads of households and artisans should remain. He also promised that the sojourn of the Ottoman fleet would not incommode the city.[72]

After deciding to remain in France, Hayreddin wrote to the sultan explaining his reasons. If they left, Doria would ravage French territories with his fleet. Also, because it was so late in the season, it would be difficult for the Ottoman fleet to find a safe harbor on the way home. Since the French king had taken responsibility for supplying the Ottoman fleet with food and necessities, he hoped that they would be well taken care of in France. When Süleyman received this letter, he sent a *hüküm* to Hayreddin giving him permission to winter in France. Süleyman had also received a letter from Polin concerning the

Ottoman fleet. Süleyman told Hayreddin that he knew that the salary and provisions for the fleet had been given on a six-month basis. It was now impossible to send anything by land or sea, but he had warned the king and Polin earlier to prepare the fleet's needs so that the men would suffer no hardships and 'to have a good agreement with you on all other matters.'[73]

Süleyman questioned Hayreddin about the provisioning of the fleet. Apparently Hayreddin had informed the sultan that the French people [*halk*] had assumed responsibility for the provisions. The sultan wanted to know on whose authority, the French king's or merely Polin's. He reiterated that Hayreddin had not informed him of what had been arranged for the army's salaries. He told Hayreddin to write in detail, quickly, and to keep him informed of all the news from 'those parts.'[74]

The Ottoman Fleet Winters at Toulon

To accommodate the Ottoman fleet was difficult because of its size. The order of François I requiring the inhabitants of Toulon to leave stated that there were 30,000 combatants.[75] This was a huge number to be lodged in a town that at the end of the sixteenth century, only had 637 houses within its walls, although Toulon also had several suburbs. The Ottoman forces were lodged in the city, the suburbs, and tents.

Obtaining supplies for the Ottoman fleet also proved difficult, for Toulon was isolated from the rest of Provence by mountains. François I gave the people of Toulon immunity from taxes for ten years because of their inconvenience, and he gave them permission to go elsewhere to buy food for the Ottomans.[76] Purchasing supplies was a major expense, however, and François I was short of money. On 29 November 1543, 30,000 livres were given to the treasurer of the marine of the Levant for the maintenance of the Ottoman fleet. The staple of the Ottoman forces was biscuit.[77] Polin claimed that 105,960 quintaux of biscuit were needed for the time that the Ottoman fleet was at Toulon,[78] but the total amount came to 193,400 quintaux because biscuit also had to be supplied for the Ottoman fleet's return to Istanbul. Since

the king could provide only 84,000 quintaux, the king's officers in Provence had to furnish the rest. Supplies were requisitioned from as far away as Lyon and the towns of southeastern France. A merchant of Lyon paid 6000 livres to Barbarossa, which he promised to repay after he received the pay of the fleet.[79] Some areas provided food, others money, but nothing was taken by force, and it was the French government that demanded these resources for the Ottoman fleet.

The 'pieces' that the consuls of Toulon, Peusin, Gardane, and Brun submitted to the town council on 28 April 1544 contain a list of expenses they incurred in order to provide for the Ottomans while they were in Toulon. The consuls recorded the cost of what they purchased, mainly food, and to whom it was given. Infrequently, they also recorded expenses that reveal somewhat more about the events of the winter than the number of pieces of fruit purchased. For example, Consul Vincens Gardane claimed the expense he incurred for renting a horse for Soliman Aga for two and a half days, when Soliman Aga went to Cabanes together with the commissioner for the king to investigate an incident in which Turks had been killed. Consul Honorat Brun also rented a horse for the same investigation.[80]

According to the *Gazavat,* Hayreddin paid for additional supplies for the fleet, as the king's officers did, and also obtained food from places outside France, including Genoa, Corsica, and Sardinia. The civic leaders in these areas, ruled by Habsburg allies, decided that it would be wiser to trade with the Ottomans than to refuse, since the Ottomans would need food, and if they could not buy it, they would probably seize it. When the leaders informed their people, the inhabitants were delighted because they could sell their goods and perhaps glimpse Barbarossa. They brought so much merchandise that the army was easily supplied.[81] Between the biscuit supplied by the French, the efforts made by the consuls of Toulon, and Hayreddin's own initiatives, the Ottoman fleet was amply fed that winter.

The Ottoman forces were accustomed to adequate supplies on campaign. Compared to traditional methods of provisioning in Europe, which often involved seizing supplies on the spot without compensation, the Ottomans' logistical preparations gave them a military advantage. Whether on Ottoman or vassal lands, the troops were required

to pay for anything that they obtained. Auxiliary troops were required to bring food supplies for several months with them. *Sipahi*s who were levied for a naval campaign were supposed to embark with enough biscuit for six months.[82]

Thus Ottoman troops on French soil knew that they must purchase whatever they needed. Polin records that since no adequate arrangements had been made to feed them, they came to him and demanded their pay 'because they do not know how they can live.' Polin begged the king to send money to pay them immediately.[83] The consuls at Toulon only once mentioned that supplies (a barrel of oil) had been obtained by force, and their statement leaves it unclear whether it was the Ottomans or the consuls who had used it.[84] Generally, contemporary observers praised the Ottoman troops' behavior in Toulon.

From Hayreddin to the average soldier, the Ottoman forces expected to be paid so that they could purchase food and other necessities in France. They also expected to be paid for their military service. Hayreddin had entered into agreements with the French to reimburse them for supplies after he himself was paid. To discharge these debts, Hayreddin needed funds in France. The expenses of the expedition were justified from the French perspective, since the Ottomans protected the Mediterranean coast of France, which had suffered from invasions by Habsburg forces during previous wars with Charles V.

Spring 1544: French Indecision

By the spring, the Ottoman forces were pressuring Hayreddin to return home. Hayreddin also wanted to leave France, but he needed the sultan's permission first, so he wrote Süleyman to explain the situation in France. Since the fleet had remained in France over the winter to be in a position to aid the French in 1544, the main question was determining French military objectives as the campaign season began. Hayreddin wrote that the fleet would sail on 22 March to begin the campaign season, but because the king of England had prevented François I coming to the Mediterranean with French troops, a successful Ottoman attack without additional forces was unlikely. The French had suggested Sardinia, Naples, and Tunis as targets. Hayreddin informed

the sultan that until the fleet obtained provisions from the French, he would agree to whatever was suggested because the Ottoman fleet was dependent on them for grain and other provisions. But, Hayreddin said, 'we have had experience of the French ambassador. He does not agree to the destruction of any enemy territory. Recently when they wanted Salih Reis to attack Spanish territory, they regretted it later.'[85] Hayreddin notified the sultan that men were passing between the king of Spain and the French, so it was possible that the French would make peace with Charles V.[86] Polin had gone to the king to obtain the salary of the Ottoman forces, but Hayreddin considered this a ploy to detain the Ottoman fleet in France for the summer. The French still had not paid the salaries when Hayreddin sent the letter. In response the sultan ordered Hayreddin to return with the fleet that summer but, somewhat contradictorily, to cooperate with the French as well; in essence, he instructed Hayreddin to judge for himself the best course of action.[87]

Among the possible targets of a naval campaign, the most important was Genoa. Plans were made for a joint Ottoman-French enterprise with sufficient French troops to support the Ottoman forces. François I sent an envoy to Genoa to demand that it place its ports at his disposal and give him 100,000 *écus*. The Genoese responded by instructing their envoy to delay any French action by dragging out negotiations as long as possible. François I fell into the trap. The French envoy to Genoa was kept waiting, and on 31 March 1544, Polin was ordered to postpone the expedition. The French troops designated for this campaign were sent to reinforce d'Enghien for the battle of Cerisoles in the Alps, and the joint Ottoman-French attack on Genoa never materialized. However, while the Ottoman fleet remained in French territory, it protected the French coasts, terrorized the enemy, and prevented the transfer of Spanish troops to Italy.[88] When Hayreddin and the fleet departed from Toulon in March, they sailed only to the Iles d'Hyeres, where they remained for about two months while François I decided how to employ the fleet or arrange for land forces to support them. By May the Ottomans feared that, if they remained in France any longer, no campaign would be undertaken and the sailing season would pass. Finally, Hayreddin went to Marseilles, where only the ambassador remained

with five galleys. Hayreddin freed the Muslim galley slaves, who were prisoners on French ships, which weakened French naval forces.[89]

Voyage to Istanbul

The Ottoman fleet sailed for home towards the end of May 1544. Captain Polin with five ships accompanied them to report on the campaign to the sultan. Since no major expedition had been undertaken, Polin gave orders to ravage the coasts and islands of Italy on the return journey. In the *Gazavat*, Muradi stated that Hayreddin followed the sultan's order by heading for Istanbul, capturing and sacking the fortresses that he passed. When the Ottomans were poised to assault Savoy and Genoa, Polin informed them that the French had made peace with Genoa and the pope, so their territories were no longer open to attack.[90]

As the Ottoman fleet sailed down the west coast of Italy they attacked and captured some fortresses with French support. The French either manned them or, if they were too far from France, abandoned and burned them. The Ottoman fleet sailed past papal lands but, together with the French, attacked towns in the region of Naples. They conquered the city of Lipari and captured many of the inhabitants. When the people of Messina offered 15,000 ducats for all the people of Lipari, Barbarossa asked in addition for 8,000 quintaux of biscuit,[91] indicating that supplies for the fleet continued to be scarce during the return voyage.

Polin with his galleys separated from the Ottoman fleet on 16 July because he needed to return to Istanbul more quickly than Hayreddin Pasha could if he stopped to capture various places on the way. Informing Hayreddin that he must reach Istanbul in time to return to François I before winter, Polin sailed directly for Istanbul, while the Ottoman fleet continued to attack the coasts of Calabria.[92] Polin arrived in Istanbul on 10 August and set out again on 9 September. Hayreddin and the fleet arrived at Istanbul on 14 October. Polin reached Marseilles on 2 October, where he probably learned that François I and Charles V had concluded the Peace of Crépy on 18 September.

Conclusion

Süleyman was hardly surprised by the defection of his ally, in view of the warning he had given to François I in April 1543. The sultan knew from experience that François I was unreliable, so he had no illusions about the king's commitment to their alliance. But it served Ottoman interests to promote the alliance for its divisive effect on Christian Europe and because it facilitated Süleyman's ability to obstruct the plans of his rival, Charles V. The sultan responded in February 1545 to the letter in which François I claimed to have made peace to deceive his enemies. Süleyman informed François I that he approved of this course of action if it caused the plans of François I's enemies to come to naught, that his ambassador was welcome, and that French merchants could continue to trade in the Ottoman Empire as they had previously.[93] The Habsburg ambassador in 1545 claimed that a furious Süleyman had threatened to impale d'Aramon, who was the French representative in Istanbul, when he heard the news, but since Süleyman had foreseen François I's treaty with Charles, this appears to have been more propaganda.[94] Although François I's defection was a poor return for the sultan's efforts on his behalf, Süleyman valued the benefits of preserving the alliance until François I's ambition again led to a rupture with Charles V.[95]

Years of diplomacy resulted in joint action by Ottoman and French forces in 1543 and 1544. Despite the extensive and expensive preparations and the notoriety that the campaign generated, the combined Ottoman and French forces made no spectacular conquests, not only because of the difficulties of long-distance planning, but also because of the vacillations of the king of France. Although François I had instructed Polin to arrange for the Ottoman fleet to come to aid the French, he did not employ it effectively: he failed to supply adequate French troops to support the Ottoman forces, he did not furnish the necessary supplies that had been promised for the Ottoman fleet, nor did he adequately supply his own insufficient forces. Often François I could not decide how, or even whether, to employ the Ottoman fleet. When the fleet arrived, it could not immediately begin operations because nothing was ready and Polin had to obtain orders from

François I, who was on the northern coast. When Polin returned with instructions to capture Nice, French troops were not available to begin the siege immediately. Also, François I put the French forces under the command of a young, untried nobleman. After the Ottoman and French forces had failed to take the citadel of Nice because Polin had not prosecuted the siege with vigour, only minor raiding was required of the Ottoman forces. The king wished to retain the use of the fleet for the next year, so he made Toulon available for it to winter in, with the expectation that the Ottomans would follow his commands during the following campaign season. But when spring came, the king could not decide which city to besiege. Many plans were proposed, none approved. Genoa, under French control as recently as 1528, would have been a worthy target for the combined French and Ottoman forces, as possession of it would have greatly enhanced French power in the region, but it was not attacked because the Genoese tricked François I. Finally, having accomplished little beyond some raids on Habsburg territory, the Ottomans insisted on returning home before another season was lost to inactivity.

This episode elicited a range of views by the French, the Ottomans, and their enemies. Traditional western historiography views the Ottomans as puppets controlled by the French, claiming that François I sent the Ottoman fleet away under pressure both from his subjects and from fellow Christian rulers.[96] On the contrary, Süleyman directed his naval forces through contact with Hayreddin, and the fleet returned to the Ottoman Empire when he ordered it to do so. The dissatisfaction of the Ottoman forces with French leadership and organization, not the French displeasure with Ottoman behavior, finally resulted in Hayreddin's request that the sultan allow them to return home.

The lack of tangible accomplishment, however, does not lessen the propaganda value of an event. Charles V's plans were temporarily checked by the Ottoman-French military action of 1543, but he perceived an opportunity to weaken François I, and indirectly Süleyman, by condemning a Christian alliance with a Muslim power. The impact of Charles V's propaganda and the dominance of the Habsburg view of this alliance continue to overshadow both the Ottoman and the French perspectives even today.

CHAPTER 5

VIEWS OF INFIDEL ALLIES: RECORDS OF NEGOTIATING, FIGHTING AND TRAVELING

The history of the joint Ottoman-French naval operations reconstructed in chapter 4, especially the Toulon episode, provides an opportunity to elucidate contemporary Ottoman and French views of their alliance. Eyewitness reports reflect the authors' opinions regarding their rulers' diplomatic relations with another ruler whose domains were populated by adherents of a different religion, Christianity or Islam. Because contemporary Ottoman and French sources have been neglected when studying the alliance, the perspective of sixteenth-century Habsburg propaganda continues to dominate historical studies of these events. As the contenders for power battled for the prestige of being considered the leading ruler of their time, they did not neglect one of the principal weapons available to foil the plans of their enemy, propaganda. While in chapter 4 a more accurate reconstruction of events was presented from sources produced by participants, chapter 5 analyzes the historiography that has developed concerning the episode which has its roots in the sixteenth-century battle for universal sovereignty.

Historiography of the Ottoman-French Alliance

Before turning to the specific views in the sources produced by Ottoman and French participants in the campaign of 1543–44, I

present some examples of the evolution of the historiography concerning the Ottoman-French alliance that have appeared in historical works of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An example of how the Toulon episode has been portrayed in the historical literature is found in a monograph on war in the sixteenth century.

> Created under such pressures, the rivalry [between François I and Charles V] expanded ... causing ... wars in Savoy, Piedmont and Provence, north-eastern France, Luxembourg and Lorraine, ... and, sensationally, directly involving the Turks in western politics through an alliance with Francis. It was a telling indication of the new desperation that afflicted international relations when Toulon in 1543–4 became a Moslem naval base, complete with mosque and slave market.[1]

The author's unfamiliarity with Ottoman involvement in 'western politics' in the fifteenth century, led him to describe the alliance of France with the Ottoman Empire as 'sensational.' As demonstrated in chapters 1 and 3, the Ottomans had been directly involved in 'western politics' since at least the 1480s. Hale mentioned a 'mosque and slave market' without which any Muslim naval base would, presumably, be incomplete. Although French and Ottoman sources do not mention either at Toulon, a mosque may have existed, but probably a slave market did, because of French needs. In 1751 this market processed 2000 galley slaves who were Turkish, and it remained in operation until 1873.[2] Hale's description of life in Toulon while the Ottomans were in residence resembles that of Vaughn, which preceded his by thirty years.

> Barbarossa was allowed to use Toulon as his headquarters, ... and during the winter of 1543–4 it was described as a second Constantinople. ... Mortality was, as usual, heavy among his crews, and neighboring French villages were raided and French peasants carried off to man the Turkish oars. Christian captives were openly sold in Toulon market-place, and while French

> Protestants were undergoing savage persecution, Turks on French soil turned unmolested to Mecca to pray.[3]

Vaughn's reference for this passage is an article written in 1937 on the topic Calvin and the Turks. This article contains a quotation from a primary source, providing evidence of sixteenth century views that contrast with those of the twentieth century, since it deals entirely with the religious activities of the Ottoman forces and does not mention slave trading:

> Disembarked in France, the Turks have the liberty to perform all their impious practices, while our friends, men who know true piety ... are not only prevented from celebrating their cult, but are persecuted in the most horrible and cruel manner, and this in the kingdom and under the authority of he who is called the Most Christian king.[4]

The letter written by Guillaume Farel, a leading French reformer forced to leave France because of his religious beliefs, mentions nothing about slave markets, but uses this episode to condemn the religious policies of François I, who was preventing French Protestants from practicing their religion and increasing their persecution.

The quotation from Hale together with its probable antecedents, illustrates that the perspective that has exerted long-lasting influence on western historiography of the Ottoman-French alliance is that of their common enemy, the Habsburg Charles V. The supporters of Charles V, including prominent historians such as Paolo Giovio; nobles such as Alfonso d'Avalos, Marquis del Vasto; and artists such as Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, produced negative propaganda against the French and the Ottomans concerning the alliance of a Christian king with an infidel. Habsburg propaganda had two main components: first, that it was religiously unacceptable for a Christian ruler to form an alliance with a Muslim ruler, and second, that the Ottoman forces harmed French territory during their sojourn in Toulon. More generally, Charles claimed to be the protector of Christendom against Muslims in general and the Ottomans specifically. This propaganda overpowered not

only Ottoman but also French perspectives. This is not to say that all subjects of the king of France agreed with French policy or that all Habsburg subjects supported Habsburg policy. Nevertheless the official Habsburg view disseminated by its supporters has dominated western historiography up to the present to the exclusion of both the Ottoman and the French perspectives.

Only recently have historians begun to protest against the uncritical acceptance of Habsburg propaganda, that is, attempts to portray all Charles V's military actions in the Mediterranean as religiously motivated efforts to unite all western Christendom under Habsburg leadership in a crusade against the Ottomans. In 1998, Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa in her analysis of the propaganda produced glorifying the 1535 Habsburg expedition to Tunis, emphasized that we must not confuse official propaganda with genuine political intentions.[5] In 2002, Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra identified a trend in Spanish discourse regarding international relations that is evident in other European countries including France: 'one observes a clear dichotomy between the literary culture and the more reality-based reports of the imperial ambassadors in Italy. The former would serve to popularize the ideal of the Spanish monarchy as the incarnation of the defense of Christianity in its fight against the Muslims.... The reality... reduced the grand humanist ideals to a confrontation between Spaniards and Ottomans.'[6] The 'theoretical view' of events glorified Charles as a 'crusader' while the diplomats analyzed the identical events in terms of political motivation. Modern scholars are now analyzing the range of viewpoints that existed in the sixteenth century regarding Charles V's relations with Muslim enemies, but they have not focused on Habsburg propaganda regarding the Ottoman-French alliance.

Subsequent generations' disregard of the contemporary French view of events, in preference to the Habsburg perspective, is directly connected to the Ottoman Empire's relations with the Great Powers in the nineteenth century, as the 'sick man of Europe,' but its roots go much deeper. To a degree, it is a result of enormous transformations in comparative power between the Ottomans and the countries of western Europe between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries; by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire needed French and British

support against its enemies rather than providing such support for France, as in the sixteenth century. During the nineteenth century, western Europeans in general, including the French, were creating empires out of territories that had once been part of the Ottoman Empire, and former Ottoman power was scarcely remembered; the Habsburg view of sixteenth-century diplomatic relations matched nineteenth century European views of contemporary relations with Muslims more nearly than the views of sixteenth-century Frenchmen. These French views themselves had been obscured because seventeenth-century patrons preferred historians who wrote polished prose to the neglect of primary sources, in contrast to the sixteenth century when legal scholars had introduced their research techniques to historical research and writing. It was not until the nineteenth century that the two traditions met in French historiography.[7]

This distorted view of the Ottoman-French alliance originated with the historian Paolo Giovio (1483–1553), native of Como in the duchy of Milan. French translations of Giovio's most important work, *Sui Temporis Historiae Libri* or history of his own times, began to appear in 1552, while in 1581 his *Commentarii delle cose di Turchi* was published in a French translation.[8] Historians writing about the Ottoman fleet's sojourn at Toulon have frequently relied on Giovio's conclusions. Although, Giovio was well informed and more objective than many of his contemporaries, his known reliance on subsidies put his objectivity into question and his 'distribution of praise and blame was certainly not always devoid of self-interest.'[9] When Giovio's account of this episode contradicts contemporary French and Ottoman sources, his accuracy and reliability are questionable. Since his contemporaries believed Giovio to have a political allegiance to Charles V, it is not surprising that his writings support Charles's policies rather than those of the Ottomans and the French. Giovio considered Christendom to have entered a decline because of the events of 1494, when the French invaded Italy, and he believed this continued after 1538, when the Ottomans defeated the navies of Venice and Andrea Doria at Preveza and the centre of power shifted to Istanbul.[10] Therefore when Giovio claimed that while the Ottoman fleet was in Toulon, there were complaints in Provence that 'the Turks pillaged the earth, even seizing

and putting in chains the men of the country,'[11] he contradicted documents written by the inhabitants of Provence, and his biased account supported Habsburg propaganda.[12]

Turning to the works of nineteenth-century Frenchmen, they echo the sentiments of Charles V's supporters rather than those of sixteenth-century Frenchmen. M. Henry, who translated archival documents concerning the Ottoman fleet's sojourn in Toulon from Provençal into French, is a prime example. Although he had studied sixteenth-century French sources, he continued to be influenced both by sixteenth-century Habsburg propaganda and the prejudices of his own time.

> This example of a rapprochement, not imitated since, of the cross and the crescent, this union of an army of baptized soldiers with an army of circumcised soldiers, forgetting for a moment the hatred and the profound antipathies which separated them, in order to go to fight in concert a Christian prince, and suffering the shame of a check before a place over which floated the standard of the sign of the redemption; an act of this nature, ... stirred up in effect the indignation of all of Catholic Europe; also, contemporary writers of all nations spoke ... with a sort of horror, of the great scandal, which the personal ambition of François I gave to Europe.[13]

Jules Michelet, a famous and influential nineteenth-century French historian, in his multi-volume history of France wrote anachronistically concerning this episode when he identified Hayreddin Pasha and the Ottoman fleet as 'Algerians,' claiming that they enslaved, from Provence, men for their galleys and women for their harems.[14]

These quotes display prejudice against the French alliance with the Ottomans, claiming that Provence suffered from Ottoman depredations because of the alliance. When Henry claimed that 'contemporary writers of all nations' spoke of it with horror, he disregarded the writings of his own countrymen. The neglected, contemporary, French authors were not horrified by the alliance. In addition, nineteenth-century authors exaggerated Habsburg accounts, which means that twentieth-century histories of this episode that rely on secondary

sources tend to be exaggerated, distorted, and biased. In this chapter, Ottoman, French, and Habsburg perspectives are contrasted, to demonstrate the biases that have influenced accounts of this episode from sixteenth-century contemporary authors until the present.

Views of the 'Other': How Rulers, Leaders, and Military Forces Were Viewed

Although the king of France and the Ottoman sultan were not personally present during the campaign, they were active in diplomatic relations, since it was their political ambitions that had led to the formation of the alliance. Therefore, how these rulers are viewed by the authors of the primary sources merits analysis. Matrakçı in *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve İstunibelgrad* provides an Ottoman perspective on relations between the sultan and the king of France. Matrakçı described the king of France by including a letter supposedly written by François to Süleyman. This 'letter' does not resemble any of François's many letters to the sultan,[15] which suggests that it is an invention of the author, expressed in Ottoman terms. In this letter, François was compared to the great sixth-century Sasanian ruler, Khusraw Nushirvan, who Muslims considered the supreme example of royal justice. Thus François's non-Muslim status was acknowledged while also emphasizing his greatness. When Matrakçı stated that Firançuşko (François) was a great infidel ruler, the term 'infidel' was not meant to be derogatory but merely to indicate that he was Christian. While Matrakcı considered François and his country France rich and prestigious, they needed the sultan's aid against the Habsburgs.[16]

Matrakçı's favorable depiction of François, the sultan's ally, contrasts with the portrayal of the sultan's enemy, Charles V, who he claimed had Jewish ancestry. The fictional letter from François stated that Charles V's ambition for imperial sovereignty caused all the troubles in western Europe, while his brother, Ferdinand, caused conflict in Hungary. Thus, François had gathered a great army to defeat Charles V, but to destroy the Habsburgs he requested two favors from the sultan: first, that Hayreddin Pasha be sent with the Ottoman fleet to the west and second, that the sultan lead an army to fight in Hungary.[17]

Thus Matrakçı indicated that the French were dependent on Ottoman aid due to the aggressive policies of Charles V. Later in his history, after the Ottoman victory in Hungary, he recorded that Süleyman sent an interpreter to France, who described Süleyman's many successes, whereupon François called himself the slave of the sultan, if the sultan would accept him, since he considered himself to be his subject.[18] The contrast between Christian rulers continued when Matrakçı's views of the Habsburgs are emphasized by his inclusion of a message from the king of France to Hayreddin brought by Polin in which the Habsburgs are described as jackals who employed trickery, broke vows, and harmed other Christian rulers.[19]

Maurand, a Frenchman who accompanied Polin on the return voyage to Istanbul in 1544, expressed his view of the relative power of the Ottoman sultan and the king of France when he noted that Polin was the French ambassador to the Grand Seigneur Süleyman, who had sent Barbarossa with his fleet to help France. Maurand also noted Süleyman's victories at Rhodes, Belgrade, and in the kingdom of Hungary, confirming that his power was greater than that of François.[20]

In contrast to the detailed assessments of Süleyman and François, Ottoman and French sources briefly assess the Ottoman and French military forces. Both the Ottomans and the French wished to observe each other and discover what their allies were like. Some Frenchmen were worried about what the Ottomans, known for their military prowess, would think of their soldiers. Monluc, after describing the siege of Nice, claimed that 'The Turks greatly despise our men, but I believe that they do not beat us when the numbers are equal. They are more robust, obedient and patient than we; but I do not believe that they are more valiant. They have an advantage: which is that they think about nothing but war.' Although Monluc believed that the Ottomans despised the French soldiers, the Ottoman sources were silent on this subject. In contrast, French sources frequently praise the orderliness of the Ottoman forces. Monluc stated that 'They comported themselves modestly to the place of our confederates,' after the siege of Nice. Maurand described the departure of the Ottoman fleet led by the galley of Barbarossa as orderly and beautiful. According to La Roncière, 'all of the contemporary testimonies are unanimous in paying homage

to the discipline of the fleet of Barbarossa.'[21] The orderliness of the Ottoman troops was described in traveler's reports as well.

In contrast to the nameless soldiers and commoners, some prominent individuals are named in the sources. Those individuals who were named generally correspond to individuals who had the most significant role as intermediaries between the Ottomans and the French. Consequently, French sources name Ottomans who were important intermediaries, and Ottoman sources name Frenchmen who were important intermediaries. They do not necessarily correspond to Frenchmen named in French sources or Ottomans named in Ottoman sources. Nor do they reflect the individuals' positions in either the Ottoman or French state hierarchy. The Ottomans named in the two Ottoman sources also differ; the author of the *Gazavat* named naval captains while Matrakçı named provincial governors.[22] Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 list individuals mentioned in five sources: the *Gazavat*, Matrakçı, Maurand, the Toulon archives, and the letter from Corfu.[23]

The French and the Ottomans had difficulties with foreign names and titles, which, except for the most prominent individuals, are distorted. The *Gazavat* never mentioned d'Enghien, but instead refers to Polin because of his close relations with the Ottoman forces. While Matrakçı mentioned d'Enghien by name, clearly Polin, who was always referred to simply as the French ambassador, was the more important French intermediary. Maurand's rendering of names was only clear for Barbarossa and Jaffer Aga; he distorted all of the other names. The consuls of Toulon had the most difficulty with foreign names, for example, in an attempt to make sense of *sancak bey,* they transformed it to San Jacobeis. The consuls in Toulon mainly dealt with Barbarossa or Jaffer Aga, although Consul Brun took two Janissaries to the fountain Saint-Philippe in Toulon and gave them money. Direct contact with common soldiers may have been difficult for the consuls without an interpreter to find out what the Janissaries needed. Jaffer Aga was said to know Italian, and according to Polin, he served as Barbarossa's secretary.[24] Because of his language skills, he frequently received food from the consuls to distribute to the Ottoman forces. The Ottoman sources had little trouble with the name of Andrea Doria, because he was as famous to the Ottomans as Barbarossa was to the French or

Table 5.1 Individuals Mentioned in Accounts of the Ottoman and French Naval Expedition, 1543–44: Ottomans

	Gazavat	**Matrakçı**	**Maurand**	**Toulon Archives**[1]	**Letter from Corfu**[2]
Süleyman, sultan	x[a]	x[b]	x[c]		
Hayreddin Barbarossa	x[d]	x[e]	x[f]	x[g]	x[h]
Salih Reis	x[i]	x[j]	x[k]		x[l]
Jafer Aga			x[m]	x[n]	x[o]
Ferhad, sancak beyi of Agriboz	x[p]	x[q]	x[r]	x[s]	x[t]
Dervish, sancak beyi of Içil	x[u]	x[v]	x[w]	x[x]	x[y]
Mustafa, sancak beyi of Kastamonu	x[z]	x[aa]	x[bb]	x[cc]	x[dd]
Idris, sancak beyi of Ankara	x[ee]	x[ff]	x[gg]	x[hh]	x[ii]
Ahmed, aga of Janissaries		x[jj]		x[kk]	x[ll]
Hüseyn Çelebi	x[mm]				x[nn]
Hasan, translator	x[oo]	x[pp]			
Hasan of Algiers	x[qq]				
Ramazan of Algiers	x[rr]				
Casamata			x[ss]		

1 These records were kept in Toulon while the Ottoman fleet wintered there. They have been published as Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque de Barberousse à Toulon, pendant l'hiver de 1543 a 1544,' in *Collection des Documents Inédits sur l'histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, ed. J.-J. Champollion-Figeac (Paris: Imprimerie Imperial, 1847).

2 This letter was published by Dorez in Jérome Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand d'Antibes à Constantinople 1544*, trans. and ed. Leon Dorez (Paris: Leroux, 1901).

a *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, manuscript, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 1b, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

b Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş Estergon ve İstunibelgrad*, manuscript, Hazine 1608, fol. 12a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul.

c Grant Signor Soliman primo. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 22.

d *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 2a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

e Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

f Bassan Barbarossa. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 24.

g Barbe-Rousse. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 526.

h Ariadin Bassa called Barbarossa. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 302.

i *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 17a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

j Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 132b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

k Sala Rais, captain of the avant garde. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 26.

l Sanirai. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

m Giafer Aga, intermediary between Hayreddin Pasha and Polin. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 26.

n Jaffer Aga. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 545.

o Zafferaga. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

p Not mentioned by name. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 37b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

q Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 13a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

r Sant Jaques. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 114.

[s] Not mentioned by name. Sant-Jacobeis. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 545.

[t] Sancak bey of Negroponte. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[u] Not mentioned by name. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 37b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[v] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 13a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[w] Sant Jaques. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 114.

[x] Not mentioned by name. Sant-Jacobeis. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 545.

[y] Mentioned as sancak bey from Caramania. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[z] Not mentioned by name. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 37b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[aa] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 13a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[bb] Sant Jaques. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 114.

[cc] Not mentioned by name. Sant-Jacobeis. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 545.

[dd] Mentioned as sancak bey from Asia. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[ee] Not mentioned by name. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 37b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[ff] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 13a–13b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[gg] Sant Jaques. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 114.

[hh] Not mentioned by name. Sant-Jacobeis. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 545.

[ii] Sanzacchi della Cappadocia. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[jj] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 13b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[kk] Capitan de genissers. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 544.

[ll] Aga de Gianizzari. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[mm] A companion of Salih Reis. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 33b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[nn] Cassein Çelebei. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 304.

[oo] *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 10b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[pp] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 132b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[qq] *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 18a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[rr] A çavuş. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 22b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[ss] Spanish renegade engineer of Hayreddin Pasha. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 118. See also Nicolay, who met him at the siege of Tripoli, 11 Aug. 1551. Nicolas de Nicolay, *Dans 1'empire de Soliman le Magnfique*, ed. Marie-Christine Gomez-Géraud and Stéphane Yérasimos (Paris: CNRS, 1989), 84.

Table 5.2 Individuals Mentioned in Accounts of the Ottoman and French Naval Expedition, 1543–44: French and their Supporters

	Gazavat	**Matrakçı**	**Maurand**	**Toulon Archives**	**Letter from Corfu**
François I, king of France	x[a]	x[b]	x[c]	x[d]	
Comte de Grignan[e]	x[f]		x[g]	x[h]	
Captain Polin	x[i]	x[j]	x[k]	x[l]	x[m]
Comte d'Enghien[n]		x[o]		x[p]	
Duke of Cleves[q]	x[r]	x[s]			
Leone Strozzi[t]			x[u]		
Monsieur d'Aramon[v]			x[w]		

[a] He is sometimes called kıral and sometimes called padişah. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, manuscript, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 6b, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

[b] Firançuşko. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş Estergon ve İstunibelgrad*, manuscript, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul.

[c] Francesco. Jérome Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand d'Antibes à Constantinople 1544*, trans. and ed. Leon Dorez, (Paris: Leroux, 1901), 22.

[d] Françoys, le roy conte de Provence. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque de Barberousse à Toulon, pendant l'hiver de 1543 a 1544,' in *Collection des Documents Inédits sur l'histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, ed. J.-J. Champollion-Figeac (Paris: Imprimerie Imperial, 1847), 536.

[e] Louis d'Adhémar. He was named governor of Marseilles 26 October 1540 and then Lieutenant general of Provence 28 February 1541. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 274.

[f] Called the bey of Marseilles. The king's governor in Marseilles. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 2a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[g] Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 275.

[h] Governor of Provence. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 525.

[i] Kapudan Polin. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 8b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[j] Identified as the French enovy. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[k] Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 29.

[l] Poullin, baron de La Garde, ambassador for the king. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 532.

[m] Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 302.

[n] François de Bourbon (1519–46).

[o] Kapudanı Entokıları, the admiral d'Enghien. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 23b, 26b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[p] The king's lieutenant for his navy. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 526.

[q] William, Duke of Cleves (1539–92).

[r] The French king's sibling's son. This is probably the Duke of Cleves married to Jeanne d'Albret, daughter of Marguerite de Navarre, the king's sister. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 19b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[s] Duka Kilava. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 132b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[t] Prior of Capua and brother of Piero Strozzi. See chapter 2.

[u] Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 28.

[v] Gabriel de Luetz or Luels (fl. 1526–1553).

[w] Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 32.

Table 5.3 Individuals Mentioned in Accounts of the Ottoman and French Naval Expedition, 1543–44: Habsburgs and their Supporters

	Gazavat	**Matrakçı**	**Maurand**	**Toulon Archives**	**Letter from Corfu**
Charles V, king of Spain	x[a]	x[b]			
Ferdinand of Austria		x[c]			
Andrea Doria	x[d]	x[d]			
Henry VIII, king of England	x[f]				
Giannettino Doria	x[g]		x[h]		
Duke of Savoy[i]	x[j]				
Son of Savoy[k]	x[l]				
Marquis del Vasto[m]	x[n]		x[o]		
Constable of Nice	x[p]				
Givan Anton	x[q]				
Hasan Cuvan of Tunis[r]		x[s]			
Ahmed, son of Hasan		x[t]			

[a] Carlo, king of Spain. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, manuscript, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 8b, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

[b] İşpanya. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş Estergon ve İstunibelgrad*, manuscript, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul.

[c] Firanduş. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 11a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[d] *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 6b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[e] Andir Dori. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 30b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[f] The bey of England. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 33b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[g] Zantini, Andrea Doria's lieutenant. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 44a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[h] Janetino Doria. Jérome Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand d'Antibes à Constantinople 1544*, trans. and ed. Leon Dorez, (Paris: Leroux, 1901), 36.

[i] Charles III, duke of Savoy 1504–1553, half brother of Louise of Savoy, mother of François I.

[j] Duka di Savoya. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 6a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[k] Probably Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, 1553–1580.

[l] *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 11b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[m] Alfonso d'Avalos, Governor of Milan for Charles V.

[n] Marquis di Vasta. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 15a, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[o] Marchese dil Guasto. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 70.

[p] Constable of the citadel of Nice, *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 6b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[q] *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 33b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

[r] Known as Muley Hasan to Europeans.

[s] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 129b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

[t] Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 131a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.

Italians. What follows is an analysis of how Captain Polin, Hayreddin Pasha, and Andrea Doria were viewed, individuals whose relations were complex and controversial.

The French ambassador, Captain Polin, was the Frenchman described in the most detail by both Matrakçı and the *Gazavat.* He was the chief intermediary and had a great deal of influence both at the Ottoman court and with the Ottoman forces in France, since he could affect the decisions of Hayreddin Pasha, but the Ottoman sources emphasize that the ultimate responsibility for the fleet remained with Hayreddin Pasha. The Ottoman sources mentioned Polin when difficulties arose between the Ottomans and the French in regards to future military actions or financial arrangements. But Matrakçı also indicated that Polin was respected as the French ambassador, because before the fleet sailed, the Ottomans had honoured Polin along with Hayreddin at a banquet, where Polin was given a robe of honor. Before sailing Hayreddin was advised to consult with others: 'Know deliberation with others is necessary in every deed, take care, act according to this advice.' This requirement caused Hayreddin Pasha endless difficulties during the following months because after arriving in France, conflicts between the allies soon arose over how the Ottoman forces would be employed. The king's wishes were seen by Matrakçı as a betrayal, '[The king of] France outwardly making an excuse but inwardly intending betrayal, had sent news with the envoy.' Hayreddin disapproved of François I's plan for the joint Ottoman-French forces to conquer Nice. Matrakçı indicated this by having François talk about Spain's trickery and breaking of vows in his message to Hayreddin. Both François and the Habsburgs continually broke their agreements with Süleyman. Although this passage referred explicitly to the Habsburgs, it reflected on the king of France, whom the author accused of treachery.[25] The author of the *Gazavat* also viewed unfavorably Polin's intervention in many incidents.[26]

The memoirs of the French who interacted with the Ottomans during the campaigns of 1543 and 1544 do not describe particular individuals that they encountered. Maurand never described Hayreddin Pasha, he merely recorded his and the Ottoman fleet's deeds during the return voyage to Istanbul. This apparent omission can be

explained by understanding that Hayreddin was so famous that his French contemporaries in 1543–44 felt no need to describe him, since everyone knew who he was and what he had accomplished. Monluc, like Maurand, only described Hayreddin's reaction to the French lack of supplies at the siege of Nice.[27] Brantôme writing later in the sixteenth century in *Grands Capitaines Estrangers* discussed the well-known Barbarossa briefly, describing the Ottoman seamen Dragut (Torgud) and L'Ouchaly (Uluç Ali) at greater length, but he stated that Barbarossa surpassed the others.[28]

Matrakçı and the author of the *Gazavat* understood the importance of Andrea Doria to the power of Charles V. According to Matrakçı, when Charles V learned that Hayreddin Pasha intended to winter at Toulon, he commanded Andrea Doria to take revenge on Hayreddin Pasha, but after Doria consulted with his experienced captains at Genoa, they reminded him of his defeat by Hayreddin at Preveza and advised him to take no action. They also suggested that Charles should renounce his imperial ambitions and form an alliance with France. The *Gazavat* claimed that when Hayreddin sailed to France in 1543, Doria withdrew from the sea and retired to Genoa because he could not oppose him. To the Ottomans, Doria was Hayreddin Pasha's main opponent, who was respected as a valiant enemy but cursed for the harm he had inflicted on Muslims.[29]

In contrast to Doria's relations with Charles V, his relations with Hayreddin Pasha are controversial because of the admiral's actions at Nice. Both Ottoman accounts emphasize that the siege of Nice was abandoned because approaching storms threatened the safety of the Ottoman fleet, and the value of its conquest did not justify the risk. The *Gazavat* claimed that 'The noble ruler's ... lowliest ship's protection was considered more important than the capture of one thousand towers like this one.' Matrackçı asked, 'Why is it necessary to get mixed up in the battle for this fortress or to become dirty with the blood of one or two filthy infidels?'[30] Doria lost four ships in the storm that followed, but the Ottoman fleet remained safely at anchor.

According to Giovio, the French were disgruntled when Hayreddin did not take advantage of Doria's loss to attack him.[31] Giovio claimed

that an understanding of long duration existed between Hayreddin and Doria dating from before the battle of Preveza in 1538. Giovio based this claim on a letter that Giammatteo Bembo wrote in 1539 concerning Doria's actions at Preveza, where Hayreddin defeated the fleets of Venice, the pope, and Doria. Venetians such as Bembo blamed the defeat on Doria's unwillingness to engage his ships. Venice consequently lost the war and all the remaining Venetian possessions in the Morea.[32]

> Doria did not wish to fight, although our general, who went by boat to board his galley, exhorted him, but he did not wish to severely harm his friend Barbarossa, who never would have left the port of Preveza if he had not had intelligence with Doria. ... I find it hard to believe that there is a man of equal villainy against all of Christendom, as against the honor, the interest and the heart of the emperor his master.[33]

Bembo disregarded Doria's explanation that the wind had died and he did not want to separate his galleys from the rest of his fleet.[34]

Pierre de Brantôme, Seigneur de Bourdeille, a late-sixteenth-century French biographer of famous men, in the section on Andrea Doria in his Great Foreign Captains, repeated almost word for word the French translation of Giovio's work concerning Doria's relations with Barbarossa. That a Frenchman relied on Giovio rather than on French participants' accounts of the events of 1543 demonstrates the pervasiveness of Habsburg propaganda.

> Captain Polin begged Barbarossa repeatedly to go attack Andrea because there would never be a better chance; ... pretending to equip himself and to wish to go, he did not go at all, excusing himself because of the sirocco wind and on some perils that he said he could see better with his clear eyes and great experience than others who talked to him and pressed him. But it was that he did not wish it; and, as the histories [Giovio] and men of war and the mariners of those times said ... it was not reasonable for Barbarossa to harm Andrea Doria as he was his brother. ... and by

secret accord pirate to pirate he must repay the favor he received from him at Bone.[35]

According to Giovio, the captains of the galleys and the sancak beys mocked Hayreddin's relations with Doria, but both the Ottoman sources contradict Giovio by claiming that concern for the safety of the Ottoman fleet led Hayreddin to remove it to a safe harbor. Since Brantôme repeated Giovio's version of events years later, his work does not indicate what the French thought in 1543, but a letter from Polin to the king in the spring of 1544 does. Polin informed the king that he had investigated Spanish approaches to Barbarossa as the king wished, but he did not believe that the king should fear that Hayreddin or his associates would be tempted by Spanish offers conveyed by Doria to change sides. Polin promised to continue to monitor the situation and to try to make the Ottomans content with the French, although it might involve some expense. However, knowing the king's financial difficulties, he promised not to spend more than necessary.

The impact of Giovio's viewpoint remains so powerful that it even influenced modern French historians who published a French translation of Matrakçı. Jean Deny and Jane Laroche accepted Giovio's version of the relationship between Doria and Barbarossa, despite providing a translation of Matrakçı's account of the siege of Nice that contradicts it.[36] When an Ottoman source contradicts Giovio's biased account, western historians often presume that the Ottoman source is less reliable. The negative view of Hayreddin's decision to preserve the fleet is believable only if one ignores the commands that the sultan repeatedly issued to Hayreddin to protect the Ottoman fleet. From the Ottoman perspective, the capture of one insignificant city among many was much less important than preserving the Ottoman fleet to fight another day.

A different perspective on treasonous relations with the Dorias is presented by the *Gazavat*, in which Polin is accused of warning Doria's lieutenant and enabling Doria's ships to escape from the Ottomans. As the Ottoman fleet was leaving St. Marguerite, Polin inquired concerning Hayreddin's plans regarding Genoa. Hayreddin replied that he intended to dispatch the irregular ships to destroy the district. Then

the *Gazavat* stated that Polin warned Genoa, which allowed Andrea Doria's lieutenant to escape from the Ottoman fleet. In addition, according to the *Gazavat*, when the Ottomans wished to attack the regions of Savoy and Genoa, Polin prevented it by claiming that the Genoese had made peace with François so that attacking them was like attacking the French; therefore those coasts were not sacked at all. But when Maurand mentioned the pursuit of Giannettino Doria on 24 May 1544, noting that nothing was harmed in Genoese waters, he believed that this was because the lords of Genoa sent presents to Hayreddin.[37] Thus, the French and the Ottomans both believed that their allies had an agreement with Doria that led them to spare Genoese possessions.

Views regarding Andrea Doria's dealings with Hayreddin are contradictory: Some contemporaries believed Hayreddin and Doria had pledged to refrain from attacking each other because they owed their positions to the ongoing naval conflict. If either Doria or Hayreddin destroyed his opponent, then they would no longer be employed by the emperor or the sultan. Other contemporaries believed that Doria was the intermediary between Charles V and Hayreddin in negotiations to persuade Hayreddin to change his allegiance. However, Doria and Hayreddin had nothing to gain if Hayreddin switched his allegiance to Charles V. Although Hayreddin may have found the French alliance unprofitable, he valued the sultan's favor and his position as grand admiral and a member of the sultan's council. The emperor had nothing comparable to offer him. Finally, the Ottomans believed that the French had treasonous relations with the Dorias. Suspicions abounded, but all evidence of double-dealing is unconvincing.

Allies of the Infidel

The French perspective regarding allying with infidels was most clearly expressed by two French brothers, Jean and Blaise de Monluc. Jean de Monluc, a French bishop and diplomat, was sent in 1542 to Venice as the French ambassador. While there, he made a speech to the Venetians defending the French alliance with the Ottomans, a version of which appears in the memoirs of his brother, Blaise de Monluc.

Since it refers to events that occurred in 1543 and 1544, it must have been revised later. Monluc's views were echoed by Cardinal Jean du Bellay in 1544.[38]

Jean de Monluc began by claiming that 'the Emperor [Charles V] is the cause of all the ruin, misery, and calamities that have come to Christendom.' Monluc then accused the Habsburgs of hypocrisy because Charles V blamed François for keeping an ambassador at Istanbul, but Charles and Ferdinand began secret negotiations with Süleyman more than ten years earlier and the Habsburgs paid an annual tribute to the sultan for the kingdom of Hungary. But their consciences were troubled that the king of France should rule his kingdom with the favor and support of 'the Turk.' This appeared to them to be disadvantageous for Christians. Jean de Monluc then discussed the joint naval action of 1543–44: 'the same ministers of the Emperor condemn, according to their custom, the sojourn that the navy of the Grand Seigneur made for some months in our ports. And under this pretext, they wish by their passionate calumnies to forge a new article of faith, saying that a prince for his defense may not be aided by those who are of a religion contrary to his own.'[39]

Jean then recalled those leaders who had allied with 'infidels' beginning with two Old Testament kings, David who allied with the Philistines and Asa of Judah who allied with Ben-hadad, the king of Aram (Syria) who lived in Damascus.[40] Monluc's Old Testament examples were excellent, since David and Asa were righteous kings, and they allied with 'infidels' when attacked by their coreligionists. Monluc also mentioned Constantine who allied with Goths, followed by a long list of individuals, Byzantines, Germans, Spanish, and Italians, who also allied with infidels, continuing chronologically until he reached Sforza. 'I am able to talk of Ludovico Sforza, who with many other potentates of Italy employed the forces of Bayezid.' Then Monluc recalled Maximilian I, 'of the house of Austria, who not for defense, but in order to ruin your state, Most Illustrious Lords, tried to provoke and embitter the Turk against you, to your great ruin and injury.' Maximilian was an excellent illustration since he was Charles V's grandfather and the previous Holy Roman Emperor. Monluc claimed he could have provided additional examples, but these were

sufficient to show the weakness of the article of faith newly forged by supporters of the emperor. 'And what is more, I say and maintain that the Most Christian King, my lord, in imitation of ... very religious princes, may, without harming ... the name of Most Christian which he bears, be aided in all his affairs ... by the Grand Seigneur.'[41]

Monluc then described the havoc that the Habsburg troops caused to Venetian territory when they were given passage to Carignano in 1544, resulting in a thousand complaints about their soldiers' evil deeds. In contrast, 'The large and powerful army ... composed of soldiers who were strangers to our religion ... [but were] destined and sent to succor our king,' gave no one cause to complain that they hurt anyone. They were courteous and paid for all they took for their provision. Monluc claimed 'there had never passed either Turks or Christians so modestly behaved.'[42]

Monluc asked the Venetians to consider that if the king had not retained the Ottoman forces, might not Christendom have suffered because they might have performed actions not under the king's direction. He claimed it was necessary for them to reprimand the insolence of the supporters of the emperor who had taken the kings' galleys from Toulon. Monluc claimed to have proved two points: first, that the king without prejudice to his name, Most Christian, accepted the forces which were sent by the sultan and second, that the succour was more useful than harmful to Christendom.[43]

He continued with his third point: that the king used the Ottomans for defence from the emperor's attacks on his kingdom, not 'for ambition to dominate.' 'And now his [the emperor's] ministers, as they talk by mockery, have no shame to say that His Caesar Majesty' is only attacking France because of the friendship between the king and the Grand Seigneur. 'O the delicate consciences! O the holy propositions! O responses well justified in order to serve all the time toward some drunks and ignoramuses, but not toward you, Illustrious Lords, who, with your admirable and accustomed prudence have ... recognized ... the truth. ...' Monluc then recounted all the ways that Charles V had harmed François: 'What inspiration of the Holy Spirit' caused the emperor to invade France seven years ago in 1536. He talked of the 'great Christian zeal,' which led the emperor to ally, without justifying

it to the world, with the king of England, who the pope had declared 'schismatic, heretic and rebel.' What justified this alliance whose aim was to divide the kingdom of France, a Christian and Catholic kingdom, between them? What inspiration also induced the emperor to join with the German princes whom he had judged 'heretics, schismatics and alienated from our faith.' Monluc claimed that the subjects of the king demanded vengeance against the evil deeds of the emperor. He asked the Venetians to consider how the emperor was the ruin of Italy and threatened the liberty of Venice. In addition, the house of Austria was always seizing the belongings of others, especially of Venice, but the king of France had been their ancient, loyal and affectionate friend.[44] This speech is French propaganda meant to justify the French position to the Venetians, who had previously sought Ottoman aid against their Christian enemies. Monluc condemned Charles V's actions as hypocritical and eloquently set forth the French perspective, which contradicted the claims imperial propaganda presented as truth.

While Jean de Monluc formulated a long and well-developed argument, his brother expressed his opinion in a few words, as befitted a man of the sword. Blaise described the arrival of Polin in France with the Ottoman fleet led by Barbarossa.

> All the Christian princes who support the party of the Emperor make a great fuss that the king, our master, has employed the Turk for his help. But against an enemy one may make arrows of all wood. According to me, if I were able to call all the spirits of hell to strike the head of my enemy who wished to strike mine, I would take good heart. God would pardon me.[45]

Blaise, in a few words, concurred with the opinion of his brother Jean: In war one uses what weapons one can find in order to defeat the enemy. Conscience does not enter into the matter. The brothers de Monluc represented two groups in French society, the clerical elite and the military elite, both of which were drawn from the nobility. Both groups supported the king's decision to form an alliance with the Ottomans.[46]

The Ottoman view of allying with infidels can be seen by examining several episodes described by Matrakçı. He revealed that he understood that preventing Christendom from uniting was the primary goal of the alliance for the sultan, when he claimed that the Genoese had advised Charles V to renounce his claim to imperial authority and make an alliance with France, in order to oppose the Muslims.[47] Later Matrakçı recounted the history of Hasan, the Muslim ruler of Tunis who became an ally of Charles V. Hayreddin Pasha defeated Hasan and conquered Tunis, but in his turn, Hayreddin Pasha lost the city to Charles V who reinstated Hasan as its ruler. According to Matrakçı's account, while Hasan was absent from Tunis supporting Charles V, the inhabitants of Tunis replaced him with his son, Ahmed. Hasan then attempted to regain control of Tunis with the support of Spanish mercenaries. Therefore, Ahmed asked the ulema of Tunis, 'My father ... allied with the lowly infidels. What is the divine command and the noble order of the prophet concerning it?' They gave him a *fetva* according to the *hadith*, 'Whoever acts like a people is of them,' allowing Ahmed to kill his father because of his betrayal of Islam.[48] Matrakçı condemned Hasan, not because he allied with Charles V, but because his actions were harming Muslims.

In contrast, Süleyman allied with an infidel, the king of France, who was described as a just ruler. All infidels were not the same; the kings of Spain were known for their cruelty and harsh measures against the Muslim inhabitants of Spain. To ally with them, rulers infamous for the distress they caused Muslims, was altogether different from allying with the king of France, who was fighting the archenemy, Spain. Also, at the same time that Süleyman sent his fleet to aid François, he was fighting the Habsburgs in Hungary. The Ottomans had frequently had Christian allies while consolidating their power in Anatolia and the Balkans, but they used their alliances with Christians to further their ambitions, which presumably improved the lot of the Muslim community.

In addition, the *Gazavat* recorded the benefits France gained from the alliance: with Ottoman support the French were more successful in fighting the war against Charles V because fear of an Ottoman attack had caused the Spanish to abandon most of the coast. Many towns

and fortresses submitted to the French or they were sacked. When Hayreddin informed the sultan of the reasons they should winter in Toulon, he stated that if they left, Andrea Doria would come with his galleys and harm French possessions, as he had before the Ottoman fleet arrived.[49] The French needed the Ottoman fleet to protect the Mediterranean coast of France from Habsburg invasions.

With regards to this episode, there were two main aspects to Habsburg 'attacks', as Poumarède[50] calls them, or 'propaganda', as Berenger, Veinstein and Bunes Ibarra term these efforts to condemn the Ottoman-French alliance. The first relates to philosophical issues concerning differences of religion, while the second slanders the behavior of the Ottomans while in France. With regard to the first point, the opinions of Frenchmen about an alliance between Christians and Muslims varied. Some accepted pro-Habsburg views favouring a crusade of all Christians against the Ottomans; others agreed with official French policy and supported the alliance. As for the second aspect, contemporary French sources do not suggest that the Ottomans harmed French territory while they wintered in France, but Habsburg propaganda does. This is not to suggest that there was no friction between the allies, Hayreddin and Polin frequently disagreed about the status of territories, but it is clear that lands of the French and their allies were not harmed.[51] It is equally clear that territories of the Habsburgs and those of their supporters were attacked by the Ottomans and the French throughout this campaign.

Giovio, who obtained information from his friend the Marquis del Vasto, Charles V's commander in Milan, cannot be considered an unbiased source. He claimed that the Ottomans devastated Provence by enslaving the inhabitants, but sixteenth-century French eyewitnesses revealed that while the Ottomans devastated Habsburg territory as assigned, they protected French territory from Habsburg attacks. Authors from Provence either did not mention the sojourn of the Ottoman fleet or merely indicated that it had wintered at Toulon. If the people of Toulon had been ill treated during the time that the Ottoman fleet was quartered there, the consuls would surely have used the information to gain greater tax concessions from the French government. On the contrary, Polin, who had handled the negotiations

between the French and the Ottomans while they were at Toulon, stated that no military force had ever been as orderly as the Ottoman fleet.[52]

Polin's statement is supported by a letter from Lyon, dated 21 January 1544, regarding the Ottoman presence at Toulon:

> as for Barbarossa he and his army are at Toulon and to see Toulon, one would think oneself in Constantinople each one practicing his profession and making Turkish merchandise with great order and justice, but at the same time continuing to privateer. In fact some days ago, he seized seven galleys and other vessels ... under way from Spain to Italy, full of men and money. ...[53]

According to this letter, the Ottomans harmed the Habsburgs not the French in typical Ottoman fashion: attack the enemy, protect your ally.

It was not complaints from his Provençal subjects that caused François I to send the Ottoman fleet away; rather, the Ottoman fleet was recalled to Istanbul by the sultan. They left behind, not a city that they had devastated, but a coast that they had protected. A painting of the Ottoman fleet at anchor in the harbor of Toulon hung for centuries in the *grande salle* of the *hôtel de ville* of Toulon, commemorating the sojourn of the Ottoman fleet at Toulon. Included in the verse underneath the painting were these words: 'This is Barbarossa and his army who came to succour all of us.'[54] In Provence, the Ottoman fleet was remembered as a protection against the forces of Charles V, which had invaded Provence in 1536. The people of Provence were grateful that the coast had been spared the harm it had endured under Habsburg invasions in 1524 and 1536. In Provence in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans were seen as protectors, while the Habsburgs were regarded as ravagers. Habsburg propaganda claimed the opposite of what the inhabitants of the region believed occurred in 1543–44. The Habsburgs exerted a tremendous propaganda effort to discredit the Ottoman-French alliance because it effectively threatened their ability to unite Christendom behind them in a 'crusade,' despite its failure to secure any spectacular conquests as a result of joint military ventures.

Understanding the place of religion in sixteenth-century conflicts and beyond into those of the seventeenth century requires understanding the context for the religious claims that were made during these wars. Speaking of Spain's wars in the Low Countries, the Belgian historian Ernest Gossart warned in 1905, 'We have considered the religious side of the struggle too much;' which advice Geoffrey Parker claimed in 1970 was sound but rarely followed.[55] Both historians were referring to wars between Protestant and Catholic Christians, but the advice is equally valid for studying conflicts of the sixteenth century involving Muslims and Christians whether as allies or as adversaries. Religion is only one facet of the picture and does not always deserve the greatest prominence among the factors that motivated the actions of individuals that were directly concerned. Concentrating on Islam, as though it were the sole factor that influenced Middle Eastern or European politics, often obscures the deeper economic, political, and societal issues.[56]

Traveler's Reports

Travelers who have written about their experiences in a particular place at a given time have produced some of the most valuable sources available to historians to reconstruct both histories of events and especially the views that individuals held concerning those events. In chapter 3, an analysis of the account of Cem's experiences in France and Italy written by one of his companions in exile allowed for an alternate view of the workings of Renaissance Diplomacy, distinct from that produced by Europeans or by Ottomans who held the perspective of the sultan in Istanbul. Likewise views of the sixteenth-century alliance can be put in a broader context by analyzing the reports of Frenchmen who traveled to the Ottoman Empire with French embassies. These reports have been examined in relation to topics such as geography, exoticism, history of science, and archaeology. But the context of these reports, why their authors were traveling in the Ottoman Empire, how they were able to travel, what connection they had to the Ottoman-French alliance, and how the travelers viewed the alliance, has rarely been considered relevant to what the authors wrote.[57] The place of these

reports in French intellectual history is only one aspect of their historical value. The alliance impacted the travels of these men, even those authors who did not explicitly express their opinions regarding it.

A travel book differs from a guide book, for its audience does not plan to follow the travels of the author but requires 'the exotic or comic anomalies, wonders, and scandals of the literary form *romance* which their own place or time cannot ... supply.' The reports of French travelers were written to entertain an audience in France, and individuals such as the essayist Montaigne read them. Most of these accounts stress the eyewitness nature of their reports, which is characteristic of travel books. 'Travel books are a sub-species of memoir in which the autobiographical narrative arises from the speaker's encounter with distant or unfamiliar data, and in which the narrative—unlike that in a novel or a romance—claims literal validity by constant reference to actuality.'[58] It is the encounter with its claims to validity that made these accounts popular in the sixteenth century.

Among the numerous French travelers to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the reports of seven are of particular interest. Each of these seven traveled in connection with an embassy. The earliest traveler of this group, Postel, a major figure in French intellectual history, traveled with the first major French embassy to the Ottoman Empire, which was headed by La Forest. Several travelers were connected with the embassy of d'Aramon, and Postel made his second journey to the Ottoman lands during his embassy. Most of these men were scholars: Gilles studied classical Greek antiquities, Belon studied natural history, and Thevet was a geographer as was Nicolay. Chesneau was the exception. He was a member of d'Aramon's staff and the least scholarly traveler of the seven, but he remained in Ottoman lands for the longest time. Finally, du Fresne-Canaye, a young Huguenot, traveled to the Ottoman Empire in 1573 with the French ambassador, François de Noailles, because it was unsafe for him to return to France after the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. Just as each man had different reasons for his travels, each had different aims for his writings: Postel's was the ultimate goal of world unity under French rule; Gilles wrote about antiquities; Belon about natural history; Thevet and Nicolay about geography; Chesneau about the events

of d'Aramon's travels as ambassador in the Ottoman Empire; and du Fresne-Canaye about his own adventures. Of these works, some were published within a year or two of the author's return to France, some were published after ten to fifteen years, and two were not published until the nineteenth century.[59]

These reports provide a perspective on the alliance over time, from the 1530s to the 1570s, as well as supplementing the views of the policy makers, discussed above, who were adherents of the rulers. This literature also shows a progression in the views about the alliance, though du Fresne-Canaye expressed his views more fully than the others. The views of each traveler are briefly assessed chronologically in terms of the dates of travel to the Ottoman Empire. See Table 5.4.

Guillaume Postel

Guillaume Postel in 1535 accompanied the French ambassador to Istanbul to purchase rare objects for the king. After Postel returned to Paris, he became a professor of mathematics and Oriental languages at the Collège Royal. In 1549, Postel sailed on a pilgrim's galley to Jerusalem, where he joined d'Aramon's party in November. After returning to Paris, Postel published several books, but he was forbidden to teach because of his unorthodox beliefs. Postel later traveled to Italy, where the Inquisition declared him to be insane and imprisoned him for four years. His *De La Republique des Turcs* was published in 1560 at Poitiers. After he returned to France in 1562, he was placed under house arrest until his death in 1581.[60]

On a practical level, Postel understood that ambassadors and messengers were privileged to travel in the Ottoman Empire without a Turkish companion or a safe conduct. On a theoretical level, Postel viewed the Ottoman-French alliance as the first step in obtaining world peace.[61] Postel explained that Muslims used the term 'fidele' (believer, faithful) in a manner similar to Christians, meaning that infidels were people who were not of their law. Postel hoped that universal peace would eventually come to pass under the crown of France. He believed that eventually 'Turks,' by which he meant Muslims, would be converted to Christianity. Their conversion was crucial because only when

Table 5.4 French Travelers in the Ottoman Empire and their Accounts of their Travels

French Traveler	Date of Travel	Ambassador Traveler Accompanied	Date Written	Date of First Publication	Language of Original	Modern Edition
Guillaume Postel	1536, 1549–50	Jean de la Forest, Gabriel d'Aramon	after 1549	1560[1]	French	no
Pierre Gilles	1544–50	D'Aramon	1550–55	1561	Latin	yes, 1988[2]
Pierre Belon	1546–49	D'Aramon, François de Fumel	1553	1553	French	yes, 2001[3]
Jean Chesneau	1547–52 1553–55	D'Aramon	1566–	1887	French	yes, 1887[4]
Andre Thevet	1549–52	D'Aramon	1553?	1554	French	yes, 1985[5]
Nicolas de Nicolay	1551–52	D'Aramon	1555–60	1567	French	yes, 1989[6]
Philippe du Fresne-Canaye	1573	François de Noailles	1573	1897	Italian	yes, 1897, 1986[7]

1 Guillaume Postel, *De la Republic des Turcs* (Poitiers: Enguilbert de Marnef, 1560).
2 Pierre Gilles, *The Antiquities of Constantinople*, ed. Ronald G. Musto, trans. John Ball (New York: Italica Press, 1988).
3 Pierre Belon, *Voyage au Levant: les observations de Pierre Belon du Mans : de plusieurs singularités & choses mémorables, trouvées en Grèce, Turquie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie & autres pays étranges, 1553*, ed. Alexandra Merle (Paris: Chandeigne, 2001).
4 Jean Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, ed. Charles Schefer (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887).
5 André Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. Frank Lestringant (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1985).
6 Nicolas de Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique*, ed. Marie-Christine Gomez-Géraud and Stéphane Yérasimos (Paris: CNRS, 1989).
7 Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, trans. M.H. Hauser (Paris, 1897; repr., Ferrières: Editions de Poliphile, 1986).

the two greatest powers of this world were reconciled, France and the Ottoman Empire, would there be perfect peace. He believed the alliance was the beginning of the fulfillment of this prophecy. Postel praised Süleyman for his humanity, justice, and fidelity, although he was Muslim.[62]

Travelers with d'Aramon's Embassy

Pierre Gilles was a French humanist with interests in natural science, as well as Greek and Latin classical authors. Gilles left France in the mid- to late 1540s on an informational mission with a French embassy.[63] While in Istanbul he gathered literary sources and studied the physical remains of the city. In 1548, since he was out of money, he enlisted in Süleyman's army, but after Gilles met d'Aramon in Aleppo in 1548, he accompanied him to Egypt and Jerusalem, where they encountered Postel. In January 1549, Gilles returned to Istanbul with d'Aramon and thence to France and later Rome, where he worked on a book until his death in 1555. His nephew Antoine Gilles finished the work, *De topographia Constantinopoleos et de illius antiquitatibus libri quatuor*, which was published in 1561 in Lyon.[64]

Gilles valued only the ancient monuments of Istanbul. He disliked the 'Turks' not because of their religion, but because they destroyed ancient monuments while rebuilding Istanbul. 'It would take up another volume to enlarge upon the public buildings of the Mohametans at present and to explain for what uses they were intended. ... the city contains more than three hundred mosques ... adorned with marble columns, the plunder and sacrilege of Christian churches, as these were previously beautified with the spoils of the heathen temples.'[65] Gilles claimed that he only traveled to the Ottoman Empire because of the command of the king.

The naturalist, Pierre Belon, in 1542 entered the service of the Cardinal de Tournon, by whom he was employed as a pharmacist and intelligence agent to German and Swiss lands. In 1547, at the suggestion of the Cardinal, he accompanied d'Aramon to the Ottoman Empire, but he sometimes traveled with a small party, such as when he accompanied d'Aramon's rival, Fumel, to Egypt, Palestine, and

Syria. He remained in the Ottoman Empire for nearly three years. After his return to Paris, he wrote *Observations de plusieurs singularitez & choses memorables trouvées en Grèce, Asie, Iudée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays estranges*, which was first published in Paris in 1553. He continued traveling for diplomatic and scientific purposes. He was assassinated in Paris in 1565 during the Wars of Religion.[66]

Belon wrote about life in the Ottoman Empire, suggesting the best way to travel in the empire, how to dress, and where to find lodgings. While at Lemnos, he heard from an old man that the island was more prosperous than in the past due to peace under Ottoman rule. He noted the different ethnic and religious groups of the empire, especially the Turks, Greeks, and Jews, mentioning the religious freedom of the Greeks under the Ottomans.[67]

Belon, despite the probability of his being a French spy, or perhaps because of it, expressed no opinion regarding the alliance, but he claimed it was easier for the sultan to assemble an army of 500,000 men than for another ruler to gather one of 100,000 because the Ottomans provisioned their forces more effectively, and their soldiers were used to enduring hardships.[68] Belon noted that all the republics and great lords of Europe had ambassadors at Istanbul, but only d'Aramon was privileged to accompany Süleyman on his campaign.[69]

Jean Chesneau was at court when d'Aramon was preparing to return to Istanbul in 1546, and since he wished to travel there, he accompanied d'Aramon as his secretary. He was sent to France in 1552 but returned to the Ottoman Empire the following year, remaining in Istanbul as charge d'affaires after the departure of d'Aramon in 1553 and continuing these functions during the first year of Codignac's embassy. He left Istanbul in 1555, entered the service of the duchess of Ferrara, Renée de France, returning to France with her in 1559. He wrote *Le voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon ambassadeur pour le Roy en Levant escript par noble homme Jean Chesneau l'un des secrétairies dudict seigneur ambassadeur* after 1566 when he was ennobled.[70]

Chesneau wrote an account of d'Aramon's embassies to the Ottoman Empire, containing information about the arrival and departure of

envoys and how they were received by the sultan. He noted that Fumel was sent to Istanbul by Henri II to renew and confirm the alliance and friendship of the French king with the sultan when François died in March 1547. He described Roggendorf's attempts to serve the sultan, before deciding to serve the king of France instead.[71]

From Chesneau's work, the importance of d'Aramon accompanying Süleyman on campaign was explained, for the king commanded him to travel with the sultan, but the Ottomans provided provisions for the French party. He praised the general orderliness of the Ottoman troops. According to Chesneau, when the Ottomans were besieging the fortress of Van in August 1548, d'Aramon advised them on where to aim their shots and was instrumental in the capture of the fortress.[72] After spending the winter at Aleppo, Süleyman and his army returned to Persia, while d'Aramon's party went to Egypt in an attempt to obtain some saltpeter to send to France. When this was unsuccessful, the French traveled to Jerusalem where they met Postel and finally returned to Istanbul in January 1550.[73]

Chesneau briefly noted the events of the following years: d'Aramon's return to France in 1551, and then his encounter with the Ottoman fleet at Tripoli, where he observed the Ottoman defeat of the Knights of St. John. After returning to France, Chesneau left in May 1553 with dispatches from the king for d'Aramon and the general of the galleys, Captain Polin, Baron de la Garde. D'Aramon left Istanbul in the fall of 1553, and Chesneau was instructed to await the new ambassador, Codignac, who arrived in May 1554, but since Chesneau and Codignac did not work well together, Chesneau left Istanbul in 1555.[74] He was not a scholar, but he was interested in everything he saw and his comments about the Ottomans were generally favorable. For him, the alliance was a fact of life, and when he wrote of his experiences several years later, he did not question whether it should exist.

Andre Thevet was a Franciscan monk who claimed to have traveled extensively. He sailed the Atlantic in 1540 and then journeyed in Italy and France. In 1543 he was sent to Italy by the command of François I, returning to Italy again in 1545 and 1549. In the spring of 1549, he was sent to the Levant by the Cardinal de Lorraine, Jean de Guise, a famous intriguer. He traveled in the Ottoman Empire until

1552, perhaps as a spy in the service of the king. Thevet published *Cosmographie du Levant* at Lyon in 1554. He was chaplain for a French voyage to Brazil in 1555–56. He entered the service of Catherine de Medicis in 1558 and was made the cosmographer of Charles IX. He died in 1590.[75]

Thevet, despite his employment as a spy, wrote little concerning political events in his account. When he wrote about infidels, he followed the traditional views of earlier travelers, especially Bertrand de La Borderie.[76] Thevet's opinion of the alliance can be surmised from what he wrote concerning a crusade: Thevet hoped that God would influence Christian princes to reconquer the lands occupied by the 'Turks,' especially the Holy Land, because France was always more renowned than other Christian kingdoms in the struggle against infidels.[77] This crusade rhetoric, although formulaic, may indicate Thevet's views about the alliance of France with infidels.

Nicolas de Nicolay traveled to northern Europe in 1542 and then to England in 1546 to spy on the Lord Admiral Dudley. Nicolay was named geographer of the king and accompanied d'Aramon in 1551 when he returned to Istanbul. Nicolay claimed to have drawn up more than 800 maps of the cities, castles, islands, and ports in the Ottoman Empire. When Nicolay returned from the Levant, he was made geographer and *valet de chambre* of Henri II. He performed other missions for Catherine de Medici, including a description of the provinces of France. His *Les quatre premiers livres des navigations et pérégrinations orientales…* was published in Lyon in 1568. He died in Paris in 1585.[78]

Nicolay's travels in the Ottoman Empire began a few years later than the other travelers who were associated with d'Aramon's embassy. He accompanied d'Aramon when he returned to the Ottoman Empire in 1551 by way of Algiers, Malta, and the Ottoman siege of Tripoli. According to documents collected by Ribier in the seventeenth century,[79] d'Aramon tried to the utmost to persuade the sultan to attack Charles V after the emperor had taken Mahdiya in Tunisia from Turgud Reis, an Ottoman subject. D'Aramon may have been trying to improve his position with the French king by showing his importance in Ottoman diplomacy, but he obviously favoured a military alliance

with the Ottomans for the purpose of attacking the Habsburgs. The influence of traditional western historiography is clear when the modern editors of Nicolay's work are more scandalized by the alliance than the sixteenth-century French authors.[80]

Nicolay is a valuable source about the embassy to Istanbul in the summer of 1551, since he listed the participants on the voyage and provided an itinerary. He described the French arrival at Algiers where the governor supplied provisions, but they were put in an awkward position by escaping slaves who sought refuge with the French ships. After leaving Algiers they sailed to Malta in search of the Ottoman fleet, which had besieged the island briefly before sailing for Tripoli. The grand master asked d'Aramon to try to persuade the Ottoman fleet to spare Tripoli, which gave d'Aramon an excuse for going to the city, and when the French party arrived at Tripoli, the Ottomans and the French exchanged gifts. D'Aramon asked the Ottoman commander, Sinan Pasha, to abandon the siege in the name of the king, but the pasha refused. D'Aramon was forced to remain at Tripoli until after the city was captured. D'Aramon obtained the release of some prisoners captured at Tripoli by the Ottomans, and he sailed to Malta to deliver them to the Knights. The grand master accused the French of coming to Malta in order to spy and of inciting the Ottoman attacks. Although the French denied this, there was an element of truth in the accusation since d'Aramon had wanted the Ottomans to attack the Habsburgs, although the French were unhappy, for political reasons, that the Ottomans had attacked the Knights of St. John. Despite the grand master's alerting Doria to the French presence, the French ships were able to complete their voyage to Istanbul.[81]

Nicolay's views of the infidel both in his drawings and in his text were influential, although not necessarily accurate. Nicolay has been described as a man of the eye 'whose activity of travel oscillated constantly from espionage to voyeurism.'[82] In every place he described, whether the people were Muslims or Christians, he noted their characteristics, be it of dress or stature, in terms of sexual interests.[83]

Nicolay stated that he was sent with d'Aramon by the express command of the king, but given that Nicolay gathered information about

the French ally, he was sent to spy on the ally and not the enemy.[84] Despite Nicolay's undoubted knowledge of the goals of d'Aramon's diplomacy, he wrote as though the French had had nothing to do with the Ottoman siege of Tripoli.

Philippe du Fresne-Canaye

Philippe du Fresne-Canaye was born in 1551, into a family which was divided by the Wars of Religion, his father, Jacques, remained a Catholic while his uncle, Philippe, a Protestant, was executed in 1568 at Toulouse. Philippe chose to be a Calvinist against the wishes of his parents, but he received permission from his father to travel in Germany and Italy. His father was on the point of ordering Philippe to return from Venice to continue his studies at the University of Valence, when the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre occurred on 24 August 1572. While Philippe remained at Venice waiting for the situation in France to improve, he decided to enter the suite of the bishop of Dax, François de Noailles, who was the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. Noailles was returning to France when he heard the news of the massacre and realized that his presence in Istanbul was vital. In January 1573 Philippe accompanied M. de Noailles to Istanbul, returning to Venice in October. After du Fresne-Canaye's return to France, Philippe studied law, and in 1584, he was at the Huguenot court of Henri of Navarre, who became King Henri IV of France in 1589. When the king decided it was necessary to convert to Catholicism, Philippe followed his example. Philippe was given many appointments by the king, including being made ambassador to Venice in 1601. He died in Paris in 1610.[85]

Philippe du Fresne-Canaye's travel account provides a view of the Ottoman-French alliance some twenty years after d'Aramon's embassy. Several ambassadors had come and gone during these years, but the Ottoman-French alliance continued, despite the fact that France was convulsed by the Wars of Religion that began in 1562. Francois de Noailles, bishop of Dax, was the French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1574. His mission was to detach Venice from the League with the Habsburgs, which had resulted in the Ottoman

naval defeat at Lepanto. In addition, he attempted to gain Ottoman support for a realm for the brother of the French king, Henri d'Anjou, first at Algiers and then as king of Poland. He was successful with Venice, and as a result of Ottoman influence, the Polish nobles elected Henri as their king.[86] Du Fresne-Canaye briefly recounted events, frequently mentioning the alliance, which for him was a fact of existence needing no discussion of whether it should continue or not. When he first met Noailles, the ambassador had just arranged for 200 Ottoman galleys to be available to the king of France, but he feared that the news of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre might ruin the results of his diplomacy. Noailles was also anxious to limit Spanish influence in Istanbul. Since du Fresne-Canaye outlined Noailles responsibilities, apparently Noailles shared some of his experiences with his suite. Du Fresne-Canaye knew when Noailles received letters from the king telling him to preserve the Ottoman alliance. He was present both when the ambassador went to kiss the hand of the grand vizier and later when he went to the sultan. Du Fresne-Canaye described the allowances of money and supplies that the Ottomans gave to the French embassy. The French ambassador was shown a degree of honor and respect when he went to the sultan, which was not shown to all ambassadors. The presents from the king to the sultan were exhibited to show how the king recognized 'the power and incomparable grandeur of the sultan.'[87] After returning to Pera, the French party learned that the sultan had never received a Christian ambassador with as much pomp as he had Noailles. While they were talking of the grandeur of the sultan, Noailles showed them letters from the king to the sultan and from the sultan to the king, in which both praised the power of the other.[88]

Du Fresne-Canaye and his party decided to remain in Istanbul until the Ottoman fleet left in the spring. Although the fleet was damaged by Lepanto, the French had seen the preparations that were made to rebuild it. When the fleet left 1 June, du Fresne-Canaye was amazed at the silence of the fleet compared to Christian armies. Soon after this, he decided to sail home on a French ship, which encountered the Ottoman fleet in the Dardanelles, and Philippe was again amazed at the orderly behavior of the fleet. While they were sailing they heard the news that Henri d'Anjou had been elected to the throne of Poland.[89]

Eventually they arrived at Modon, where they visited Hajji Murad (Aschlit Murath), who had been an ambassador from the sultan to the king of France. Hajji Murad had met Charles IX and Catherine de Medicis at Bayonne in 1565, when they were there to meet Elizabeth, the king's sister, who had married Philip II. Hajji Murad told du Fresne-Canaye that he was amazed that 'for the sake of religion, which should be free to all, the king acted to destroy his most affectionate and faithful subjects.' According to du Fresne-Canaye, Hajji Murad claimed to have advised the king to kill those nobles who were striving to take the crown on the pretext of religion. Du Fresne-Canaye claimed that events showed that the king was not content with this counsel, but he found others 'more horrible' and 'cruelty less tolerable in a most Christian king, than in a Turk….'[90] He was undoubtedly referring to the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre.

Du Fresne-Canaye praised many aspects of life in the Ottoman Empire. He admired the architecture of the mosques, 'turbes', and caravansaries. He believed that the Ottomans had excellent artisans and that because of Christian renegades they had acquired all the things that Christians had that were good, and in addition had many other refinements that had not yet been brought to Christian territory. He stated that the sultan was the lord of three languages, and his power was enormous. He governed in such a fashion that in spite of the diversity of peoples in his empire due to language, religion, and costume, that great peace and obedience reigned among all parties.[91] Du Fresne-Canaye contrasted peace in the Ottoman Empire with the France he knew, which was being torn apart by religious differences.

For Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, the Ottoman-French alliance was a tradition of long standing, but by the time he traveled to the empire, the alliance no longer resulted in significant military action. Despite this, French ambassadors had been in Istanbul more or less continuously for almost forty years, and the alliance was still seen as a necessity for France, nevertheless du Fresne-Canaye had ambiguous feelings about it. He mentioned the alliance frequently, and he knew what diplomacy Noailles was involved in and was delighted at his successful negotiations. Nevertheless, on his return voyage, du Fresne-Canaye and his companions admired the place, Lepanto, where two years

earlier the Ottoman fleet had been destroyed by the League. So they displayed Christian solidarity when they saw 'with joy' the place where their allies were beaten by a league which Noailles, the French ambassador, had worked to dissolve.[92] But Noailles criticized French lords who interfered with his policies by fighting in the ranks of the Spanish or Venetians at Cyprus during the 1570s. In 1602, du Fresne-Canaye also criticized the duc de Mercoeur, who had fought for the Habsburgs against the Ottomans in Hungary. He wrote to the French ambassador in Istanbul, M. de Breves, to reassure him that the king, Henri IV, would not do anything to injure the ancient alliance he had with the sultan.[93] Although by the early years of the seventeenth century, a new king and a new dynasty ruled France, the alliance remained an important element of French foreign policy.

Several of the French travelers included the standard trope about the value of being an eyewitness which meant, they claimed, to be accurate.[94] Some also spoke of the value of travel.[95] These reports contribute to understanding the nature of Ottoman and French interaction because their authors traveled in the Ottoman Empire and interpreted their experiences independently. So despite the fact that all of the travelers studied here were associated with French embassies and that all travelled, wrote, and many were first published in the years between 1536 and 1573, there was no consensus of opinion among them about allying with infidels.

Philippe du Fresne-Canaye traveled to Istanbul after a tradition of travel in the Ottoman Empire was well established in France. He noted his use of Gilles, and he also could have read Postel, Belon, Thevet, and Nicolay, whose accounts were all published before he made his journey in 1573. Philippe wrote: 'It is an honorable and good thing to visit many countries and thanks to a knowledge of foreign languages and to the experience of the affairs of the world to realize the dignity of governing. ...'[96] This belief in the benefits of foreign experiences led him to make the journey to Istanbul, 'this journey to my thinking, crowned all the others in glory and contentment of spirit.'[97] Near the end of his report he repeated a similar sentiment, 'Some stupid people do not understand that rotten food and water is more pleasing to elevated spirits in order to accomplish their noble designs

than partridges for bestial appetites.'[98] For him, the benefits gained from foreign travel more than compensated for all the inconveniences. Indeed, Philippe's experiences as a young man in the Ottoman Empire profoundly influenced him as he became a *politique* who sought to better France by the policies of toleration he advocated when he became an adviser of the king. He opened France to the Jews and Moors of Portugal because he wished the country to be peopled by industrious individuals. He did not believe that religious fanaticism should be the reason for political decisions.[99] Individuals such as du Fresne-Canaye insured that the Ottoman-French alliance continued into the next century and beyond.

In 1596 Selaniki, an Ottoman historian, mentioned the activities of a French ambassador in Istanbul, M. de Breves. He did not always approve of this ambassador's influence with the viziers, but M. de Breves had accompanied the sultan on campaign in Hungary as was expected of French ambassadors.[100] The close relations between the Ottomans and the French were so striking that the Ottomans created a myth, referred to by Selaniki, that some time previously a French princess had become the mother of an Ottoman sultan. This fictional genealogy explained the close relationship that existed between the Muslim sultan and this one Christian ruler, who was more favored than any other.[101] Although by this time many European states had ambassadors in Istanbul, the French ruler still retained a special place and title, that of padişah. If the religious question of allying with an infidel became too acute for Ottomans, the claim could be made that this infidel ruler was a kinsman. For the Ottomans as well as the French, this special relationship was a part of diplomacy, which was now accepted as a long-standing tradition. Selaniki noted that France was first among countries that were Christian, that French monarchs had been friendly with the Ottoman sultan for a long time, that the French ambassador was expected to accompany the sultan when he went on campaign, and that his expenses were provided from the Ottoman state treasury. The current French ambassador was a veteran of diplomatic service who was able to speak Turkish without a translator. While various events, such as the duc de Mercoeur, a Frenchman who was also an imperial vassal, commanding the imperial forces in

Hungary in 1599, ensured that there were always diplomatic tensions, yet 'true friendship' was how Selaniki described the relations between the sultan and the king.[102] By the end of the sixteenth century, individuals, Ottoman and French alike, accepted and worked to preserve the Ottoman-French alliance, which was seen as fundamental to the diplomatic policies of both states.

CONCLUSION

This study began with the question of why Ottoman and French views of their sixteenth-century alliance have failed to exert substantial influence on western historical writings that discuss this alliance. I have argued that many factors have affected the resulting historiography, but the beginning of the dominance of the Habsburg view of the alliance can be traced to Charles V's propaganda. The new configuration of power in Europe that resulted from Charles V inheriting vast territories, which fueled his ambition to be recognized as the foremost ruler of this period, affected his policies in regards to his principal rivals, François in Christian Europe and Süleyman on a more global stage. François and Süleyman responded to the threat that Charles V posed to their own dominance by seeking ways to limit his power, and consequently they chose to unite against him. Charles V naturally opposed this alliance with any weapon available, including propaganda. Jerry Brotton in his study of cartography in the early modern period claims that the 'sovereigns and city-states of early modern Europe were neither politically powerful nor diplomatically cohesive enough to establish a sustained and coherent demonization of the Ottoman empire.'[1] While this is true of the majority of rulers and states, Charles V is an exception. Because the alliance between Süleyman and François threatened his claims to leadership of a Christian empire in Europe as well as his global ambitions, he had the motivation and as ruler of extensive territories in Europe and the Americas, the means to influence the views of his contemporaries regarding the Ottoman ruler who was his most powerful rival. While attempting to fashion views of Süleyman, Charles would not

neglect to condemn the alliance of his foremost rival in Christendom, Francois I, to the Muslim ruler whose power impeded the expansion of his own.

Charles V employed artists and historians to fashion views of himself as a Christian emperor in contrast to his Islamic rival. Charles V's Burgundian ancestors had used tapestries to impress their contemporaries, and he employed them to establish his imperial claims in the sixteenth century. Two tapestry series exemplify Charles V's ideology: *Los Honores* and the *Conquest of Tunis*. Through the images presented by these series, he claimed a Christian European empire, placing a divide between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. After Charles became Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, a series of tapestries was designed to celebrate his election. In the first tapestry, entitled *Fortune*, Eastern or Asian characters are classified as unfortunate, and Roman characters as the fortunate. Europa, the personification of Europe, loses her Asian connections and is transformed into a 'Habsburg imperial icon.'[2] In this tapestry a division was created between East and West, with Europe being claimed by Charles V.

François I of France tried to compete in the tapestry wars by commissioning a series identifying him with Scipio Africanus in 1532,[3] but his identification with this Roman general was weak. Charles V's next set of tapestries, the *Conquest of Tunis*, commemorated his expedition to Tunis in 1535, instead of relying on associations with classical mythology or ancient Roman conquerors. Charles V attacked Tunis, which had been taken in 1534 from his Muslim vassal Mulay Hasan[4] by Hayreddin Pasha, who had served as an intermediary between Süleyman and François at the beginning of their alliance. Charles attacked Süleyman's subject ruler in order to reinstate his own.

From the beginning Charles saw the propaganda value of this expedition and represented it as a crusade, but many of his contemporaries challenged this claim, for example, the French author François Rabelais satirized Charles V's policies in *Gargantua*.[5] In contrast, the art historian Hendrick Horn in his recent massive work on this tapestry series, while recognizing the tapestries as propaganda, is influenced by them when he designates this expedition Charles V's 'greatest crusade.' Charles V's ambition was to be recognized as the leader of

Christendom, and the Tunis expedition demonstrated this. The first caption states that Charles led an international crusade against Süleyman and Hayreddin, which claim Horn accepts at face value as he considers this to be a 'universal message' that still deserves to be heard.[6]

The narrative of the tapestries was meant to supplement and rival contemporary written history. Horn claims that the captions on the tapestries and other contemporary accounts are official history and propaganda for Charles V. Later Horn states, 'the emperor must have believed that the tapestries would plead his cause most effectively if these allowed the course of history to speak for itself.'[7] History can only speak for itself if the account has been fashioned so that the potential audience knows how to interpret events. Charles V, who commissioned this series, included captions so that viewers would be given the correct, that is the Habsburg, interpretation. Charles V employed artists to accompany him to Tunis to ensure that the expedition would be commemorated as he wished. However the designs for the tapestries were not begun until 1544, when the events of 1543–44 may have convinced Charles of the need to make use of the Tunis expedition as propaganda despite the enormous expense tapestries involved. The tapestries were not completed until 1554, by which time the military results of the 1535 expedition were of little importance, but their value as propaganda was still significant as the Ottoman-French alliance continued to result in joint Ottoman-French military action against the Habsburgs in the 1550s.

While the tapestries were the most impressive instance of Charles V's propaganda, in the long run they were less influential than the works of the famous Italian historian, Paolo Giovio. Giovio was a friend of the Marquis del Vasto, one of the commanders of the Tunis expedition, the man responsible for the assassinations of the French ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire in 1541, and the commander who came to the defense of Nice from Milan in 1543. Jean Bodin, a sixteenth-century French political theorist, claimed that Giovio did not write accurately about the Ottomans or the French. Bodin correctly assessed the long-term impact of Giovio's histories: 'When, however, he was asked why he fabricated things that were false or

concealed what was true, he answered that he had done this because of his friends. Although he knew that witnesses would destroy confidence in his writings, yet he understood that these things would be believed by an endless posterity, which would bring praise to him and to his compatriots.'[8] Bodin already perceived in 1566 that Giovio's fabrications concerning the events of 1543–44 were accepted despite eyewitness French sources to the contrary. Giovio's influence is clear on Brantôme in the sixteenth century, Henry and Michelet in the nineteenth, and on Deny and Laroche in the twentieth.[9] Charles V understood the use of contemporary history for propaganda; thus he ensured that his accomplishments were recorded to his satisfaction.[10]

Bodin in his *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History* discussed a different aspect of the utility of history, which he claimed was great in accurate narratives, in terms of influencing the actions of military leaders or rulers. The examples he cited are Scipio Africanus reading Xenophon, Selim reading Caesar, and Charles V reading Commynes, after which these three men were all inspired to great deeds by these past examples. Bodin again raised the issue of historical accuracy, for although he believed that fables could be inspiring, it is the truthfulness of history which is its greatest claim. Bodin said of Selim that his ancestors had 'avoided history on the grounds that it was always false,' but Selim read the accomplishments of Caesar and then imitated them. Bodin believed that history is important and is rarely condemned if it is accurate: 'no one has yet been found who has marked the record of the past with any stain of infamy—unless perchance the man who accused this art of mendacity .... But such a reproach is for fables, not for history; if the account is not true, it ought not even to be called history. ...' But assessing the mixture of truth and falsehood in history is more difficult than Bodin acknowledged, because no history is completely free of inaccuracy, whether intentional or not.[11]

Bodin believed history teaches us 'the arts necessary for living. ... objectives which at all costs must be sought, ... which state is the best ... '[12] History is used by those who represent rulers, states, or civilizations to contest that they are superior. It has been and continues

to be used competitively to stake out claims to superiority just as the tapestry series in the sixteenth century was used to lay claim to power and prestige.

Times change and what the present desires from the past changes as well, causing history to be transformed to most nearly satisfy that desire. Historians may understand that history's relationship to the past is an uneasy one. But history's use by anyone from politicians to academics to the news media to achieve present day objectives means that those who fashion it should try to make history accurate and recognize how circumstances have influenced what we think we know about the past.

Süleyman and François formed an alliance in the sixteenth century in opposition to the Habsburg Charles V, who was their common enemy. Many ties—diplomatic, commercial, and cultural—connected the Ottomans to their neighbors to the west. But it was to the Habsburgs' advantage to emphasize the differences between the Ottomans and Christian Europeans whether using medieval crusade ideology or the classically based humanist ideology of Europe versus Asia.[13] Our interpretation of the views of the sixteenth century is relevant today, for if we see a Western European identity as interacting with an Ottoman one during the early modern period as opposed to being created in opposition to it, then we are less likely to see the world today in adversarial terms. Western historiography on the early modern Ottoman Empire, until recently, has been heavily weighted toward division rather than connection. But evidence mounts showing the ties between the Ottoman Empire and Europe in the sixteenth century. We are recovering an image of the Ottoman Empire as a state with cultural, commercial, and diplomatic ties to the city-states of Renaissance Italy as well as with France. Relations with France were part of a web of connections, rather than an aberration from standard practice.

The views analyzed in this book were those of contemporaries who, for the most part, were personally affected by the alliance, individuals who directly encountered their allies of a different religion. These are views of 'the other' as found in the works of soldiers, diplomats, statesmen, and travelers with embassies. These views are closely tied to

the events that brought about, and then resulted from, the encounter between allies who espoused different religions. As we come to understand these sixteenth-century views, we will revise our own perception of the sixteenth century Mediterranean world from one with a great religious divide between East and West to that of a world with many connections drawing it together.

APPENDIX A

Hüküm 1. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*. Manuscript. Supplement Turc 1186, folios 7b-11a. Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.[1]

Translation

Commander of the noble Commanders, greatest of the illustrious great ones, possessing power and respect, possessor of glory and completeness, you who are marked as special by the omniscient king, Governor of the Islands, Hayreddin Pasha (may his prosperity last), when the sublime signature of the sultan arrives, let it be known that:

You recently sent a letter to my exalted court informing me that you reached the straits of Messina on the second of Rebiü'l-evvel [5 June 1543]. There the people of Reggio, from fear of the army asked for safe conduct, agreeing to become prisoners. With the knowledge and participation of the French emperor's ambassador, Reggio was burnt and destroyed. But the ambassador did not agree to your sacking any other cities or fortresses that were in those provinces. Since he said, "Formerly it belonged to us, and in the future it may submit to our emperor," you did not worry about it. He said, "There are places that were previously the Spanish king's. These may be destroyed. And also the French emperor is waiting with the fleet at Marseilles." The fleet arrived safely on the fourth of Rebiü'l-evvel [7 June 1543] at the fortress named Antibes in France. Since the French king with his available forces was occupied in Flanders, the ambassador went with a courier to him. The fleet waited opposite Marseilles until he returned. He came twenty days later, with the response that the French emperor's

true object is to attack Nice near Genoa. In order not to remain idle until French forces are gathered to help besiege it, we will capture other castles and fortresses. Actually, the {Ottoman} imperial fleet's ships are about to begin to do this.

Then you informed me in detail concerning the location of the king of Spain and the condition of his army. You reported in detail about Andrea Doria sailing about with some of his fleet in the area in order to spy. You communicated that the {Ottoman} imperial fleet was delayed by contrary winds during the voyage. "Since the winter season is near this winter the imperial fleet must winter in these lands." Now I am informed in detail of whatever was said.

The king of France also sent a letter to me, in which he said to me: "If only the imperial fleet had arrived a little sooner, then Charles would not have crossed to Italy and gone to *Kayandor* {?} in Germany. God willing, with this aid it will be possible to destroy the lands of the enemy. For six weeks I have been attacking the region of *Kayandor* {?} in the direction of Germany with my army. I have captured many lands and sacked and ruined some of their fortresses. I intend to sack and ruin his country. From now on I will not be reconciled or surrender to him. You should question the ambassador Captain Polin and his man that he sent."

And the ambassador {Captain Polin} also sent a letter to me, requesting that the imperial fleet might be with them in the spring. "Because of contrary winds during my voyage with the fleet, I arrived late, and I went to the emperor of France with a courier, we talked together and I returned," he informed me. "And our ships that I requested at the Sublime Porte and our fleets, we found to be greater than I requested when we came here. God willing, tomorrow we will set out from here and go to Spanish districts. The season is late, but we will be extremely vigilant. If possible we will try to take care of necessary preparations for the spring."

But nothing was written as to how the fleet will be taken care of during the winter, nor regarding arrangements for the military's salaries and provisions. It was not discussed in detail in your letter. Previously when we spoke together while the ambassador was at my court, {when I inquired} "If it becomes necessary to winter in those

regions, how will it be {arranged}?" he replied: "We will arrange for their provisions, biscuit and grain are prepared. Besides this, if oarsmen or anything else becomes necessary, it will be prepared. Absolutely no harm will come to them," he said. Now he informed me in the letter that arrived, "More winter provisions have been prepared than I requested previously." Beyond this, I have written and sent a letter to the French emperor and to the ambassador stating:

It is impossible for the pay of the soldiers who are with my imperial fleet or for the fleet's needs to be sent by land or by sea by any means from here because of the great distance. On your {the French} behalf, I am committing the charge of all the fleet's and army's affairs to the Governor of Algiers {Hayreddin Pasha}, may his prosperity endure. You should make arrangements with him so that if you can prepare my army's salaries and provisions, the fleet's oarsmen's needs, weapons, and other necessities, well and good, let it be done as he sees fit. But if you cannot see to these matters, it will not be possible for the imperial fleet to remain there. It should come either to the harbor of Preveza or to that of Modon, on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, so that the army can be provisioned from there. Then you should, as a sign of friendship, provision my army as necessary to keep it from harm and hardship.

Now, previously all the affairs of the imperial fleet were placed in your {Hayreddin Pasha's} charge. And when you left, my noble imperial decree was issued to you. You know why all the affairs were commended to your care. Now when you arrived there with my imperial fleet, the cursed Spanish king whose companion is error and the army of destruction ...

... or if only a man of yours had also been sent. If only he had been questioned I would have been informed of your condition in detail. In that case a definite answer might have been given. Since you summarized this matter in your letter, {your} condition is not truly known. In my court we are not familiar with that country's conditions, so that without consulting with you, a definite answer could {not} be given to you. You are my useful and trusted slave. Your piety and sound judgment are relied on no matter what. Since you have been active in those places for a long time, you are active in religious endeavors and

all sorts of holy wars, you know everything about the lowly infidels, how they conduct themselves and their countries' conditions. Because I rely on you completely, you were charged previously with all matters of the imperial fleet. Now again it is committed to you. I ordered that when Hasan (his value is great), who is one of the translators in my service, arrives:

If the French emperor will provide my army's salaries and provisions as necessary for the beys and Janissaries and other soldiers that are there, the imperial fleets' oarsmen's needs, and weapons and other necessities, well and good, you have the salary register of the military forces. You should pay everyone according to it, the salaries of my slaves the Janissaries, the oarsmen, the artillerymen, the captains, the carpenters, and the other men of the fleet, you should pay them {all} according to that register. But supposing the French king does not agree to this, {then} all matters are committed to you, I rely on you. You should investigate the proper course and arrange matters wherever according to the abundant piety and thoughtful management and sagacity that is in your disposition. {You should decide} whether in this respect it is better to winter there or to return here. You should do whatever is proper for religion and my state, and the honor of my sultanate, so that if the French king does not consider it feasible {to provide} the army's salaries and other necessities in this way he must tell you that. You know all the matters of my imperial fleet and my army and the sea. You know whether it is proper to come with my noble fleet to the harbors of Preveza or Modon, on the borders of my protected lands, or whether you should come to a suitable place, as you see it, in that district so that {the fleet} will not be found in a distant place, so that it may be possible to provision and provide for the needs of my imperial fleet. Likewise in the summer when there are affairs that concern my imperial state and it is necessary to go out to sea, you should not be far away, you should be ready so that there will not be an impediment or delay in affairs. But be careful, you should take great care in this matter so that no harm will happen in any way to my imperial fleet while it is traveling. You should know this, you should rely on my imperial seal.

APPENDIX B

Report of the man sent from the king of France to Süleyman, [1543]. E. 635. Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Istanbul.

Translation

Title: Report of the news delivered orally by the man who came from the French padişah.

Section 1: When he was asked, "In what neighborhood is the French padişah now?"

[He answered,] "When the envoy departed from the imperial fleet he [François] was in the field by the fortress called Villa Nova[1] in Flanders. Previously, the fortress belonged to the Spanish king. Now the French padişah has captured it."

When he was asked, "Besides this fortress, did he conquer any other fortresses?"

He answered, "He took lots of fortresses and castles belonging to Spain besides this fortress. And in lower Germany the lord called Duke of Cleves took many countries and provinces of Spain."

He answered, "And the fortress called Vala subject to Spain, near to the French padişah's country called Piedmont, that impeded the journey in the past if a man traveled to France, the French padişah's commander who was in Piedmont captured that fortress three months ago. And also in addition, he captured a steep fortress near Milan."

When he was asked, "What sort of army is with the French king now?"

He answered, "Now he has an army of forty thousand foot soldiers and sixteen thousand horsemen. And also in Germany there are some

friendly lords, who in the event of trouble can provide twenty-four thousand foot soldiers to help him. In fact, we encountered fourteen thousand foot soldiers while they were coming to the French padişah's city called Lyon. The distance between Flanders and Lyon is fifteen stages {days journey}."

When he was asked, "And now to the best of your knowledge, how did the French padişah retaliate against the Spanish king of cursed religion?"

He answered, "In my opinion, by now they may have encountered each other."

When he was asked, "And the French padişah, whom did he leave as deputy in his own place?"

He answered, "He left in his place four able lords who are always with him and who he usually leaves in charge. But since they are not worried, he has not put anyone from the army with them. He made these arrangements and then left, taking his own two sons with him on campaign."

Section 2, line 18

When he was asked, "Where is the Spanish King?"

"While I was there he was in a city called Spires in Germany. But after I left, I suppose now he may have gone to Flanders."

When he was asked, "How large is the army with him?"

{He answered,} "There are seventy thousand foot soldiers and about four thousand horsemen."

When he was asked, "And did the bey {lord} of England provide any assistance?"

He answered, "He was informed, 'It is necessary {proper} for about fifteen thousand men to come to help.' But I don't know if they came or not."

When he was asked, "And are any soldiers coming to help like the ones from Flanders?"

He answered, "There are not any soldiers like them coming to help. He placed substantial {numbers of} foot soldiers in the fortresses that are in the province of Flanders and fortified them."

When he was asked, "Did the [king of] Spain, whose religion is cursed, meet with the Pope?" [He answered,] "They met by a fortress called Bologna. But no one knows what their plans or preparations were. But after they separated, the Pope sent three thousand infantry after him to Vienna."

When he was asked, "Whom did the Spanish king put in his place in Barcelona?"

He answered, "He put his son with two or three thousand men and an able lord in his place in Barcelona. And in the city called Perpingnan he placed ten thousand foot men with a commander."

Section 3

When he was asked, "Did any corsair ships come to the imperial fleet?"

He answered, "Altogether twenty-two corsair ships came including corsair kayiks and galiotas."

When he was asked, "Did any news come from Hasan Ağa in Algiers?"

He replied, "Hayreddin Pasha sent two kayiks from opposite Genoa. But because the wind was contrary, one could not go, but returned to Hayreddin Pasha. The other went ahead."

When he was asked, "When you went with the imperial fleet was Marseilles ahead of Algiers or behind?"

He answered, "Algiers is a place three hundred miles ahead of Marseilles."

When he was asked, "Did you get any news from Veli who was sent to Mahdiya, or from Murad Ağa who was sent to Tecvere, or from Tunis?"

He answered, "No news came from them. But five corsair galleys came from Jerba that are five of the twenty-two corsair ships that I mentioned."

Section 4

The French padişah's man traveled from Marseilles to the imperial army in thirty-one days. But he traveled from Marseilles to Venice in nine and a half days.

When he was asked, “Is Venice’s fleet out?”

He answered, “Venice has forty or fifty galleys at Corfu. But Hayreddin Pasha did not see them, nor did we. The beys {lords} of Zante sent fruit. We heard it from them. And also while traveling here from Venice in the harbor called Sigala I saw eight galleys and two kayiks with Jenderal {General?}.”

Reverse

This is the news brought by the man who came from the French padişah.

APPENDIX C

Letter from Süleyman to François concerning his making peace with Charles V in 1544. 12321 no. 226. Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Istanbul.

Translation

27 Zilkade 951 {9 February 1545}

Let a noble letter be written to the French king {padişah} François {saying} that your agent named Monsieur d'Aramon, who is the deputy of your envoy Polin, has recently sent a letter to my felicitous court, informing {me} that the reason you are making peace with Charles {V} is that Charles and the king of England and all the Christian kings and lords united {against you}. You deemed it advisable to make peace while these allies are preparing to advance from every direction, sack the country of France, and wage war. Therefore due to extreme necessity, you consented to this deception for a good cause. Whatever has been said, it is known to us in detail. If this is the case, if these affairs are actually true, it is acceptable. If you know that as a result of your plan to dissemble, your enemies' preparations will be broken up and the opposition will become weak and lose spirit, your planning to dissemble in this way is very suitable.

And he informed us why you did not yet send your envoy, Polin, to our felicitous court. You sent him to that council to find out what they are thinking. Later, in accordance with your friendship you will send him to my felicitous court again. Your agent d'Aramon also informed me that you are preparing to send your envoy together with Charles V's envoy to my court. If this is the case, with the driving of days and the

passage of years from the time of our noble fathers and the ancestors of our exalted lineage, our felicitous court is always open. Whether in friendship or enmity, no one is prevented from coming and then leaving. Whoever comes, according to the custom of my imperial authority and the rules of my daily increasing caliphate, will obtain a reply and depart. What God, whose praises I recite, the exalted, the noble in the eternity without beginning of eternities, has decreed or made possible of these affairs, if God the most glorious wills it, will be made possible with beneficial ends.

And your envoy's lieutenant informed me that you wished for your country's merchants and laborers to travel in my lands freely as they have in the past. In that case, according to the love and friendship that has existed between us up until the present, your merchants may continue to travel in my lands as they have in the past; henceforth let no one interfere with or oppose them, in accordance with our friendship let them come and conduct their business in safety and security. And as you wish concerning these matters, it is confirmed that imperial orders have been written to the governors of Egypt and Syria and all the governors and judges of my protected lands to say: Let no one interfere with or oppose the merchants who come from your country, while they travel by land or sea, as it has been up until the present, henceforth according to friendship let them travel in safety and security. The imperial orders that were written were given to your agent.

And again, whatever the nature of the relations between you and Charles, and whatever the hope and reason that led you to conclude an eight-month agreement with him, do not be lax in informing my felicitous court again, according to your friendship, how you have deviously concluded a state of peace and friendship in order to prepare to take your revenge on Charles and your other enemies, {so} that all your affairs that are beneficial of hope may be known to our felicitous court. Written on.

NOTES

Introduction: Webs of Diplomacy and Historiographical Images

1. Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires, 1521–1576*, ed. Paul Courteault (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 86.
2. This history was published 1618–24. Sandoval refers to Paolo Giovio frequently in this volume, indicating that Giovio was Sandoval's source for this section of his history of Charles V. Prudencio de Sandoval, *Historia del Emperador Carlos V, Rey de España* (Madrid: 1847), 7:296. I thank Dr. Beth Vinkler and Dr. Fannie Rushing, both of Benedictine University, and especially Dr. Kevin Gosner, of the University of Arizona, for their assistance in translating this passage into English. Any remaining errors are my own.
3. R. J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 365–66.
4. 'Historiography is as much the result as it is the record of events, and should, therefore, be expected to react variously to the circumstances in which it is produced, in accordance with the temper of its times. In its prejudices and its assumptions, in its omissions no less than in its contents, it is the reflection of the inconstant human situation, ... ' J. R. Walsh, 'The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (Oxford: 1962), 197. 'The classical historians, for the most part, do not represent the civilization of their ancestors as it really had been, but rather in the image of their own times. An old mistake this, and one of which we have never been free.' Lancelot-Voisin La Popelinière, *L'Idée de l'histoire accomplie* (Paris: Chez Marc Orry, 1599), 76, quoted in George Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History: Historical erudition and historical philosophy in Renaissance France* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 146.
5. Vaughn described these patterns more than fifty years ago. While her description of patterns has had little influence on later historiography, her description

of Toulon at the time of the Ottoman wintering of the fleet, although inaccurate, has been followed by R. J. Knecht and J. R. Hale. Dorothy Vaughn, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances 1350–1700* (Liverpool: University Press, 1954; New York: AMS Press, 1976).

6. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978), 92–110.
7. When discussing the effect in the sixteenth century of the Ottoman Empire on European identity, Gerard Delanty cites Paul Coles, *The Ottoman Impact on Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), which is discussed in chapter 2 below. Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
8. The idea of 'the other' in history is described by Hélène Cixous: 'in History, of course, what is called 'other' is an alterity that does settle down, that falls into the dialectical circle. It is the other in a hierarchically organized relationship in which the same is what rules, names, defines, and assigns 'its' other.' Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, *The Newly Born Woman*, trans. Betsy Wing (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 70–71. This reference to 'the other' is included in a passage criticizing French actions in Algeria.
9. Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Lucien Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
10. John Francis Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 2.
11. For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Said, *Orientalism*; Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986); Hichem Djait, *Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity*, trans. Peter Heinegg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Norman Daniel, *Islam, Europe, and Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966). For other periods, see Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, trans. Roger Veinus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960). The early modern period has been neglected in works on Orientalism. It has been studied by Robert Schwobel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453–1517)* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); and Clarence Dana Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (1520–1660)* (Paris: Boivin, 1938), but with different objects in mind.

12. Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980; New York: Penguin, 1982).
13. R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 95. John V. Tolan has finally examined medieval Christian images of Islam from a broader perspective. *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). For a discussion of pilgrimage itineraries, see Rita George-Tvrtkovic, *Wonder, Doubt, and Dissonance: Riccoldo da Montecroce's Views of Islam* (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Press, forthcoming).
14. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay is an excellent example of a political theorist whose position changed radically when circumstances in France changed. He recommends resistance to tyrants in his *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, which was written in 1579 during the French religious wars, but in 1584 when Navarre became the heir to the throne, Duplessis-Mornay began to write divine right monarchy political theory. 'Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,' in *Early Modern Europe: Crisis of Authority*, ed. Eric Cochrane, Charles M. Gray, and Mark A. Kishlansky (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 103–37. See also J. H. M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1975), 235.
15. For example, see M. A. Cook's 'Introduction' in *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730: Chapters from The Cambridge History of Islam and The New Cambridge Modern History,* ed. M. A. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1; Vaughn, *Europe and the Turk*, 1; and Schwobel, *The Shadow of the Crescent*, ix–x.
16. 'Richard Knolles, the Elizabethan historian of the Turks, was expressing the common feeling of Europe when he spoke of the Turkish Empire as 'the present terror of the world'.' Bernard Lewis, *Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: Norton, 1982), 32.
17. Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 643–44. The idea of Christians recognizing the superiority of Muslim praxis is a common theme among those medieval Christians who had actually witnessed such practices.
18. 'Only in one place, on the continent of Europe, did a Muslim state, the Ottoman Empire, … stubbornly resist the advance of Christian Europe towards the Balkans, the Aegean, and Constantinople. … Accustomed to look down on the rest of the world from a comfortable altitude of true religion and superior power, they now found themselves in a situation where the hitherto despised infidels were steadily gaining strength.' Lewis seems to be referring to the late sixteenth century, but he gives no dates in this section. *Muslim Discovery of Europe*, 39.

19. Examples of this are H. G. Koenigsberger, George L. Mosse, and G. Q. Bowler, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1989); Richard Bonney, *The European Dynastic States, 1494–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Thomas A. Brady, Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy, eds. *The Handbook of European History 1400–1600* (Leiden: Brill, 1994).
20. Henri II to Sieur Boucher responding to the lies and calumnies of Charles V concerning the Turks, 1551, in *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, ed. Guillaume Ribier (Paris: Frederic Leonard, 1677), 2:358–60; Bonney, *European Dynastic States*, 60.
21. Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 641, paraphrasing Ferdinand Brunetière's review in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1906, 690–707 of Pierre Martino's *L'Orient dans la littérature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Hachette 1906).
22. See especially Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, 35–38; Denis de Rougement, *The Idea of Europe*, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 88–91; Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 110–15; M. E. Yapp, 'Europe in the Turkish Mirror,' *Past and Present* 134–35 (1992): 134–155.
23. Richard M. Eaton, 'Islamic History as Global History,' in *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order*, ed. Michael Adas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 2–3; Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), ix, 3–7.
24. Daniel, *Islam and the West,* 7–10, 271–94. Tolan, in *Saracens,* analyzes why Medieval European Christians portrayed Islam in such an inaccurate and negative manner.
25. Southern, *Western Views of Islam*, 3, 7, 12.
26. Southern, *Western Views of Islam*, 85, 95, 97, 103. Southern does not mention religious pilgrims like Riccoldo.
27. Lewis, *Muslim Discovery of Europe*, 11–12, 32, 152.
28. William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, trans. Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 2:34, 140–44; Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, 'Some Aspects of Muslim-Frankish Christian Relations in the Sham Region in the Twelfth Century,' in *Christian Muslim Encounters*, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Zaidan Haddad (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995), 193–209; Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 10th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), 607–14; Halil Inalcik, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,' in Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, 21; Linda T. Darling, 'Being or Becoming: Ghaza in Early Ottoman Identity' (paper presented at the New England Medieval

Conference 'Crusade, Jihad, and Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean World,' Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 3–4 October 2008).

29. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, manuscript, Supplement Turc 1186, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
30. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş Estergon ve İstunibelgrad*, manuscript, Hazine 1608, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul. This has been published as Sinan Çavuş, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş, Estergon ve Istol{n}i-Belgrad or Süleyman-name* (Istanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1987).
31. See de Rougement, *Idea of Europe*, 33; Linda Darling, 'Rethinking Europe and the Islamic World,' *Journal of Early Modern History* 2 (1998): 221–46. There clearly is a relation between the creation of a European identity and confrontation with the Orient, but it is not obvious which caused the other. Confrontation may have followed the development of a European identity rather than have led to its formation.
32. E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1848–60); and Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*.
33. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque de Barberousse à Toulon, pendant l'hiver de 1543 a 1544,' in *Collection des Documents Inédits sur l'histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, ed. J.-J. Champollion-Figeac (Paris: Imprimerie Imperial, 1847), 518–66.
34. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde produict et mect pardevers vous nosseigneurs les juges et commissaires depputez par le Roy, lesquelles pièces il employe pour sa justiffication et deffence tant seullement, manuscript, Moreau 778, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
35. Philippe Commynes, *Memoirs*, ed. Samuel Kinser, trans. Isabelle Cazeaux (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1969); Philip Commines, *Memoirs*, ed. Andrew R. Scoble (London: George Bell, 1892).
36. Guillaume du Bellay, *Memoires de Martin et Guillaume du Bellay*, ed. V.-L. Bourrilly and F. Vindry (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1908–19).
37. Monluc, *Commentaires*.
38. Vincent Carloix, *Memoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux, Sire de Vieilleville* (Paris: Foucault, 1822).
39. Jérome Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand d'Antibes à Constantinople 1544*, trans. and ed. Leon Dorez, (Paris: Leroux, 1901).
40. Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Ludovic Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris: Libraire de la société de l'histoire de France, 1864–82).
41. Geoffrey Atkinson, *La Littérature géographique française de la Renaissance* (Paris: Editions Auguste Picard, 1927), 87, 102, 119, 134, 197 (entries not pages).

42. Jean Deny and Jane Laroche, 'L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer du Sultan Süleyman sous le commandement de l'amiral Hayreddin Pacha, dit Barberousse (1543–1544),' *Turcica* 1 (1969): 162.
43. Paolo Giovio, *Historiarum sui temporis* (Paris: Vascosan, 1558), 2:fol. 337, quoted in Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, xxxii.
44. V. J. Parry wrote an article that is another example of this historiographical trend. While this article is primarily devoted to Giovio, the only French work Parry cites in his list of numerous Italian, German, and English works is the seventeenth-century book about the French ambassador M. de Breves. Parry dismisses Jean Bodin's criticism of Giovio as giving 'credence to mere rumour,' by stating that Giovio had criticized 'the actions of Florence and France—and his chief detractors seem in fact to have been Florentine or French in origin and allegiance.' But on the other hand, the French knew more about their alliance with the Ottomans than Giovio did, and Bodin's criticism was justified in this case. V. J. Parry, 'Renaissance Historical Literature in Relation to the Near and Middle East (with Special Reference to Paolo Giovio),' in Lewis and Holt, *Historians of the Middle East*, 277–89.
45. Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France* (Paris: Lacroix, 1876), 9–10: 418.
46. For an examination of French historiography in the sixteenth century, see Donald Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); and Huppert, *Idea of Perfect History*. François Furet provides a brief overview of French historiography in 'The birth of history in France,' in *In the Workshop of History*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 77–98.
47. Jacques-Auguste de Thou, *Histoire Universelle* (Paris: 1734), 2:376.
48. For French historiography in the seventeenth century, see Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1980).
49. François Eudes de Mezerai, *Histoire général des Turcs* (Paris, 1662), 2:98–100.
50. The *Mercure* published several articles in 1625 defending the alliance. Guay's work, *Alliances du roy avec le Turc* was published in 1626, see Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 149.
51. Mezerai, *Histoire général des Turcs*, 2:196.
52. François Emmanuel Guignard Saint Priest, *Memoires sur l'ambassade de France en Turquie, 1525–1770*, ed. Charles Schefer (Paris: 1877; repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1974), 138–39.
53. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, 288–91.
54. Furet, 'The birth of history,' in Mandelbaum, *In the Workshop of History,* 88.

55. Henri Omont, 'Projets de prise de Constantinople et de fondation d'un empire français d'Orient sous Louis XIV,' *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 7 (1893): 195–246.
56. Beverly Southgate, *History: What and Why? Ancient, Modern and Postmodern Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1996), 8.

Chapter 1 The Ottoman Involvement in European Alliances, Diplomacy and the Balance of Power, 1453–1600

1. This chapter is a historical outline of events, serving as a background to the discussion of views of the Ottoman-French alliance. For more detailed histories, see the sources indicated in the endnotes to this chapter.
2. Bonney, *European Dynastic States*, 109–110.
3. See chapter 4 of *The Prince*, where Machiavelli compares the sultan and the king of France. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, 1948), 12–13. Jean Bodin claims that the Ottoman Empire not the Holy Roman Empire is the heir of Rome. *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), xxi, 293.
4. Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 99.
5. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, trans. Norman Itskowitz and Colin Imber (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973; New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989), 28–29; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 36.
6. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481–1512* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948), 64–65; K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978–85), 2:512–14.
7. Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey,* 69–72; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:516–521; Housley, *Later Crusades*, 115.
8. John S. C. Bridge, *A History of France from the Death of Louis XI* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), 3:77–78.
9. Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey*, 73, 75–81; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:519, 522, 524, 525, 527, 531, 536–38; Bridge, *History of France*, 3: 134–136, 139, 144–45, 199.
10. Housley, *Later Crusades*, 116–17.
11. The Venetians claimed that Louis was trying to make himself 'monarch of the world.' Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:35, 54–59, 61, 66; Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey*, 101; and Housley, *Later Crusades*, 124.

12. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:74–75; and Housley, *Later Crusades*, 124.
13. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:88–89.
14. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:159–63; Sebastian Giustinian to the Signory, 6 December 1515, in *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Longman, 1864–98), 2:270–71; Doge and College to Sebastian Giustinian, ambassador in England, 28 December 1515, Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 2:273–74; François I to the king of Navarre, 14 December 1515, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:cxxix–cxxxi.
15. Sebastian Giustinian to the Signory, dispatch, 13 April 1517, in Rawdon Brown, *Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII: Selection of Despatches Written by the Venetian Ambassador, Sebastian Giustinian* (London: Smith, Elder, 1854), 2:56–62; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:163–70, 172–75; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:10, 12–13, 29–30.
16. Sanuto included a report from Alvise Mocenigo of June 1518 in his diary which claims that Selim read the life of Alexander in order to emulate him and that Selim hoped to become 'master of the world.' A friar suggested that Selim should convert to Christianity as Constantine had, in order to gain dominion over the world. Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto* (Venice: F. Visentini, 1879–1903), 25:439; Gülru Necipoğlu, 'Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in a Context of Otttoman-Hapsburg Rivalry,' *Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (1989): 401–27; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:78–79, 185.
17. Knecht, *Francis I*, 66–67; Ernest Lavise, *Histoire de France* (repr. New York: AMS Press, 1969), 1:128–29; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:187–90; Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:77–79.
18. Charrière claims that Charles contacted Selim in case François won the election. Charrière, *Négociations de la France*,1: 82; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:190–92; J. Ursu, *La politique orientale de François Ier (1515–1547)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, Libraire-Editeur, 1908), 14–18.
19. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:193–94, 205–209, 212–13, 216–17, 218, 232; Villers l'Isle-Adam to his nephew la Rochepot-Montmorency during the siege of Rhodes, 13 November 1522, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:cxxxi–cxxxiii; Pope Adrian VI, bull, 3 March 1523, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1: 96–102; The Sacred College to François I, 5 March 1523, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:103–6; G. A. Bergenroth, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Spanish* (London: 1864–98), 2:534–35, 537–38, 540; Knecht, *Francis I*, 113.
20. Gasparo Contarini, Venetian ambassador with Charles V, to the Signory, 12 March 1525, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 3:413–14; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:222–26, 229.

21. Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:112–15; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:244–45; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 30–35; Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, 40:824.
22. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:245–46; François I to Süleyman [1526], in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:119–21, 152; Treaty of Madrid between François I and Charles V, 14 January 1526, in *Ordonnances des Rois de France, Règne de François Ier* (Paris: Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 1902–75), 4:178–219; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 36. François to Süleyman concerning the church in Jerusalem that was turned into a mosque, [1526?], E 6609 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul. The French were changing their role as the protectors of Christians in the Holy Land from warriors for the faith to mediating diplomats. French interest in the Holy Places in Jerusalem, which was begun by François I, was later reflected in the terms of the capitulations of 1604, which contain two articles devoted to French privileges in Jerusalem. See I. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères depuis le premier traité conclu en 1536 entre Sulayman I et François I jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Amyot, 1864), 1:143.
23. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955; New York: Dover, 1988), 148–55. Citations are to the Dover edition.
24. *Ordonnances des Rois de France*, 4:88–92, 165–79, 199–201; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:238–239, 241–43; Knecht, *Francis I*, 191.
25. Andrea Navagero to the Signory, 12 May 1527, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 4:63–64; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:254–58, 260.
26. Secretary Juan Perez to Charles V, 18 May 1527, in P. de Gayangos, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Spanish*, vol. 3, part 2, 201–2; and Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:269–71.
27. Knecht, *Francis I*, 218–20; Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, 53:8; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:327, 337–38.
28. Giovanni Antonio Venier, Venetian ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate, 8 May 1531, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 5:619–20; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 55. For another aspect of this rivalry, see Cornell H. Fleischer, 'Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s Istanbul,' *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 13 (2007): 52–62.
29. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:346–47; Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, 54:402.
30. I have modernized the language of the original 1546 English translation. This book was originally written by Giovio in Italian in 1530 and reflects the rivalry of the 1530s between Süleyman and Charles V. Paolo Giovio, *Commentario delle cose de' Turchi*, translated by Peter Ashton into English with

the title *Turkyshe Chronicles* (London: 1546), fols. 118a–b. Perhaps the events of 1543–44 prompted the English publication in 1546.

31. Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521–1555* (repr., New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 35–36; Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V,' *Turcica* 28 (1996): 299–318; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:348.
32. Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:177–82; Nicolas Jurissitch to Ferdinand of Austria, 30 August 1532, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:215–20, 226, 229, 235, 238; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:348–49, 363, 365–67; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 58–59.
33. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:360, 372–81; Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, 56:616.
34. For example, see Hayreddin Pasha to Süleyman about his meeting with the French envoy at Modon and Tunis, 1535, E 5532, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul; Report concerning information received from the French ambassador at Venice, 1548, E 5873, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; News sent from Venice to the French ambassador, [1532?], E 6594, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
35. François I to de la Forest, instructions, 11 February 1534 [1535], in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:255–63. The document is dated 1534, but at this time in France the New Year did not begin until Easter so a document dated in February 1534 was actually written in 1535. Dodieu de Vely and the bishop of Macon to Francois I, 19 April 1536, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:295–309; V.-L. Bourrilly, ed., *Le Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris (1515–1536)* (Paris: Librairie Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1910), 376; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:392–93, 398–400.
36. The question of whether this treaty was ever ratified and implemented appears to have been answered in the affirmative by the evidence of two documents from Jerusalem, analyzed by Joseph Matuz. See Joseph Matuz, 'À propos de la validité des capitulations de 1536 entre l'empire ottoman et la France,' *Turcica* 24 (1992): 183–92. See also Halil Inalcik, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. 'Imtiyazat;' 'Treaty between France and the Ottoman Empire,' in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:283–94; J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535–1914* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), 1–5. This treaty was followed by the Capitulations of 1569, the terms of which were generous to foreigners who traded in the Ottoman Empire, requiring that all Europeans with the exception of the Venetians trade under the French flag. The French king also became the protector of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire and of the

pilgrims going to the Holy Places. Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 96–97; The bishop of Montpellier and Captain Polin to François I, 10 April 1541, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:539–41; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Sinan Kuneralp, and Frédéric Hitzel, *Représentants Permanents de la France en Turquie (1536–1991) et de la Turquie en France (1797–1991)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1991).

37. The Bishop of Mâcon to Cardinal du Bellay, 19 June 1536, 14 October 1536, 26 October 1536, 6 December 1536, 8 December 1536, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:309–10, 321–23; The Bishop of Mâcon to the Duke of Montmorency, 11 January 1537, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:323–24; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 100–101; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:406–10.
38. Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 107–109, 111–12; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:442.
39. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:442–44, 447–49, 451; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 121.
40. Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 115, 117–18, 126–34; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:450, 456–58; Knecht, *Francis I*, 293–300, 302; Accounts of the Embassy of Rincon, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:474–86; François I to Jean Duval, 18 April 1541, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:486–88 .
41. Jean de Montluc, reports concerning his Embassy, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:580–620; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:473, 480–81; Knecht, *Francis I*, 370–71; Ursu, *Politique orientale de François Ier*, 155–56.
42. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:550, 556; E. Alberi, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneziani al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto* (Florence: Società editrice fiorentina, 1840), 3rd ser., 1:81–82.
43. D'Aramon to Henri II, 26 August 1551, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:154–62; Jean Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, ed. Charles Schefer (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887), xlvii–xlix, 151–52; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:539, 552–53, 555–56; Lucien Romier, 'La Crise Gallican de 1551,' *Revue historique* 109 (1912): 37–43; Instructions to d'Aramon for his return to the Levant, 17 May 1551, in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:297–300.
44. Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 124–26; D'Aramon to Henri II, 22 July 1552, 30 July 1552, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:209–18; Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, 151–54; Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine Française* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1906), 3:507–511; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:582–85.
45. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine Française*, 3:513–515; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:588–89; Henri II to Dragut, 6 June 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations*

de la France, 1:259–60; Henri II to the Baron de la Garde and d'Aramon, 6 June 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:260–62; The Cardinal of Ferrara and de Terme to the Baron de la Garde, 2 July 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:263; De Selve to Henri II, 2–26 July 1553, 4 August 1553, 12–18 August 1553, 12 September 1553, 12–21 October 1553, 2 November 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:263–77, 279–284; De Selve to the Duke of Montmorency, 30 September–8 October 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:277–79; Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 124–26; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:928–29.

46. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:592, 594–98, 602–607; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:313, 321–22, 327.
47. Bernardo Navagero, Venetian ambassador at Rome, to the Doge and Senate, 11 April 1556, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 6, part 1, 406.
48. Bernardo Navagero to the Doge and Senate, 23 October 1556, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 6, part 2, 732–35.
49. Bernardo Navagero to the Doge and Senate, 16 January 1557, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 6, part 2, 909–12.
50. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:678–679; Bernardo Navagero to the Doge and Senate, 20 March 1557, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 6, part 2, 979–82.
51. Bernardo Navagero to the Doge and Senate, 3 September 1557, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 6, part 2:1279; The Bishop of Lodève, ambassador at Venice to Henri II, concerning Carafa, 5 January 1556 [1557], 4 February 1556 [1557], in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:673–75; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:670, 672, 673, 674.
52. Letter, 28 December 1557, in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:711; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:932–33, 941, 944–45; Henri II to Süleyman, 30 December 1557, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:421–25; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:476–78, 480–83; The Bishop of Dax to de la Vigne, 4–18 August 1558, 18–27 August 1558, 20–28 September 1558, 7–20 October 1558, 7 November 1558, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:487–508; Henri II to de la Vigne, 3 August 1558, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:508–24; De la Vigne to Henri II, 10 November 1558, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 4:524–29; Setton *and the Levant*, 4:682–87, 698, 701–702, 704–705; De la Vigne, French ambassador at Istanbul, to Henri II, 14 November 1558, in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:770–72.
53. Jean Boistaille to Catherine de Medici, 27 June 1561, 5 August 1561, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:659–61, 662–63; Jean Boistaille to

Charles IX, 11 July 1561, in Charrière *Négociations de la France,* 2:661; De Petremol to Catherine de Medici, 15 July 1561, in Charrière *Négociations de la France,* 2:663–64; De Petremol to Boistaille, 24 July 1561, 15 January 1562, in Charrière *Négociations de la France,* 2:665–66, 682–87; De Petremol to Charles IX, 25 November 1561, in Charrière *Négociations de la France,* 4:680; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:831–33.

54. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 4:913, 1062, 1066; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:1102; The Cardinal de Rambouillet to Charles IX, 7 November 1571, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:190–93.
55. De Noailles to Charles IX, 10 June 1572, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:273; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 4:1076.
56. De Noailles to Charles IX, 28 November 1572, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:312–17; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:361; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 4:1088–89, 1091; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:1124.
57. Charles IX to de Noailles, 17 September 1572, written soon after the St. Bartholomew Massacre, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:303–309; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 3:333, 339, 403, 432, 499–500; Mühimme Register 21:407, Başbakanlık Archives, Istanbul; Mühimme Register 22:220, 243, 245, Başbakanlık Archives; Mühimme Register 23:403, 404, 405, Başbakanlık Archives; Mühimme Register 24:109, 823, Başbakanlık Archives; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 4:1087–88; Rouillard, *Turk in French History*, 134.
58. Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 97–99; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:1150–54.
59. Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1989), 2:657–58; Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980), 343–46; Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahat name*, Bagdat 304, folios 27b–29b, 31a–31b, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, Istanbul. Volume one of the *Seyahat name* has been published as *The Seyahatname of Evliya Celebi*: *Book One: Istanbul. Facsimile of Topkapi Sarayi Bagdat 304, Part 1: Folios 1a–106a*, ed. Sinasi Tekin and Gonul Alpay Tekin (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1989). For an analysis of the political implications of this myth, see Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'Royal French Women in the Ottoman Sultans' Harem: The Political Uses of Fabricated Accounts from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century,' *Journal of World History* 17 (2006): 159–196.

Chapter 2 Multiple Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ottoman Empire

1. A shorter version of this chapter was published previously as Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'Shifting Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ottoman Empire,' *Journal of Early Modern History* (2004): 109–34.
2. The modern definition of 'foreigner' is not necessarily identical to a sixteenth-century definition of the same word. We continue to have difficulties categorizing certain individuals, especially the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. We see this in our continuing efforts to understand the millets of the Ottoman Empire. See Benjamin Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System,' in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 69–88; Daniel Goffman, 'Ottoman Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century,' *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11 (1994): 135–58.
3. An example of this is the difference between Ottoman and western sources which relate the origins of Hayreddin Barbarossa. Contemporary western sources often speculated about his ethnic origins, see below. Ottoman sources do not discuss his origins in terms of ethnicity.
4. Bartolomé and Lucile Bennassar used inquisition records to study renegades, most of whom were from humble backgrounds and who subsequently came under the jurisdiction of the inquisition. Despite a difference in social status, the elite individuals whose political identity required a change of religion in order to demonstrate a commitment to a dynastic cause bear some similarities to the renegades whom the Bennassars describe, in terms of the function of religion in creating a political identity. *Les Chretiens d'Allah: L'histoire extraordinaire des renégats xvie et xviie siècles* (Paris: Perrin, 1989).
5. Bonney, *European Dynastic States*.
6. I am not claiming that Ottoman practice was identical with that of contemporary European states but that some similarities exist. Ottoman practice has usually been studied from the perspective of its differences both from other Muslim states and from European states. It is useful to see in what ways it was similar to other contemporary states and how Ottoman practice reflected widespread developments throughout the region.
7. The following historians reflect this view. I include a quote from Gibb and Bowen as an example. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: Strahan, Cadell and Davies, 1797), 12:59; Albert H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), 195; Paul Coles, *The Ottoman Impact on Europe,* 49–50, 54–55, 73, 154; Bernard Lewis, *The Jews*

of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 143; Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen: 'But the Ottoman Empire was a Moslem state in which it was paradoxical that any institution should be reserved for the infidel born. ... by the eighteenth century the whole system of a slave-manned Ruling Institution had been swept away. Free Moslems had captured nearly all the posts it formerly included—and with disastrous results.' *Islamic Society and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 44–45. Norman Itzkowitz criticizes this biased view of Ottoman administration in 'Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities,' *Studia Islamica* 16 (1962): 81.

8. Guillaume Postel, *De la Republic des Turcs* (Poitiers: Enguilbert de Marnef, 1560), 1:34, 39; Nicolas de Nicolay, *The Nauigations, peregrinations, and voyages, made into Turkie*, trans. T. Washington (London: Thomas Dawson, 1585; Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), 8; Vaughn, *Europe and the Turk*, 282; Richard Pennell, 'The Devil (as I'me sure hee will) take 'Um: A Seventeenth Century English consul and his views of Tripoli,' in *D'un Orient l'autre*, ed. Marie-Claude Burgat (Paris: Editions au Centre national de al recherche scientifique, 1991), 359–62; Bennassar and Bennassar, *Les Chretiens d'Allah,* 258.
9. Postel, *De la Republic des Turcs,* 1:69, 71.
10. Postel, *De la Republic des Turcs,* 2:18–19; Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, 2.
11. I thank Cornell Fleischer for this insight based on his reading of Mevlana 'Isa's *Câmi' ül-meknunat*. Piri Reis used the term Turk to describe the Ottoman seamen in the Mediterranean who fought against Habsburg expansion there. *Kitab-i Bahriye*, manuscript, Yeni Cami 790, 138b–139a, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul. See also Svat Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus* (Oxford: Oxford University and Nour Foundation, 1996), 48–49.
12. Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 4, 19–21, 26–28, 141.
13. Coles, *Ottoman Impact on Europe,* 33, 71, 154.
14. Mustafa Ali, *Künh ül-ahbar* (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1860), 1:16; and Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541–1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University, Press, 1986), 254.
15. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 16–17.
16. Robert Dankoff, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588–1662): As Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels (Seyahat-Name)* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 8–9; Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 255–56.

17. Ibrahim Metin Kunt, 'Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974): 233–39; Bennassar and Bennassar, *Les Chretiens d'Allah,* 393–96, 412, 418.
18. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 254–57; Itzkowitz, 'Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities,' 75, 79–83.
19. Andrew C. Hess, 'The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain,' *American Historical Review* 74 (1968): 3.
20. Hess, 'The Moriscos,' 7; Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 2:780–97; Housley, *Later Crusades,* 297–304.
21. Knecht, *Francis I*, 363–64.
22. J. B. Harrison and P. Hardy, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. 'Babur;' Muni Lal, *Babar Life and Times* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1977), 69–73. Unfortunately Babur's autobiography, *Babur-nama*, has a lacuna of almost eleven years from 1508 to 1519, so we do not have his interpretation of his alliance with Ismail of Iran. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English (Memoirs of Babur),* ed. Annette Susannah Beveridge (London: Luzac, 1922), 347–66.
23. Although Henri converted for political reasons, this statement was actually made by his enemies in the Catholic League. Michael Wolfe, *The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1.
24. Bennassar and Bennassar, *Les Chretiens d'Allah,* 260, 396, 429, 475. Some renegades were Christian in Christian lands and Muslim in Muslim lands. Others thought one could be saved with either religion, that the religions were the same, only the prayers were different.
25. During Süleyman's reign, it is estimated that there were six thousand kapıkulu cavalry and twelve thousand Janissaries. Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 108.
26. The Janissaries were the sultan's infantry recruited from the devşirme. The kapıkulu cavalry were also recruited from the devşirme.
27. 'The revolutionary concept of the nation as constituted by the deliberate political option of its potential citizens is, of course, still preserved in a pure form in the USA. Americans are those who wish to be. Nor did the French concept of the 'nation' as analogous to a plebiscite ("un plébiscite de tous les jours' as Renan phrased it) lose its essentially political character. French nationality was French citizenship: ethnicity, history, the language or patois spoken at home, were irrelevant to the definition of 'the nation'." E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 87–89.
28. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 67–72, 195–220, 485, 493.

29. Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, trans. Susan Ross Huston (Berkelely: University of California Press, 1991), 2, 6, 8, 152–171.
30. Charlotte Wells, *Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), x, xv, xvi, 9.
31. Louis XI, reigned 1461–83, waived the *droit d'aubaine* in the case of those who offered special services to the crown. Wells, *Law and Citizenship,* 24–26.
32. Wells, *Law and Citizenship,* 29–30, 33.
33. Wells, *Law and Citizenship,* 39, 42–43.
34. Henry Heller, *Anti Italianism in Sixteenth-Century France* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), viii, 108, 128, 146, 154–56, 160–61, 171, 205, 215.
35. Philippe de Commynes, *Memoirs*, 9.
36. Jean Bacquet a 'royal legist' of the sixteenth century wrote of Commynes: 'Philippe de Commines {sic} likewise says in his history that it is an odious thing to give offices or benefices or any ecclesiastical, political, or military post to foreigners, who can be neither so fit for them, nor so acceptable as those who belong to the country, who have a notable interest and natural attachment to the preservation of their fatherland.' Wells, *Law and Citizenship*, 66, 71.
37. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 1:254; Knecht, *Francis I*, 162–63.
38. He gradually learned French. Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:161–62.
39. He is described as a refugee by Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:216; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:147; and T. C. Price Zimmermann, *The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 178; but as a renegade by Knecht, *Francis I,* 214.
40. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 4:138–39; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:373.
41. But converts were not always considered to be renegades. See Goffman, 'Ottoman Millets,' 135–58.
42. Information about Hüseyn is mostly gleaned from several documents dating to the 1480s found in the Topkapı archives.
43. Hüseyn to Bayezid, September–October 1482, E 5457, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; Nicolas Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem, l'Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes 1480–1522* (Paris: Peeters, 1994), 173, 393, 395.
44. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 177, 402, 409–410.
45. See Commines, *Memoirs*, 2:67–68; Mehmed Arif, ed., *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* (Istanbul: *Tarih-i Osmani Encumeni Mecmu'ası*, 1914), 12; Nicolas Vatin, *Sultan Djem: Un prince ottoman dans l'Europe du XVe siècle d'après deux sources contemporaines: Vâḳı'ât-ı Sulṭân Cem, Œuvres de Guillaume Caoursin* (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société Turque d'Histoire, 1997), 162

46. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 411–12, 199–200; Hüseyn to Bayezid, Spring 1485, E 6071/16, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
47. There is no record that Hüseyn made a second trip to France. In late November of 1486, he wrote from Lemnos to the sultan that one of the spies he had sent to France had returned with the news that Cem had been moved to another fortress and was under a larger guard than before. One more letter from Hüseyn to Bayezid, probably from this same year, reports that Cem has not been seen for over a year and it is suspected that he is dead.
48. Charles VIII, letter of security for Hüseyn Bey, ambassador of the sultan, 20 April 1486, in Jacques Lefort, *Documents Grecs dans les Archives de Topkapı Sarayı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981), 109–111; Nicolas Vatin, 'La traduction ottomane d'une lettre de Charles VIII de France (1486),' *Turcica* 15 (1983): 220–222.
49. Even when an individual discloses his former occupation as Domenico of Jerusalem did in his *Relatione* and his 'autobiography,' it does not always help establish his previous identity. Domenico informed the reader of neither his former name nor his motivation for leaving the sultan's service as his personal physician and subsequently converting to Catholicism. It does not appear to have been for personal gain, for despite his employment by the Holy Office in Rome as a censor of Hebrew materials and a teacher of Hebrew, he claimed to be 'supporting great poverty for love of Our Saviour.' Domenico Hierosolimitano, *Domenico's Istanbul*, ed. Geoffrey Lewis, trans. Michael Austin (Warminster, Wilts.: Printed and published for the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust by Aris & Phillips, 2001), i–iv, ix–x, 22–23.
50. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 381.
51. Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 117; Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 173. This is similar to a case from the sixteenth century when another Ottoman official, who was probably a subaşı at Draç, was also in charge of gathering information. See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther,' 299–317.
52. Heath Lowry, 'The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms under Ottoman Rule,' in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, eds. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1986), 235, 238; Hüseyn to Bayezid, E 5457, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 391–94.
53. Lowry, 'The Island of Limnos,' in Bryer and Lowry, *Continuity and Change*, 238, 242. A fief for a subaşı ranged from 20,000 to 100,000 akçes.
54. I. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York: 1983), 16–17.

55. He accompanied an ambassador from Naples on this embassy. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 220, 381.
56. Bayezid II to d'Aubusson, 29 August 1489, in Lefort, *Documents Grecs,* 98–99; D'Aubusson to Bayezid, 18 November 1489, in Lefort, *Documents Grecs*, 103–105; Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 223.
57. Ismail Hikmet Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem* (Istanbul, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1951), 186; E 6071/9, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
58. Perhaps George did not arrive in France until 1473 since it is only after this date that we have much information about him there. Jonathan Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West, 1400–1520* (Camberley, Surrey: Porphyrogenitus, 1995), 180.
59. Vatin, 'La traduction ottomane d'une lettre de Charles VIII,' 222, 228.
60. M. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' *Mémoires de la Société Académique d'Archéologie, Sciences et Arts du Département de l'Oise* 14 (1889): 41–42.
61. Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 176.
62. This activity would have been similar to that of Theodore Bassanos, Nicolas Palopanos, and his son, George Palopanos, who were three Greek shipbuilders at Venice.
63. Jonathan Harris, 'Bessarion on Shipbuilding: A Re-interpretation,' *Byzantinoslavica* 75 (1994): 296–303; Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 178.
64. George, who was known for his generosity, helped the city of Beauvais pay a tax debt. Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 176.
65. Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 59–60, 139–143.
66. Commynes, *Memoirs,* 1:321; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 2:377.
67. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 42–43.
68. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 51–56, 62; Lefort, *Documents Grecs,* 110.
69. Harris, 'Bessarion on Shipbuilding,' 299.
70. Andronicus Callistus to George Palaeologus Dyshpatos, 1476, in *Patrologia Cursus Completus, Ser: Graeco-Latina* (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1857–66), 161:1017–20. Jonathan Harris kindly provided a translation of this letter.
71. Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 179.
72. George appears to have had two sons from a previous marriage; one died in 1486 and the other in 1487. The elder, named Jean, was also known as 'le Grec.' Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 64–67.
73. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 71–77.
74. Nothing indicates that the worship in the chapels was anything other than in compliance with Latin Catholicism. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 31–35, 56–61.
75. Renet, 'Les Bissipat du Beauvaisis,' 48, 66–67, 71–98.

76. Svat Soucek, 'The Rise of the Barbarossas in North Africa,' *Archivum Ottomanicum* 3 (1971): 239.
77. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, manuscript, 2639, fol. 5a, Istanbul Üniversite Kütüphanesi, Istanbul. Katib Çelebi summarized this account in his *Tuhfetu'l-kibar fi esfari'l-bihar*, Revan 1192, folio 23a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul. This has been edited by Idris Bostan and published in facsimile with an English translation. Katib Çelebi, *The Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns*, ed. Idris Bostan (Ankara: Prime Ministry Secretariat for Maritime Affairs, 2008). For an older translation, see Katib Çelebi, *History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, trans. James Mitchell (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1831), 28.
78. Soucek, 'Rise of the Barbarossas,' 245; *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, 2639, fol. 32b, Istanbul Üniversite Kütüphanesi.
79. Aldo Gallotta, *Il 'Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Pasa' di Seyyid Murad* (Naples: Centro di Studi Magrebini, 1983), fol. 167a–b, 175a–b; Katib Çelebi, *History of the Maritime Wars*, 42–43.
80. Gallotta, *Il 'Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Pasa' di Seyyid Murad*, fol. 224a–226b, 229a.
81. This beylerbeylik included Algiers and thirteen sancaks on the Mediterranean coasts and islands. Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 105.
82. Soucek, 'Rise of the Barbarossas,' 246–47. Bennassar and Bennassar call the Barbarossa brothers 'Islamicized Greeks' and consider Hayreddin to have been a 'Greek of Lesbos.' *Les Chretiens d'Allah,* 232, 267, 366.
83. Soucek, 'Rise of the Barbarossas,' 248.
84. Aldo Gallotta, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. 'Khayr al-din (Khidir) Pasha Barbarossa.'
85. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 2:67–69, 5: 398–405.
86. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 43; C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 243a–245b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
87. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 85. Also see chapters 4 and 5 concerning Charles V's efforts to attract Hayreddin to his service.
88. Edouard Petit, *André Doria: Un Amiral condottiere au XVIe Siècle (1466–1560)* (Paris: Maison Quantin, 1887), 1, 10, 12–13, 20, 28, 40, 49–50; Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa & the Genoese, 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 314–16; Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 25; Knecht, *Francis I,* 215, 217–18, 322; Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 2:29–43.
89. Petit frequently condemns Doria for lacking patriotism, but this is anachronistic for the sixteenth century. As was typical of the sixteenth century, Doria considered loyalty in relation to people rather than places. Petit, *André Doria,* 76–77, 82, 94–99, 102, 111–13, 359–61.

90. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 26–34, 42–56; Petit, *André Doria,* 58–62, 181–82, 253, 345.
91. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, xxx–xxxi. The Venetians believed that Doria had an agreement with Hayreddin Barbarossa and so was reluctant to actually fight in the battle. See chapter 5.
92. For an excellent discussion of the confusion regarding the designation of both areas that Hayreddin governed as *Cezayir*, see Idris Bostan, 'The Establishment of the Province of *Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid*,' in *The Kapudan Pasha: His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 241–51.
93. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, xxiii, 21; Joseph von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, trans. J.-J. Hellert (Istanbul: Isis, 1996), 5:165; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:367, 422; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier*, 170.
94. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, xxiv; Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:14–15.
95. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, xxiv–xxv, 205; De Morvillers to François I, 7 December 1546, 25 January 1547, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:628–30, 636–38; D'Aramon to François I, 4 May 1547, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:11–16; Kunt, *Sultan's Servants*, 39–40.
96. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, xxv, 21–23, 225; De Morvilliers to Henri II, 12–20 October 1547, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 2:35–36; Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:124–25.
97. Aloisio Gritti was the son of Andrea Gritti, who was doge of Venice from 1523 to 1538. His mother was Greek, and he was born in Istanbul while his father was bailo there. He was educated in Italy and returned to Istanbul to seek his fortune. He was a favorite of Ibrahim Pasha and played an important role in Ottoman foreign relations during Ibrahim's tenure as grand vizier. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, 22–23; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:253, 334. Setton states that Gritti 'had a double loyalty, to the Porte and to the Republic' and while Venice and the Ottoman Empire were at peace he had no conflict between these two loyalties. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:334. Yunus Bey, Ottoman envoy to Venice of Greek origin but 'now a Turk,' said of Gritti that he was neither Turk nor Christian. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:384, 386. This comment could reflect on his political loyalties as much as his religious ones.
98. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, 22–25, 226.
99. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, 21–22; Instructions to Roggendorf sent as envoy to the King of Bohemia and the German princes, 24 January

1554, in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2:507; Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 6:223–24.

100. L. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan: Fils de Mohammed II, Frère de Bayezid II (1459–1495)* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1892), 110–113.
101. Charles VIII, letter of security for Hüseyn Bey, 20 April 1486, in Lefort, *Documents Grecs,* 39, 110–11.
102. Harris, *Greek Emigres in the West*, 179.
103. Vatin, 'La traduction ottomane d'une lettre de Charles VIII,' 226.

Chapter 3 Sultan Cem: A Fifteenth-Century Ottoman View of Relations with the Infidels

1. For example, a history of diplomatic relations during the reign of Bayezid II mainly uses western sources and a few translations of Ottoman chronicles. Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey.* The second volume of Setton's work, *Papacy and the Levant*, which contains three chapters that concern Cem extensively, also relies on western sources. Only recently has a major work on relations between the Ottomans and a western state extensively used Ottoman sources as well as western sources. Nicolas Vatin's use of several documents from the Topkapı archives as well as the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* and western sources enables us to view these relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Knights of Rhodes from 1480 to 1522 from an Ottoman, as well as a western perspective. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem.* Vatin prepared a critical edition of the *Vakı'at Sultan Cem* published in *Sultan Djem* and has also written several articles on related topics. See Nicolas Vatin, 'À propos du voyage en France de Hüseyn, ambassadeur de Bajazet II auprès de Louis XI (1483),' *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* IV (1984): 35–44; Vatin, 'Une tentative manquée d'ouverture diplomatique: la lettre de créance d'un envoyé de Bajazet II auprès de Louis XI (1483),' in *L'Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*, ed. H. Batu and J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul-Paris: Isis, 1986), 1–13; and Vatin 'Macabre trafic: La destinée *post-mortem* du Prince Djem,' in *Mélanges offerts à Louis Bazin*, ed. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et R. Dor (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), 231–39. Vatin's work follows in the path of Halil Inalcik's article, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' in which Inalcik uses Ottoman sources to analyze in detail one episode in the diplomatic history of Cem's experiences in France and Italy. Halil Inalcik, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 3 (1979): 209–30. This article demonstrates the value of Ottoman sources in understanding fifteenth-century history.

2. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, 1; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 120; Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 30; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 26–27; and Saddedin, *Tac-ut-tevarih* (Istanbul: 1279 [1862]), 2:2–8. For the chronology of Cem's life, see Halil Inalcik, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. 'Djem.'
3. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, 2; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 122–130; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 33–38.
4. Karaman had been incorporated into the Ottoman state in 1464, but princes of this house continued to resist Ottoman rule from the mountains. V. J. Parry, 'The Reigns of Bayezid II and Selim I, 1481–1520,' in Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, 55; Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–1491* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 81–86; Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, 4–5; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 134.
5. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, 5–6; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 138–39; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 53–54.
6. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*, 6–7; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 142; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 54–55. See Bayezid's letter in Feridun, *Mecmu'a-i Munşeat üs-Selatin* (Istanbul: 1858), 1:285; and Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, 118. Kasim Bey had requested aid from the Knights in 1481. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 155.
7. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 57–62; and D'Aubusson, letter patent for Cem Sultan and his suite to come in security to Rhodes, 12 July 1482, in Vladimir Lamansky, *Secrets d'etat de Venise*, (St. Petersburg: Academie Impériale des Sciences, 1884; New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 1:261–62.
8. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 68–70.
9. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 57–62, 68–72, 74, 76–77, 80; D'Aubusson, letter patent, 12 July 1482, in Lamansky, *Secrets d'etat de Venise,* 1:261–62; Inalcik, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Djem;' Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 166; and Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2: 383–84.
10. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 76, 82–96. While Thuasne condemns d'Aubusson for agreeing to keep Cem captive for 45,000 ducats, Vatin considers him to have been an able diplomat. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 166–80, especially 179.
11. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 10–12; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 154; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan,* 99, 109–110; and Inalcik, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Djem.'
12. The subaşı of Lemnos, see chapter 2.
13. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 104–105; Hüseyn to Bayezid, 1483, E 3286, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi; Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 'Cem Sultan'a dair beş orijinal vesika,' *Belleten* 24 (1960): 463–65; and Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, 183.
14. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 12; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 162. For this embassy, see Vatin, 'Une tentative manquée d'ouverture diplomatique;'

Vatin, 'À propos du voyage en France de Hüseyn;' and Commines, *Memoirs*, 2:67–68.

15. Cem was at Le Pouët which was probably not more than 100 kilometers from Rives where Hüseyn waited. For the identification of Rives, see Vatin, 'À propos du voyage en France de Hüseyn,' 41–43.
16. In 1486 when Barak came to France, he was not instructed to meet with Cem but only to ascertain his whereabouts. V. L. Ménage, 'The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France in 1486,' *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1965): 128.
17. Probably at Les Eschelles. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 121, 131–132; and Uzunçarşılı, 'Cem Sultan'a dair,' 458–63.
18. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 110–13; and De Villers l'Isle-Adam to La Rochepot-Montmorency, 13 November 1522, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:cxxi–cxxii.
19. Bayezid to Louis XI, February 1483, E 6071/9, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
20. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 189–91; Hüseyn to Bayezid, September-October 1482, E 5457/1, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; Vatin, 'Une tentative manquée d'ouverture diplomatique,' 1–13; and Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, 186–91.
21. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 15; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 170; and Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 122.
22. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 15–16; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 176–77; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 128, 132, 133, 137, 158, 174–76.
23. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 179–182.
24. In the letter from Bayezid to Charles VIII of 1488 that Rericho brought to France, Bayezid calls Charles his brother. Rericho also brought a catalog of relics to France. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 216–18, 219–22, 227; Franz Babinger, "Reliquienschacher am Osmanenhof im XV. Jahrhundert zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der osmanischen Goldpragung unter Mehmed II., dem Eroberer," in *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-historische. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte* (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1956), 15–24; Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:cxxiv; Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 19–21; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 194–196.
25. Inalcik, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 212–13, 215; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 266–68, 278, 280; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:412–16, 418–21; and Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey*, 45.
26. H.-François Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII en Italie* (Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot, 1888), 295, 305, 315–16, 346–48; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan,* 314–15, 319, 433–34; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:442, 447; and G. R.

Potter, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 1, *The Renaissance 1493–1520* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 350–52.

27. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 26, 28; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 224; Potter, *New Cambridge Modern History*, 350–52; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 315–16, 346–48.
28. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:461–63, 468, 471–77; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 327–29; and Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey,* 48.
29. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 335–40; and Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:456–57.
30. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 31; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 238; Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 554; Saddedin, *Tac-ut-tevarih,* 2:38; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 364, 367–75; and Garcin de Tassy, 'Aventures du prince Gem, traduites du turc de Saadeddin-effendi,' *Journal Asiatique* 9 (1826): 173.
31. For example, in 1389 Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, was known as a friend and ally of the sultan. This policy was continued by his son, Filippo-Maria Visconti, who sent an ambassador to Murad II in 1432. Vaughn, *Europe and the Turk*, 37, 49–50.
32. Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 189–91, 400–403; Vatin, 'Une tentative manquée d'ouverture diplomatique,' 1–13; and Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, 186–91. The documents are Hüseyn to Bayezid, September-October 1482, E 5457/1, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; Bayezid to d'Aubusson, December 1482, E 11982/3, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; and Bayezid to Louis XI, February 1483, E 6071/9, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
33. Report on the French army that invaded Italy in 1494, D 2550, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi. This is incorrectly cited as E 2250, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, by Vatin in 'Macabre trafic,' 237. This document is a small defter that contains information about the number of French troops in the land and sea armies. It is published in facsimile in *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Kılavuzu* (Istanbul, 1938).
34. With Cem's death Bayezid had no fears that a crusade would materialize. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:479, 481–82; Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey,* 47–49; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 339.
35. Commines, *Memoirs,* 2:181–82.
36. Earlier Ottoman attempts to negotiate with the French were in 1483, Bayezid to Louis XI, February 1483, E 6071/9, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; and in 1488, Babinger, 'Reliquienschacher am Osmanenhof,' 17; and Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:cxxiv–cxxv.
37. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*. In this edition, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* is only 35 pages.
38. See chapter 5 for examples of French traveler's reports.

39. For another evaluation of the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* as a view of 'the other,' see Nicolas Vatin, 'À Propos de l'exotisme dans le *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*: le regard porté sur l'Europe occidentale à la fin du XVe siècle par un Turc Ottoman,' *Journal Asiatique* 272 (1984): 237–48.
40. The Ottoman historian, Idris-i Bidlisi, obtained most of his information from Mustafa, the kapıcı başı who was sent to conduct negotiations with Innocent VIII. For a discussion of the identity of the author of *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* and a review of Ottoman primary sources on Cem, see Inalcik, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy.' 209–210, 217.
41. Ismail Hami Danişmend, ed., 'Gurbet-name-i Sultan Cem,' *Fatih ve Istanbul*, 1 (1954): 211–70; Inalcik, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 209, 217–18; and Barbara Flemming, 'A Sixteenth-Century Turkish Apology for Islam: The *Gurbetname-i Sultan Cem*,' *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16: 105–121.
42. Nicolas Vatin prepared a critical edition of the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem.* Vatin relied on a manuscript of 34 folios found in Vienna. This publication includes a facsimile of the manuscript, a transliteration, and a French translation. Vatin, *Sultan Djem.*
43. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 1, 34; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 116–17, 246–53. Sadeddin's account of Cem in his *Tac-ut-tevarih*, a history of the Ottoman empire up to 1520, generally relied on the *Vakı'at.* Thuasne, a nineteenth-century historian who specialized in fifteenth-century history, used a French translation of the sixteenth-century Ottoman historian Sadeddin as well as many western sources in this study. Ismail Hikmet Ertaylan based his study of Cem, *Sultan Cem,* mainly on Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem*; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*; and documents from the Topkapı Archives. Inalcik discusses the historiography relating to histories of Cem. See 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 209, 218.
44. For Idris-i Bidlisi's version, which differs in many important points from the *Vakı'at ı Sultan Cem*, see Inalcik, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 209–10.
45. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 3–4; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 126–29. Once Cem reached Tarsus in Mamluk territory, he was safe from his brother's forces.
46. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 4–5; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 130–31.
47. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 5; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 134–35.
48. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 7; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 142–43; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 62–63.
49. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 7; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 144–45; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 64. Thuasne's source is Caoursin, vice-chancellor of the Knights of Rhodes.

50. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 7; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 144–45; Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 72–73; Feridun, *Mecmu'a-i Munşeat,* 1:285–86; and Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, 148–50.
51. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 74; Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 166; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:383–84; Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 8; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 144–45.
52. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 76–77, 80; and Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de Jérusalem*, 166.
53. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 8; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 146–47.
54. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 10; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 154–57. Louis XI was at Plessis-les-Tours near Tours. It seems unlikely that they could have gone there and back in twelve days from Nice.
55. He probably knew an Italian dialect, although it is possible that he knew Provençal or French.
56. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 10–11; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 156–57. It would have been relatively simple for Frenk Süleyman Bey to escape since he spoke the language and could pass for a local. Nothing further is said about Frenk Süleyman Bey. One wonders why he went to Rome. Was he planning to negotiate directly with the pope on Cem's behalf? It is also possible that the author meant Rum rather than Rome and that he returned to Ottoman territories, although there is no record of him there.
57. The duke was Charles I of Savoy. Louis XI was married to Charlotte of Savoy.
58. Ménage believes that this place was actually Les Eschelles. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 130–32.
59. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 11; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 160–61. Izeddin believes that they were killed. M. Izeddin, 'Un Prince Turc en France et en Italie au XVe siècle: Djem Sultan,' *Orient* 30 (1964–65): 86.
60. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 12; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 160–63. Le Pouët is twenty-three kilometers east of Montelimar. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 131.
61. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 12–13; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 166–67. It seems likely that the author of the *Vakı'at* was one of the group of men who were separated from Cem in 1483. He gives a detailed itinerary for their travels and seems to have actually endured the hardships. See also Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 130.
62. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 13–15; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 168–69. Guy-Allard wrote an historical novel, *Zizimi prince ottoman, amoureux de Philipine-Hélène de Sassenage* (1673), about this 'love affair.' Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan,* x–xi.

63. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 15; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 168–69; and Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 122.
64. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 15; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 174–75. In 1490 when Mustafa Bey came to Rome as Bayezid's ambassador, Cem requested from Blanchefort the twenty thousand gold pieces that had been taken deceitfully from Kaytbay. Mustafa Bey met with the pope and was able to obtain five thousand gold pieces of the twenty thousand for Cem. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 23; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 208–9.
65. The author was referring to the duke of Bourbon at the time Jean II (died 1488), whose brother Pierre de Beaujeu had married Anne de France daughter of Louis XI. This couple acted as regents for Charles VIII. Jean II alternated between supporting the regents and joining their enemies. He was one of the most powerful of the nobility of France at this time. Bridge, *History of France*, 1:16–17, 113–14, 131–32, 135–36; and Izeddin, 'Un Prince Turc en France,' 89.
66. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 15; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 174–75.
67. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 158; Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 16; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 178–79. It is unclear who this lord was, but it seems likely that it was the duke of Bourbon who later provided some assistance in Cem's escape attempt. The Knights may have realized that one of Cem's men was in his service and been suspicious of the duke's activities.
68. They arrived before the death of the king of Naples' son, who was a cardinal, which occurred on 17 October 1485. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 16; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 178–79; and Inalcik, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 217. Cem's entire retinue may have only included five Turks at this time: Ayas Bey and Sinan Bey, who had recently returned from Rhodes; Celal Bey, who had remained in France; as well as two more men, Şir Murad Aga and Sufi Şadi, about whom we know nothing except that they were now with Cem at Bourganeuf and met with Hüseyn Bey. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 16–17; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 178–81. Compare this with the report of the Ottoman secret agent Barak, who, when he observed Cem in October of 1486, saw six men with turbans, presumably Cem and five Turks of his retinue. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 118, 127.
69. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 17; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 180–83.
70. No mention is made as to why he may have betrayed Cem. One may speculate that he was a secret supporter of Bayezid or perhaps he had been bribed by the Knights.
71. It seems likely that the *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* is referring to Guy de Blanchefort who was responsible for Cem throughout his imprisonment in France. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 122.

72. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 17–18; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 184–85.
73. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 18–19; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 186–89. It seems likely that when Barak saw Cem, it was before the Knights began guarding Cem so closely. Although he saw Cem outside the castle, Cem was still within the area enclosed by the moat. Just before Barak saw Cem, he had seen many Knights in the church of the castle where he attended mass as a means of gaining entrance to the castle where Cem was held prisoner. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 126–27.
74. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 19, 21; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 196–97; Report on Cem's arrival at Rome in 1489, E 5454, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 226–230.
75. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 21; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 198–201. Burchard, the papal master of ceremonies, claimed that they tried to persuade Cem to salute the pope in the Turkish fashion by touching the ground with one hand and then kissing it, but Cem refused to do this or to genuflect. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 233.
76. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 22; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 202–3. According to Burchard, the pope informed Cem that he had been brought to Rome for his good and that he should not be concerned but be assured that everything would be managed for the best. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 233.
77. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 238; and Report on Cem's arrival at Rome in 1489, E 5454, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
78. Giuliano della Rovere was Cardinal of St. Peter ad Vincula or, in French, St. Pierre-aux-Liens. Commines, *Memoirs,* 2:98; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 175–76, 182. Rovere had been instrumental in Giovanni Battista Cibo's (Innocent VIII) election as pope in 1484 and had enormous influence with him. Della Rovere would later become Pope Julius II. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:391.
79. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 22–23; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 202–5.
80. Perhaps Cem had come to realize over the years that by seeking help from the Knights of Rhodes in 1482, he had put himself in an awkward position. He certainly realized in 1489 that if he accompanied crusading armies, he would be condemned by the Ottoman religious establishment, which supported his brother.
81. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 23; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 206–7. The *Vakı'at* stated that it was 'efrenc dil' presumably an Italian dialect since Innocent was from Genoa. The version of this story in Saddedin does not quote what the pope said to Cem. Sadeddin, *Tac-ut-tevarih,* 2:23–24. See also Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 258.

82. Roman diarist, fl. 1480. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2: 560. The *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem* merely stated that Mustafa brought a letter and a gift for Cem and that when they met, Mustafa consoled Cem. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 24; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 208–9.
83. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 240–1, 261–64, 273–74, 279–80, 428–29. Inalcik believes that Bayezid was trying to kill Cem. 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy,' 213–14, 220.
84. The chapel of S. Niccolo da Bari in the Vatican palace.
85. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 25; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 212–15. It was generally believed that Rodrigo Borgia bought the papacy and that belief is reflected in this account. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:431–35; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 304.
86. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 25–26; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 216–17.
87. See Corio's account of the ceremony in Louis Thuasne, ed.,*Johannis Burchardi Argentinensis ... Diarium sive rerum urbanarum commentarii {1483–1506}* (Paris, 1883–85), 2: 620–21. See also Alain Boureau, *La Papesse Jeanne*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), 8–114, 375; Emmanuel Rhoidis, *Pope Joan (the Female Pope): A Historical Study*, trans. Charles Hastings Collette (London: George Redway, 1886), 47–48, 77–78, 87–88; and C. M. Aherne, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, s.v. 'Joan Popess, Fable of.'
88. Boureau, *La Papesse Jeanne,* 11, 18, 27, 374.
89. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 26; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 216–17.
90. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 306–06, 313–14; and Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:441.
91. Charles VIII's sister Anne de Beaujeu was accused of accepting bribes, although this is disputed. See Bridge, *History of France*, 1:241–46.
92. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 26; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 218–19. Charles sent a messenger to learn Cem's wishes about going to Hungary during the period when the Hungarian ambassador tried to arrange for Cem to be sent there. Hieronimo Zorzi, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, 1487, in Brown, *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, 1:166–67.
93. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 26–27; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 218–21. Presumably since Cem was kept in the Knights' commanderies, the author believed that this meant that Cem had not set foot in France.
94. Usually this term meant admiral, but it also had a non-nautical meaning of captain, that is a military commander of soldiers or governor of a town. Henry Kahane, Renée Kahane, and Andreas Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin* (University of Illinois Press; repr., Istanbul: ABC Kitabevi, 1988), 144. Thuasne identifies this man as

Anthoine de Gimel, 'maréchal-des-logis' of his majesty. *Djem-Sultan,* 235. Saddedin also uses kapudan. *Tac-ut-tevarih,* 2:35–36. The French translation by Garcin de Tassy refers to him as 'officier' or 'seigneur.' Tassy, 'Aventures du prince Gem,' 169.

95. This could reflect the fact that at this time Charles ended the regency of his sister and her husband and began to rely on his own favorites. See Bridge, *History of France*, 1:220–52, 2:10.
96. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 27–28; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 220–23.
97. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 22–28; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 226–27.
98. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 28; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 228–29. The pope decided to transfer Cem to the Castel in October 1494. He also replaced Cem's guard composed of Knights of Rhodes with two of his own nephews. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 2:458; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 330–31.
99. Ferrantino, duke of Calabria, son of Alfonso, arrived in Rome 10 December 1494 with the Neapolitan army. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:458–59, 469; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 341.
100. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 28–29; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 228–29. Ferrantino withdrew from Rome 25 December 1494. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan,* 344; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:471; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 505.
101. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 29; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 228–29. The pope went to the Castel S. Angelo 7 January, 1494, and the French considered bombarding it, but Charles would not agree to do so. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 512, 514.
102. Monsieur de Bresse was the brother of Charles VIII's mother, Charlotte of Savoy. The pope and the comte de Bresse reached an agreement concerning Cem on 11 January 1495. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 516; and Thuasne, *Djem*-Sultan, 349.
103. It is significant that the author of the *Vakı'at* uses this terms to translate the pope's words. In the sixteenth century the Ottomans only referred to the king of France among Christian rulers by this term. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 29; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 231; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 355.
104. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 30; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 232–33. While they remained at Velletri, the king wrote to the pope to demand the return of Cesare Borgia, but the pope pretended to know nothing about Cesare's plans. The king considered the treaty between the pope and

himself broken. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 359–61; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 543–44.

105. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 30; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 232–33. Actually the king did not go to Montefortino. This city was captured by Englebert de Cleves on 31 January 1495 and because its lord had supported Charles VIII and then deserted him for the Neapolitans, the city was sacked. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 544.
106. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 30; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 232–33. Most places submitted to the French without a fight. The lord of Monte San Giovanni, the marquis de Pescaire, had cut off the noses and ears of the French heralds who asked him to submit to the king. Therefore, after the city was taken, the French showed no mercy to any of the men of the city, although the women and children were supposed to have been protected. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 547–49; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 361–62.
107. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 30; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 232–33.
108. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 30–31; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 234–35.
109. The king entered Naples 22 February 1495. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 555; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 363.
110. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 31; Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 236–37; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 554.
111. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 31–32; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 236–41.
112. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 364–66; and Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII,* 582.
113. Rum designated the lands ruled by the Ottoman sultan that had been part of the Eastern Roman Empire. See Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 1–2, 4.
114. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 32–34; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 242–53.
115. Another important fact was that Cem had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was sometimes referred to in Ottoman documents as *hacı*, one who had performed the pilgrimage. Ménage, 'Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent,' 113, 115, 116, 122; and Uzunçarşılı, 'Cem Sultan'a dair,' 462, 472.
116. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 24; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 210–11.
117. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 7; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 144–45.
118. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 21, 23, 31; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 198–201, 204–5, 240–41.

119. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 14, 19; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 190–91.
120. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 22–26; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 212–17.
121. Many Christians were also disgusted by the popes' actions during this period. An example is Savonarola in Florence. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 2:505–507.
122. Mehmed Arif, *Vakı'at-ı Sultan Cem,* 21, 25; and Vatin, *Sultan Djem*, 198–99, 214–15. Muslims believe that their good and bad acts will be weighed in a balance at the judgment.
123. Since the author was writing for a Muslim audience, he may have wished to emphasize his own commitment to Islam.
124. See Cem's letters in Feridun, *Mecmu'a-i Munşeat,* 1:284–86; and Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan*, 49–50, 73.
125. Saddedin, *Tac-ut-tevarih*, 2:36–37; and Vatin, 'Macabre trafic,' 238.

Chapter 4 Allies with the Infidel: Joint Ottoman-French Naval Operations

1. An abbreviated version of chapters 4 and 5 was published previously as Christine Isom-Verhaaren, ''Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us': Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543–44,' *French Historical Studies* 30 (2007): 395–425.
2. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. This has been published as Sinan Çavuş, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*. For a discussion of authorship, see Hüseyin Yurdaydın's study of Matrakçı's *Beyān-ı menāzil-i sefer-i 'Irāḳeyn-i Sulṭān Süleymān Ḫān*, ed. Hüseyin Yurdaydın (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1976), 131–34.
3. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, Bibliothèque Nationale. For a discussion of an earlier version of the *Gazavat,* see Rhoads Murphey, 'Seyyid Muradi's Prose Biography of Hizir Ibn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa: Ottoman Folk Narrative as an Under-exploited Source for Historical Reconstruction,' *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungarium* 54 (2001): 519–32. The Paris manuscript of the *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa* is the only one that includes an account of the campaign of 1543–44. Matrakçı was associated with the court, Muradi with seafaring.
4. Süleyman's correspondence is found in the *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa,* Supplement Turc 1186, Bibliothèque Nationale; and in Süleyman to François concerning his making peace with Charles V in 1544, [1545],

12321 no. 226, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi; and in Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puisssances étrangères*.

5. Report of the man sent from the king of France to Süleyman [1543], E 635, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi.
6. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, Bibliothèque Nationale; Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 518–66; Charrière, *Négociations de la France*; Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires*; Du Bellay, *Memoires de Martin et Guillaume du Bellay*; Carloix, *Memoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux*; and Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*. Dorez, who edited *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, included a useful introduction and appendices drawn mainly from archival sources.
7. For studies that emphasize the theoretical, holy war perspective, see Géraud Poumarède, 'L'Europe de la Renaissance et l'Empire ottoman de la chute de Constantinople à la bataille de Lépante. Aspects culturels et politiques,' in *La Renaissance. Actes du Colloque de 2002 de l'Association des historiens modernists* (Paris: Presses de l'université de Paris, 2003), 47–95; Géraud Poumarède, 'Justifier l'injustifiable: l'alliance turque au miroir de la chrétienté (XVIe–XVIIe siècles),' *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* (1997), 217–46; and Géraud Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade: Mythes et réalites de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siécles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004).
8. See chapter 2 for more information about these two admirals.
9. Because Hayreddin only had control of Tunis from August 1534 until July 1535, this document must date to that year. Hayreddin Pasha to Süleyman, E 5532, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi. V.-L. Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest et de Marillac à Constantinople,' *Revue Historique* 76 (1901): 299, 308.
10. See François I to de la Forest, instructions, 11 February 1534 [1535], in Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:255–63. Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 300; and Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:392–93, 400. He did not want Süleyman to attack Hungary because although the Germans would help defend Habsburg lands in Austria, they would not help the Habsburgs in Italy.
11. Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 308; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:344.
12. Treaty between France and the Ottoman Empire, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:283–94; and Inalcik, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Imtiyazat.' Two important provisions in this treaty were that any subjects of the two sovereigns who were slaves in the hands of the other should be set free and that the ships of the two countries should salute each other when they met.

Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 309; Hurewitz*, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 1–5; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier*, 96–97.

13. French diplomats referred to Charles V as Süleyman's 'mortal enemy' and discussed the Ottomans' military preparations and campaigns, see The Bishop of Mâcon to Cardinal du Bellay, 19 June 1536, 4 July 1536, 21 July 1536, 28 July 1536, 14 October 1536, 26 October 1536, 6 December 1536, 8 December 1536, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:309–11, 321–23; The Bishop of Mâcon to the Duke of Montmorency, 11 January, 1537, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:323–24; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:406–10; Hess, *Forgotten Frontier*, 65; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 96, 98–101.
14. Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 314–15. Lutfi Pasha states that after François sent a letter to the sultan informing him of his naval preparations and arranging to meet at Avlona in order to attack Apulia, Süleyman sent Lutfi Pasha and Hayreddin Pasha with a fleet. Lutfi Pasha, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1922), 358–59.
15. A kind of galley. See Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, *Lingua Franca in the Levant*, 100–2; or barge, see Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, *Lingua Franca in the Levant*, 92–93.
16. Report of the news sent from the king of France to his ambassador with Süleyman [1537], E 2990, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, is a translation of the report that La Forest received. Lutfi Pasha, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman,* 359.
17. La Forest, who had remained at Avlona because he was ill, died there in September. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 91, 96, 101–105; Journal of the Voyage of the Baron de Saint-Blancard, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:340–41; and Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 324.
18. Knecht, *Francis I*, 286. Lutfi Pasha's account indicates the lack of coordination of the forces. After mentioning the letter sent by François arranging to meet at Avlona, Lutfi Pasha never mentions the French again in his account of the naval operations in Apulia and at Corfu that year. Lutfi Pasha, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman,* 359–62; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 105; The Bishop of Mâcon to Montmorency, 6 August 1537, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:336–37; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:430–33; and Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de la Forest,' 323.
19. Hayreddin had given them biscuit so they could return home from Corfu, but due to the weather, they went to Modon. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 108; and 'Journal of the Voyage of the Baron de Saint-Blancard' in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:351, 371–383.
20. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:423–27. This battle was significant because the Ottoman fleet defeated the combined fleets of Venice and Doria, the

only fleets capable of opposing the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Lutfi Pasha, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman,* 365–68; and V. J. Parry, 'The Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent, 1520–66,' in Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, 88–89.

21. For example, see Knecht, *Francis I,* 364–66.
22. According to the French representative in Istanbul, Hayreddin, as a result of his experiences in France in 1543–44, modified his position of promoting the Ottoman-French alliance to speaking against François's interests. Jean-Jacques de Cambray to François I, 7 July 1546, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1: 624.
23. Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606* (Vienna: VWGÖ, 1988), 123–126, 128; G. Veinstein, 'Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent,' in *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In memorian Vanco Boskov*, ed. H.G. Majer (Weisbaden, 1986), 182–83; and C. H. Imber, 'The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent,' *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 211–82.
24. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
25. See chapter 2 for information concerning Rincon.
26. Guillaume Pellicier, *Correspondence politique de Guillaume Pellicier, ambassadeur de France à Venice, 1540–42*, ed. Alexandre Tausserat-Radel (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière, 1899), 358.
27. He was known by contemporaries for the rapidity of his voyages and his many names, see Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 4:139–50; and Michel Montaigne, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 204. He had a remarkable career: beginning as a simple soldier, he became admiral of the French galleys. See La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:375–76.
28. Pellicier, *Correspondence politique de Guillaume Pellicier*, 386, 432, 537, 550; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 135–37; Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 4:141; and William Paget, English ambassador to France, to Henry VIII, 13 March 1542, in *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*, ed. J.S. Brewer, J. Gairdner and R. H. Brodie, (London: Public Record Office, 1862–1910), 17:73–75.
29. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 4:141; and Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, ambassador at Venice, to Charles V, 3 January 1543, in Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers, Spanish*, vol. 6, part 2, 193–96. The Spanish knew in January 1543 that the Ottoman fleet might go to Toulon. Du Bellay, *Memoires de Martin*, 4:50; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:377–78.

30. The Bishop of Montpellier to François I, 14 December 1541, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:525–27; and François I to the Diet of Nuremberg, 9 January 1543, in Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:558–61. Charles V's attack on Algiers ended in disaster in October 1541. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier*, 137; and Hess, *Forgotten Frontier*, 74.
31. Du Bellay, *Memoires de Martin*, 4:6; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 133.
32. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism*, 91–92; and William Bradford, ed., *Correspondence of the Emperor Charles V* (London: Richard Bentley, 1850), 545.
33. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 141; and Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane*, 1:37.
34. Incir limanı in Turkish, on the western side of Levkas. Piri Reis, *Kitab-i Bahriye* (Istanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1988), 2:691, 700.
35. Piri Reis calls Calabria 'Kalavri.' *Kitab-i Bahriye* (1988), 3:1023.
36. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 17a–18b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. A hüküm from the sultan to Hayreddin Pasha also mentions the attack on Reggio and the arrival at Antibes. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 7b, Bibliothèque Nationale. For more information concerning this letter, see below.
37. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 302–307. Historians have been using the version of the letter published in *Lettre di Principi*, Venice, 1581. It seems likely that the mistake was made not by the original author but by a careless editor when the collection was put together in the sixteenth century. Dorez notes that it is full of typographical errors. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxiv. Ursu, who compared a variety of sources, states that the date of departure given by this letter is improbable. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 141. Charrière states that this letter has the wrong date, 1545, in the collection. *Négociations de la France,* 1:557. Those who have accepted the date of departure given in this letter have been misled. Jean Deny and Jane Laroche state that Matrakçı's *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş* contradicts Giovio and the letter of the anonymous Venetian from Corfu. Deny and Laroche, 'L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer,' 188. Giovio must have had an incorrect chronology as well. Giovio's history has been widely accepted as accurate despite its contradictions by Ottoman and French primary sources. See chapter 5.
38. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 304–305.
39. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 326–29.
40. This letter from Polin to the governor provides additional evidence that Süleyman was overseeing the campaign, ensuring that Hayreddin conducted

it so as to promote French interests. Polin to the Governor of Terracina, 27 June 1543, in Gayangos, *Calender of State Papers, Spanish*, vol. 6, part 2, 557. Rhoads Murphey indicates that Hayreddin's subservience to the sultan had been questioned earlier. 'Seyyid Muradi's Prose Biography,' 520–21.

41. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:470.
42. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 151b–153b, Bibliothèque Nationale; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:378; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier*, 139; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxv; Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 21b, 23b–24a, 26a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; and *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 2a, 4a, 5b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
43. A *fuste* was a light, speedy, low draft galley with one or two oars per bench, frequently used for coastal shipping or raiding. Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, *Lingua Franca in the Levant*, 235; Imber, 'The Navy of Süleyman,' 279; and Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 252. *Nave*, or *nef* in French, is a general term for a round-hulled sailing ship, often applied to large merchant ships. Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower,* 253; and Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, *Lingua Franca in the Levant*, 315–16.
44. Deny and Laroche, 'L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de,' 201–202. This excellent article provides a French translation of Matrakçı's *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş* as well as a wealth of material from western sources.
45. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 2a–5a, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 24a, 25b–26a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
46. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 2a–3b, 4b–5a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
47. Vieilleville was a relative of d'Enghien and accompanied him to Marseilles. Carloix, *Memoires de la vie de Francois de Scepeaux,* 107.
48. D'Enghien sent biscuit for the Ottoman fleet on 2 and 3 August. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:382; C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 153b–154a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
49. The *Gazavat*'s account of this stratagem and its results agrees closely with that of Vieilleville. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 6a–7a, Bibliothèque Nationale; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:380; and Carloix, *Memoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux,* 100–01, 104–09.
50. A copy of this hüküm would have been written in the Mühimme Registers. However, the earliest surviving register is from 1545. The only knowledge we have of these particular orders is due to Muradi including them in this

history. Since their form is identical to the orders in the Mühimme registers, they seem to have been copied by the author from the archival copy or the actual order sent to Hayreddin Pasha. These orders were usually issued in response to a letter or petition sent by an individual to the Ottoman ruler. After addressing the recipient, the order from the sultan then repeats in some detail the information sent by the writer. In this way we know to a degree what was said in the original letter, although it may not have been preserved. For a detailed study of the documents in the Mühimme Registers, see Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552–1615: A Study of the Firman According to the Mühimme Defteri* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960).

51. For an English translation of this order, see appendix A. For a facsimile of the document with its transliteration, see Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'Ottoman-French Interaction, 1480–1580: A Sixteenth-Century Encounter' (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1997), app. A.
52. He probably wrote about 1 August.
53. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 7b–9a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
54. Report of the man sent from the king of France to Süleyman, E 635, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi. From internal evidence, it was written in 1543. For an English translation of this document, see appendix B. For a facsimile of the document with its transliteration, see Isom-Verhaaren, 'Ottoman-French Interaction,' app. B.
55. Of all the Christian rulers only the king of France was called padişah. In this document, Charles is referred to as kıral [king] and Henry VIII as bey [lord].
56. The Duke of Cleves, an ally of François I's since 1540, was forced to submit to Charles on 7 September 1543. This agent must have been sent before news of the duke's submission was known in France. Knecht, *Francis I,* 300–1, 363–64.
57. Charles was in Spires on 27 July. Charles met the pope at Bassetto near Cremona on 21–25 June 1543. Bradford, *Correspondence of the Emperor,* 537–38.
58. When he was asked, " 'When you went with the imperial [Ottoman] fleet was Marseilles ahead of Algiers or behind.' He answered, 'Algiers is a place three hundred miles ahead of Marseilles.' " Report of the man sent from the king of France to Süleyman, E 635, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
59. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 9a, Bibliothèque Nationale; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:378.
60. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 9a–9b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

61. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 10a–11a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
62. Imber, 'The Navy of Süleyman,' 218–220. According to Polin, Süleyman spent 1,200,000 ducats in order to prepare the fleet to send to François. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fol. 152, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 140.
63. Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:578n2.
64. Carloix, *Memoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux,* 119.
65. Du Bellay, *Memoires de Martin*, 4:188, 196–231.
66. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant,* 3:471.
67. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 26b, 28b–29b Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; *Gazavat*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 11b–14b, Bibliothèque Nationale; Monluc, *Commentaires,* 92; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 143–44; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:382–84.
68. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 30a–30b Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 15a–17b, 22b–23a, Bibliothèque Nationale; Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 144; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:384–85.
69. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 19b–20b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
70. See Süleyman's hüküm to Hayreddin. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 31a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. The archives of Toulon indicate that they arrived on 29 September. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 542.
71. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, folios 155a–156a, Bibliothèque Nationale; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxviii–xxxii; and 'Registers of the deliberations of the Council of Toulon' in Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 525, 557–58.
72. 'Registers of the deliberations of the Council of Toulon' in Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 525–28, 530.
73. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 21b, 23b–24b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
74. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols.25a 32a, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 133a–136a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. In the *Gazavat*, Hasan seemed to be

bringing permission to winter in Toulon, and in Matrakçı, he seemed to be bringing permission for the Ottomans to depart. Matrakçı did not mention any more concerning the Ottomans in Toulon. Matrakçı returned to the Ottoman Empire in 1543, so some of the Ottoman forces did leave at this time, while the majority of them remained in France. But in the *Gazavat*, it was at this point that Hayreddin made preparations to remain in Toulon.

75. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 558.
76. Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 559.
77. Knecht, *Francis I,* 377; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:382, 387; and C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fol. 153b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
78. A quintal is 56.449 kilograms, Imber, 'The Navy of Süleyman,' 281.
79. Grignan was repaid in March 1544, 6000 livres tournois for his expenses. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 158b–160b, 165b–166b, 167b, 243b, Bibliothèque Nationale; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxxiii–xxxv, 315; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 147.
80. 'Registers of the deliberations of the Council of Toulon' in Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 547–48, 554.
81. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, fols. 32b–33a, Supplement Turc 1186, Bibliothèque Nationale. Cities such as Marseilles, Venice, and Genoa were known to seize grain ships if threatened by famine. Braudel described a similar phenomenon concerning grain prices in the Mediterranean. Often when it became known that one region had had a poor harvest so grain was bringing high prices, so many merchants would send ships of grain to the area that prices would fall at that region but would rise in the surrounding districts. Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 1:331, 574–75.
82. Finkel, *Administration of Warfare,* 123–126, 128. Veinstein refers to orders that required an eight month supply. 'Some Views on Provisioning,' 178–79, 182–83.
83. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 243b–244a, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, 315–16.
84. 'Registers of the deliberations of the Council of Toulon' in Henry, 'Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque,' in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 544.

85. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 38b–39b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
86. François sought peace after the Anglo-Habsburg invasion of France began in May 1544. Knecht, *Francis I,* 367–70.
87. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 38b–40b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
88. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 168b–169a, 173a–174a, Bibliothèque Nationale; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:389–90; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier*, 152.
89. The French perspective on Hayreddin's actions at Marseilles is quite different from the Ottoman one, because releasing the galley slaves weakened the French naval forces. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:390; C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fol. 163, Bibliothèque Nationale; and *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 36b–38b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
90. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 169b–170a, Bibliothèque Nationale; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xlv; and *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 40b–41b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
91. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 43a–b, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 67, 95–99, 125–27, 135–37.
92. C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 169b–170a, Bibliothèque Nationale; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xlv–xlvi, xlix–l, lii, 137–39; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:393.
93. Süleyman to François concerning his making peace with Charles V in 1544 [1545], 12321 no. 226, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi. For an English translation of this document, see appendix C. For a facsimile of the document with its transliteration, see Isom-Verhaaren, 'Ottoman-French Interaction,' app. C.
94. Charrière, *Négociations de la France,* 1:593; and Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 158.
95. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François Ier,* 156–70.
96. Knecht, *Francis I*, 364–66; Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:470–73; and Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, 'The Maritime War between the Ottoman and Spanish Empires during the Time of Sultan Selim and Süleyman,' in *The Turks*, eds. Hasan Celal Güzel, et al. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), 3:291–92.

Chapter 5 Views of Infidel Allies: Records of Negotiating, Fighting and Traveling

1. J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450–1620* (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1985), 16. Hale provides no references in this section.
2. Deny and Laroche, "L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer," 194n25.
3. Vaughn, *Europe and the Turk*, 127.
4. Guillaume Farel to Jean Calvin, 30 May 1544, in Jacques Pannier, "Calvin et les Turcs," *Revue Historique* 180 (1937): 268–86.
5. For an excellent account of Habsburg propaganda as it relates to the expedition to Tunis in 1535, where Giovio and Del Vasto, among others, collaborated to portray this campaign as a crusade, see Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, "L'expédition de Tunis (1535): Images, interprétations, répercussions culturelles," in *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance*, ed. Bartolomé Bennassar and Robert Sauzet (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 1998), 75–132. See especially page 96n33, where she states that earlier William L. Eisler had criticized Frances Yates for uncritically accepting the claims of Charles V's biographers.
6. Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, "Charles V and the Ottoman War from the Spanish Point of View," *Eurasian Studies* 1 (2002): 161–82.
7. For an examination of French historiography in the sixteenth century, see Donald Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship*; and Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History*. François Furet provides a brief overview of French historiography in, "The birth of history in France," in Mandelbaum, *In The Workshop of History*, 77–98. For French historiography in the seventeenth century, see Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory*.
8. Geoffrey Atkinson, *La Littérature géographique*, 87, 102, 119, 134, 197 (entries not pages); and Deny and Laroche, "L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer," 162.
9. Eric Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 366–75.
10. Linda Susan Klinger, "The Portrait Collection of Paolo Giovio" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1991), 43. Giovio's *Commentario delle cose de' Turchi* was dedicated to Charles V. Esther Kafé, "Le Mythe Turc et son declin dans les relations de voyage des europeens de la Renaissance," *Oriens* 21–22 (1968–69): 167; Zimmermann, *Historian and the Crisis*, 121–22; and Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography,* 373.
11. Paolo Giovio, *Historiarum sui temporis*, 2:fol. 337, quoted in Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand*, xxxii.
12. Giovio obtained his information from del Vasto, the Habsburg commander. Zimmermann, *Historian and the Crisis,* 190–91.

13. Henry, "Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque," in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des documents inédits*, 518–19.
14. Michelet, *Histoire de France*, 9–10:418. The French were struggling to impose colonial rule on Algeria in 1876.
15. For example, the Ottoman translation of a letter from François concerning Jerusalem, stating, "I, Françesko, am by the grace of God ruler of the French country." E 6609, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi.
16. Nasuh Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 10b, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi. This has been published as Sinan Çavuş, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*.
17. This claim that Charles V is of Jewish descent may be an Ottoman view of what a Christian would find shameful rather than reflecting Ottoman prejudice against the Jews. The Ottomans knew of the Spanish rulers' persecution of the Jews, many of whom had found refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 11a–b, 12a, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi.
18. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 134b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
19. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 21b, 26a–26b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
20. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 25, 257–259.
21. Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires,* 92; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 41; and La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, 3:386. La Roncière usually relied on contemporary French sources in his history of the naval affairs of France.
22. Matrakçı, who had been educated in the palace school, was more interested in others who were members of the Ottoman administrative and military elite than with naval officers who may have reached their positions through demonstrating expertise at sea as corsairs. In contrast to Matrakçı, the author of *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa* did not provide the names of the sancak beys, but he did name Salih Reis and Hüseyn Çelebi who were important naval captains. Hüseyn was the nephew of Hayreddin according to Polin. Polin to François I, 14 March 1544, in Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 318. This author also named the captains whom Hayreddin Pasha freed from Genoa, giving extra information about Turgud Reis, another important corsair in Ottoman service. Muradi, the probable author, was interested in the naval officers of the Ottoman fleet. He had a long history of writing about naval matters and had assisted Piri Reis in writing his *Kitab-i Bahriye.*
23. I have not indicated those individuals who are of minor importance, such as the nameless messenger of the king of France. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 40a, Bibliothèque Nationale. I have also not

included individuals whose identity I have not been able to determine such as "chachaia del Gran Segnor." Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 26. I have also not included individuals who were not closely associated with the events of 1543–44, such as Sultan Cem. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 5b, Bibliothèque Nationale.

24. Henry, "Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque," in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 553; and Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 27, 314. "C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde produict et mect pardevers vous nosseigneurs les juges et commissaires depputez par le Roy, les quelles pièces il employe pour sa justiffication et deffence tant seullement." C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols. 159a, 159b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
25. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 12a, 13b, 14b, 21b, 26a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. He was known in French sources as an amazingly fast traveler. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 4:142.
26. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 5b, 7a–9b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
27. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 92.
28. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, 2:67.
29. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 31b–36b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; and *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 49a–50a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
30. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fol. 15a, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 30a, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
31. Dorez is basing this on Giovio. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxix–xxxi.
32. See Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, 3:445–47; and Parry, "Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent," in Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, 88–89.
33. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxx–xxxi.
34. J. R. Hale, "Armies, Navies, and the Art of War," in *New Cambridge Modern History*, ed. G. R. Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957–79), 2:507. For an analysis of the battle of Preveza, see Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 42–56.
35. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 2:35–36.
36. Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes,* 2:35n3; *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 11a, 15a–16b, 22b, 24b, Bibliothèque Nationale; Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 30a–30b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi; Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 316–317; and C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fols.

243a–245b, Bibliothèque Nationale. Monluc only states that the Ottomans went to winter quarters. *Commentaires,* 92. Guillaume du Bellay also only writes that Barbarossa saw that winter was approaching and retired his army to Toulon. *Mémoires de Martin*, 4:188; Deny and Laroche, "L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer," 195–96.

37. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 40b–41b, Bibliothèque Nationale; and Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 37, 41–43.
38. The style of the speech is that of Jean rather than Blaise. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 82, 913–14. Cardinal Jean du Bellay, bishop of Paris, was sent to Germany to the diet at Speyer in 1544, but he was not allowed across the borders. The embassy stayed at Nancy. Du Bellay composed an apology that he wished to deliver at the diet, but since the assembly was under the influence of Charles V, they refused permission and declared war against France. In this "celebrated piece" du Bellay justifies the policy of the king by examples from the Old Testament, Greek and Roman emperors, and treaties of alliance and commerce of Venice and Poland and other Christians with infidels. Charrière, *Négociations de la France*, 1:575.
39. Monluc, *Commentaires*, 82.
40. Monluc accurately relates the Old Testament accounts; see 1 Samuel 27–29, 1 Kings 15, and 2 Chronicles 14–16. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 82.
41. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 83–84.
42. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 84–85.
43. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 85–86.
44. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 87–91.
45. Monluc, *Commentaires,* 81–82.
46. Another individual who used the Bible to support his position in favor of the Ottoman alliance was François Sagan. François Sagan, *Apologie en defense pour le roy, fondée sur le texte d'Evangile contre ses ennemys et calumniateurs* (Paris, 1544). Pierre Danès, a French bishop, published *Apologie pour le roy contre les calomnies des Impériaux, avec une lettre missive du Turc à l'Empereur et de l'Empereur ou (sic) Turc, plus la Prinse de Tripoli et autres villes prinses par ledit Turc* (Paris, 1551). See Esther Kafé, "Le Mythe Turc," 163–64. Also see the note above about Cardinal Jean du Bellay's defense of the alliance.
47. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fols. 32a, 33b–36b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
48. Matrakçı, *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş*, Hazine 1608, fol. 131b, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi. Lutfi Pasha also records the incident. Lutfi Pasha, *Tarih-i Al-i Osman*, 433. "Mouley Hassan" went to Naples in 1540 after he was blinded by his son. Kafé, "Le Mythe Turc," 173; and Guy Turbet-Delof,

L'Afrique barbaresque dans la littérature française aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973), 77–78. Von Hammer recounts this incident in detail, mainly relying on Sagredo and Etrobius (in Chalcondyle). Hasan was forced to sign a humiliating treaty with Charles V in exchange for his help to regain the throne of Tunis. Von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman depuis son origine,* 5:120–26.

49. *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Supplement Turc 1186, fols. 17b, 19a, 21a–21b, Bibliothèque Nationale.
50. Poumarède, "Justifier l'injustifiable," 218–19, 229; Gilles Veinstein, "Sulayman the Magnificent and Christianity: The Limits of an Antogonism [sic]," *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 8 (2003): 160; Gilles Veinstein, "Charles Quint et Soliman le Magnifique: le grand defi," in *Carlos V : Europeísmo y universalidad : Congreso internacional, Granada, mayo de 2000*, 3:519–29 (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal Para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V : Universidad de Granada, [2001]); Jean Bérenger, *Histoire de l'empire des Habsbourg, 1273–1918* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 112; and Bunes Ibarra, "Charles V and the Ottoman War," 161–64.
51. For a view of relations between French ambassadors and Ottoman admirals in general, and Polin and Hayreddin Pasha in particular, that is not consistent with the Ottoman sources, see Jean Bérenger, "La collaboration militaire Franco-Ottomane à l'epoque de la Renaissance," *Revue Internationale d'histoire militaire* 68 (1987): 51–66.
52. Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* xxxii; Deny and Laroche, "L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer," 198–99; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française,* 3:386; and C'est l'inventaire des pièces que le seigneur de La Garde, Moreau 778, fol. 224a, Bibliothèque Nationale.
53. Letter from Lyon, 21 January 1544, in Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérome Maurand,* 311.
54. This painting was destroyed in the French Revolution. Henry, "Documents relatifs au séjour de la flotte turque," in Champollion-Figeac, *Collection des Documents Inédits*, 566.
55. Ernest Bossart, *Espagnols et Flamands au XVIe Siècle: l'Etablissement du Régime espagnol dans les Pays Bas et l'Insurrection* (Brussels, 1905), quoted in Geoffrey Parker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1559–1648," *Past & Present* 49 (1970): 73–74.
56. For a discussion of Islamic political movements, see James Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University, 2005), 290–99. See also Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2004).

57. Jacques Paviot is an exception in that he is interested in these men in relation to d'Aramon's embassy. Jacques Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon to the Porte: Scholars and Travellers in the Levant 1547–1553," in *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1987). The editors' introduction emphasizes the importance of the political context of Nicolay's mission to the Ottoman Empire. Nicolas de Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique*, ed. Marie-Christine Gomez-Géraud and Stéphane Yérasimos (Paris: CNRS, 1989), 17.
58. Fussell's study of travel books between the world wars provides insights that are applicable to the genre in general. Paul Fussell, *Abroad: British Literary Traveling between the Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 203. Rouillard, *Turk in French History* (Paris: Boivin, 1938), 364–65, 372–73.
59. The works of Postel and Gilles are not travel books in the sense that they are not a record of their travels. Postel mentions events that took place in the Ottoman Empire during his stay, and Gilles describes the ancient monuments of Istanbul. Postel, *De la Republique des Turcs*; and Pierre Gilles, *The Antiquities of Constantinople*, ed. Ronald G. Musto, trans. John Ball (New York: Italica Press, 1988).
60. Stephane Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman (XIVe–XVIe siècles)* (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société Turque d'histoire, 1991), 186–87; Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon," 32–33; Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief*, 107–22; and William Bouwsma, *Concordia Mundi: The Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel (1510–1581)* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 1–29.
61. Postel, *De la Republique des Turcs,* 1:20–21, 73.
62. Postel, *De la Republique des Turcs,* 1:40; 2c, d, 3–4; 3:Aiib, 69, 86.
63. Different sources give contradictory information about the date of his departure from France. Gilles, *Antiquities of Constantinople,* xviii; and Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 209.
64. Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 209–210; and Gilles, *Antiquities of Constantinople,* xvi–xx.
65. Gilles, *Antiquities of Constantinople,* 216.
66. Paul Delaunay, "L'aventureuse existence de Pierre Belon," *Revue du Seizième Siècle*, 9 (1922): 251–68; and 10 (1923): 2–34; George Huppert, "Antiquity Observed: A French Naturalist in the Aegean Sea in 1547," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 2 (1995): 275–83; Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 205–207; and Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon," 29–30.
67. Pierre Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses memorables trouvées en Grèce, Asie, Iudée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays estranges redigees en trois livres*

(Anvers: Christofle Plantin, 1555), 4b, 7b, 39a, 44a, 47a, 80a, 107a, 155b, 189b.

68. Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez,* 330a–330b.
69. Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez,* 121b, 244a, 248a, 254b, 368a.
70. Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 211–14; Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon," 30; and André Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. Frank Lestringant (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1985), 281.
71. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon*, 17–24.
72. A letter from Süleyman to Henri about the conquest of Van does not mention the French ambassador. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon,* 58, 83, 87–88, 263.
73. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon,* 100–150.
74. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon,* 152–167.
75. Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 219–220; Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon," 33–34; and Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, xiii–xv.
76. Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, 45, 86, 130, 144, 146–47, 159, 188.
77. Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, 76–77, 86, 180. Lestringant claims that a call for a crusade was "de rigeur" in writings relative to the Holy Land. Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant,* 181.
78. Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman,* 224–225; and Paviot, "The French Embassy of d'Aramon," 35–36.
79. D'Aramon to Henri II, 27 September 1550, 13 December 1550, 7 April 1551, 26 August 1551, in Ribier, *Lettres et memoires d'estat*, 2: 289–97, 303–308.
80. Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 12, 14.
81. Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 60–62, 75–76, 80, 93.
82. Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 28.
83. Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 66, 76, 108, 124.
84. Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 56–92.
85. Philippe du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, trans. M.H. Hauser (Paris, 1897; repr., Ferrières: Editions de Poliphile, 1986), viii–xxii; and Yerasimos, *Les Voyageurs dans l'Empire Ottoman*, 297–99.
86. See du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 152; and Mühimme Register, 21:407, Başbakanlık Archives; Mühimme Register, 22: 220, 245 Başbakanlık Archives; and Mühimme Register, 23: 20, Başbakanlık Archives.
87. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 28, 68.
88. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 73–74.
89. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 152.
90. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 182–83.
91. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 120, 147.
92. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 186.

93. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, xxxv.
94. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 130; Thevet, *Cosmographie de Levant*, 13; Nicolay, *Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique,* 47; Postel, *De la Republique des Turcs,* 3:1; and Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularitez,* 5.
95. Travel books perform the function of mediation between the dimension of specific places and the dimension of universal significance, Fussell, *Abroad,* 214.
96. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 1.
97. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 3.
98. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, 192.
99. Du Fresne-Canaye, *Le Voyage du Levant*, xxxv.
100. Selaniki, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, 657–58.
101. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, "Royal French Women in the Ottoman Sultans' Harem," 159–96.
102. Selaniki, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, 658.

CONCLUSION

1. Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 117.
2. Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton, *Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 75–76.
3. Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal in 202 BC near Carthage in North Africa. Tunis occupies the same site as ancient Carthage.
4. In 1535, Charles defeated Hayreddin and put Mulay Hasan back on the throne. In 1542 Hasan's son, Ahmed, eliminated his father and took the throne himself. Tunis was not under the control of the Ottomans, but Ahmed was not a supporter of Charles V either. This indicates that the religious divide was not so absolute as Charles pretended. See Hendrick J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen: Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis* (Doornspijk, Neth.: Davaco, 1989), 1:113, 147–27.
5. François Rabelais, *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, trans. J. M. Cohen (London: Penguin, 1955), 109–13.
6. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen*, 1: xi, 223.
7. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen*, 1: 260, 288.
8. Jean Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension*, 60.
9. Brantôme, Henry, and Michelet, see chapter 5. Deny and Laroche, 'L'Expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer,' 161–211.
10. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen*, 1: 228–14.

11. Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension,* 12–13.
12. Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension,* 13–14.
13. Brotton, *Trading Territories*, 114, 118.

Appendix A

1. This order from Süleyman to Hayreddin Pasha begins with a summary of the correspondence that Süleyman had received from Hayreddin, François I and from the French ambassador, Captain Polin. Süleyman then states his response to this information. The main issue of the order is how to provide for the fleet in France, since from the correspondence that he had received it appeared that the Ottoman fleet must remain in France over the winter. Süleyman complained that his correspondents had not given him detailed information concerning how the fleet would be supplied with provisions and other necessities over the winter, nor how they would be paid. Since this information was not available to the sultan, his response to the question we can infer Hayreddin asked, "Should the fleet remain in France or sail to an Ottoman port?" Süleyman replied that he could not answer this and informed Hayreddin that he must make this decision himself. But, and this is important for countering Habsburg propaganda that Hayreddin had an agreement with Doria not to attack him, Süleyman emphasized that Hayreddin must ensure that the fleet suffered no harm whatsoever as a result of his decisions.

Appendix B

1. The French held Villanova in Asti [Italy] in November 1543, see du Bellay.

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II. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul

TKS E 635	Report of the man sent from the king of France to Süleyman in [1543].
TKS E 2990	Report of the news sent from the king of France to his ambassador with Süleyman [1537].
TKS E 3286	Letter from Hüseyn to Bayezid [1483].
TKS E 5176	News sent from the French ambassador in Venice to Istanbul about Codignac [1556 or 1557].
TKS E 5454	Report on Cem's arrival at Rome in 1489.
TKS E 5457/1	Hüseyn to Bayezid [September–October 1482].
TKS E 5532	Letter from Hayreddin Pasha to Süleyman about his meeting with the French envoy at Modon and Tunis [1535].
TKS E 5873	Report concerning information received from the French ambassador at Venice [1548].
TKS E 6071/9	Letter from Bayezid to Louis XI [February 1483].
TKS E 6071/16	Letter from Hüseyn to Bayezid [Spring 1485].
TKS E 6594	News sent from Venice to the French ambassador [1532?].
TKS E 6609	Letter from François to Süleyman concerning the church in Jerusalem that was turned into a mosque [1526?].
TKS E 11982/3	Bayezid to d'Aubusson [December 1482].
TKS 12321, no. 226	Letter from Süleyman to François concerning his making peace with Charles V in 1544 [1545].

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